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ABSTRACT
Lindsay Reid: Generating a Quality Peace: Negotiated Settlements and Government Respect for
Rights in the Wake of Civil War
(Under the direction of Mark J.C. Crescenzi)
How can a quality peace be established in the wake of civil war? What role do peace agreements play in
shaping what peace looks like following the resolution of civil war? This dissertation builds and tests a
theory of how peace agreements and their contents influence the quality of post-conflict peace. Moving
beyond negative or minimalist definitions of peace, I define a quality peace as one that is politically
inclusive in nature. Specifically, I focus on two key components of a quality peace within this work:
women’s political rights and the political rights of societies more broadly. I argue that peace agreements
both constrain and incentivize actors to commit to more politically inclusive outcomes. As such, I assess
the extent to which peace agreements not only end war but go on to create a peace that is meaningful
for those living in post-conflict societies.
I identify two characteristics of peace agreements, their gender-specificity and context-specificity,
and argue that these characteristics influence progress made toward women’s political rights and broader
political inclusivity, respectively. Peace agreements, through their language, lay the framework for the
structures, behaviors, and norms of the post-conflict state; their content, through direct and indirect
mechanisms identified within this dissertation, influence progress toward a quality peace. I quanti-
tatively test the theoretical expectations on a set of civil war peace agreements signed between 1981
and 2011 using new data that I have collected on the gender-specificity and context-specificity of agree-
ments. I also present a number of case illustrations to assess the plausibility of the mechanisms identified
herein. In sum, this dissertation contributes strong evidence that peace agreements play a unique role in
shaping post-conflict societies, and it offers new data to strengthen understanding of when and through
which mechanisms peace agreements shape both the end of violence as well as the consolidation of
peace.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
...[T]he view that one cannot meaningfully work for both absence of personal violence and
for social justice can also be seen as essentially pessimistic, as some sort of intellectual
and moral capitulationism... [O]nce the double goal has been stated – that peace research
is concerned with the conditions for promoting both aspects of peace – there is no reason
to believe that the future will not bring us richer concepts and more forms of social action
that combine absence of personal violence with [a] fight against social injustice... There
are more than enough people willing to sacrifice one for the other – it is by aiming for both
that peace research can make a real contribution.
– Johan Galtung in “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” 19691
The 2002 signing of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding by the military commanders of
UNITA (Unia˜o Nacional para a Indepeˆndencia Total de Angola) as well as the Government of Angola
has been durable and successful in preventing the recurrence of civil war in Angola. The case of Angola,
though, reveals that conflict resolution must strive for more; in Angola, while war is over, structural
violence continues to manifest itself through social injustice and inequality. Galtung (1969) writes that
“Within this region [of peace] a tremendous amount of variation is still possible, making an orientation
in favor of peace compatible with a number of ideologies outlining other aspects of social orders” (168).
Galtung thus posits that while peace is indeed the absence of violence, peace itself comes in many forms.
While the Luena Memorandum of Understanding put an end to the violence that had endured for almost
1Galtung (1969, 186); Galtung writes that violence is present “when human beings are being influenced so that their actual
somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations” (168). He goes on to identify personal violence as
the type of violence specifically used by one person to directly harm another, and structural violence as violence that occurs
because it is built into the structure of society and leads to unequal power and unequal life chances (170–171).
1
three decades, an accomplishment that cannot and should not be understated, the peace emerging from
the agreement remained void of political, social, and economic opportunity or growth.
Since emerging from its lengthy civil war, Angola has been plagued by political, social, and eco-
nomic struggles. The current president, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, has been in power since 1979. Ac-
cording to the Polity IV Country Report on Angola from 2010, the opposition (UNITA) has accused the
Dos Santos government of destroying democracy in the country (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2010). In
2010 revisions to the country’s constitution, presidential elections were abolished; instead, the president
is now elected by the majority party in the legislature. At the same time, political freedoms are restricted
across the country, rendering political participation minimal. Gender disparities also plague Angola and
offer indication that peace is elusive for Angolan society. Women in Angola formed a number of orga-
nizations during the country’s civil war. As early as 1962, the Organization of Angolan Women (OMA)
was created as the women’s wing of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA);
in 1973, the Independent League for Angolan Women (LIMA) was created as the women’s wing of
UNITA. While women’s roles and importance varied throughout the conflict,2 women remained active
in various political and social capacities. Following the signing of the Luena Memorandum of Under-
standing, however, the vast majority of Angolan women were left out of all direct benefits set forth in
the agreement. Angola has avoided war recurrence since 2002, yet peace remains one that is marked
by inequality, injustice, and structural violence. In sum, Angola is in a state of peace (as defined by the
absence of war), but the country has a long way to go to consolidate a meaningful and just peace.
Liberia experienced two deadly episodes of civil war spurred by the Liberian government’s highly
exclusionary and corrupt practices. Indeed, the pre-war and interwar governments monopolized political
and economic power amongst a small class of elites. Following the second civil war, which began in
2000, Liberians put a durable end to their conflict with the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement in
2003. Members of the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
(LURD), and the Movement for Reconciliation and Democracy (MODEL) committed to negotiations
and reached an agreement to bring a durable end to Liberia’s war. In contrast to the case of Angola,
2OMA played an active role in supporting the MPLA and had an estimated 1.8 million members nationwide by 1983. LIMA,
on the other hand, had few ties to the UNITA leadership as male leaders of the group feared repercussions of being too closely
associated with women.
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Liberia offers indication that countries can and should strive for a higher quality peace in the post-
conflict period. While Liberia still faces a number of challenges stemming from issues such as poor
infrastructure, governmental corruption, and sexual violence, it has nonetheless been able to achieve
some of the very structures of justice and opportunity that Galtung described in his 1969 writing.
In the aftermath of civil war, Liberia has made positive strides toward inclusivity and opportunity
for many of its citizens. For example, the political activities of Liberians have been marked by greater
security and greater access. All significant groups, according to one account, have at least some access
to political power. President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who was elected in 2006 following the post-conflict
transitional period, has supported a Constitutional Review Committee which aims to increase the par-
ticipation of political parties, civil society groups and other groups within the political life of the state
(UN News Centre, 2013). Women, in particular, have gained a greater voice in Liberian politics. Thus,
Liberia has made strides toward a peace that is not only defined as the absence of personal violence,
but one that has greatly reduced structural violence as well. The legal and normative structures of the
state have made important progress toward a more inclusive and secure state; indeed, the post-conflict
environment in Liberia is one that is at the same time more meaningful and more hopeful for many in
society.
The preceding glance at Angola and Liberia illustrates that post-conflict states are far from a ho-
mogenous group. The term post-conflict itself contains within it a vast array of human outcomes and
realities, some positive and some negative. Whereas many post-conflict states have, like Angola, been
unable to move toward more positive dimensions of peace, countries such as Liberia have established
institutions and practices of inclusivity and opportunity. What accounts for the variation in what peace
actually looks like in post-conflict states? Perhaps more pointedly, how can civil wars be resolved in
ways that not only end war but also create a positive and meaningful peace? Peace is not established
when violence ends. Civil wars continue to inflict harm and suffering on populations even after the
fighting stops. Galtung (1969) challenges peace makers and peace researchers to strive for more, to
strive for a the creation of a peace that not only ends violence but also establishes structures of social
justice and equality. Within the framework that I develop, I argue that civil war resolution truly becomes
successful when a quality peace is established, or a peace that is both secure and politically inclusive in
opportunity. The goal of this dissertation is to evaluate the possibility of generating structures of justice
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and equality in post-conflict societies. Indeed, the goal is to grapple with how peace can be made mean-
ingful for those living in post-conflict societies. How, truly, can countries be guided out of the conflict
trap and move beyond the legacy of war?
A great disconnect exists between policymaking goals and scholarship on civil war resolution. While
scholarship on conflict resolution strives to measure determinants that end violence (either in the short-
or long-term), the policymaking community has been calling for, as United Nations Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated in 1992, more “comprehensive efforts to...consolidate peace.”3 Ending
war is the necessary first step in the search for peace, but it is only the beginning of the journey and it
is insufficient for the consolidation of peace. This dissertation tackles the concept of quality peace and
explores mechanisms through which the international community can work to increase the quality of
peace in the wake of civil war.
Within this dissertation, I build a theoretical framework and test the extent to which peace agree-
ments, in particular, influence the quality of peace following civil war. Specifically, I argue that the
contents of peace agreements shape the post-conflict peace through institutional constraints and incen-
tives. Peace agreements’ contents constrain actors to new institutions and policies while also incentiviz-
ing new behaviors, attitudes, and norms within societies. In the case of Liberia, the 2003 Accra Peace
Agreement incentivized inclusivity while also constraining actors from perpetuating exclusionary poli-
cies. Through direct and indirect mechanisms, the specific content of peace agreements helps to guide
countries away from a legacy of war.
In particular, the chapters of this dissertation focus on two distinct applications of the aforemen-
tioned theory. First, I posit that gender-specific peace agreements influence inclusivity and rights for
women in the post-conflict period, leading to tangible improvements in the quality of peace. Second,
I argue that the context-specificity of peace agreements shapes levels of political protections within
post-conflict societies.4 Across both sections, I contribute new data on the contents of peace agree-
ments; beyond using this data for the research questions herein, the data on the gender-specificity and
context-specificity of peace agreements can be applied to a number of questions about conflict resolution
3From “And Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping,” 31 January 1992.
4I define gender-specific agreements as those agreements that include provisions for women’s rights and context-specificity
as the extent to which peace agreements address the causes of conflict. More details can be found below.
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processes and post-conflict outcomes. In sum, this dissertation contributes strong evidence that peace
agreements are instrumental in shaping the environments within post-conflict societies, and it offers new
data to strengthen understanding of when and through which mechanisms peace agreements shape both
the end of violence as well as the consolidation of a quality peace.
Puzzle and Motivations
Why are some countries, such as Liberia, able to make strides toward a higher quality peace while
others, like Angola, remain plagued by widespread structural violence? In other words, what can peace-
makers do to achieve Galtung’s calls for promoting both negative and positive dimensions of peace?
The research presented here focuses on peace agreements as defining tools in achieving a peace that is
both durable and meaningful. Peace agreements, documents that are crafted by both domestic and in-
ternational actors to lead countries out of war, are roadmaps for the post-conflict realities that states will
face. As former U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali pointedly states, international efforts to guide
countries out of the grips of civil war require extensive attention to identify and strengthen structures
that facilitate the consolidation of peace. Moreover, he states that peace agreements themselves can be
harnessed as mechanisms to advance and consolidate peace in the post-conflict period. Peace agree-
ments, in this account, can be crafted to not only end violence but also establish institutions that foster
political, social, and economic opportunity for populations emerging from war.
In spite of all that is known about peace agreements and the resolution of civil war, the negotiated
settlement of civil wars often seems destined for failure. Negotiated settlements such as the 1993 Arusha
Accords, signed to end the Rwandan civil war, and the 1994 Lusaka Protocol in Angola did little to end
the long-running and violent conflicts that plagued those states. In Rwanda, a genocide resulting in the
deaths of an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus occurred just months after the signing of
the agreement. While the country has only experienced minor levels of physical violence over the past
several years, key political, social, and economic challenges remain as the country moves further along
the path to peace. In Angola, in spite of the comprehensiveness of the Lusaka Protocol, war resumed
across the country soon after its signing. Why do so many civil war peace agreements fail to put a
lasting end to violence? While the normative goal in negotiating settlements to end civil war is to end to
violence and prevent future human suffering, many agreements are designed in short-sighted ways. If
5
the goal is the creation of a long-lasting peace in the wake of civil war, why do so many agreements lack
the mechanisms necessary to build not only a durable, but also a self-enforcing and equitable peace?
A key shortcoming within peace efforts and within extant work on civil war resolution can be identi-
fied in policy-makers’ and scholars’ visions of conflict resolution success. At the most basic level, civil
war resolution success is often marked by the signing of an agreement, whether it be a ceasefire or a
more comprehensive peace agreement. More “advanced” definitions of resolution success measure the
concept as the creation of a durable peace. A subset of this more advanced definition imply that civil
wars have been successfully resolved if the subsequent peace lasts a set number of years. Another subset
of these studies posit that the longer lasting peace is following a civil war, the more successful the reso-
lution process has been. While these conceptualizations of civil war resolution success have generated
much knowledge and contributed important insights into the civil war resolution process, they are all
plagued by a common flaw. Each of these definitions of successful civil war resolution assume peace to
mean the absence of violence at levels associated with war. If violence is occurring but does not reach
the 1,000 battle-death threshold, is that really peace? As Galtung (1969) identifies, these definitions
of success rely on the idea of a negative peace, or a peace that is defined by the absence of personal
violence.
Crocker and Hampson (1996) reiterate, however, that success can and should be measured in a
number of ways when studying conflict resolution. They write:
In some circumstances, success can legitimately be defined as the avoidance of major set-
backs or disasters. In others, success may mean a marginal improvement in stabilizing,
containing, and checking the human price and territorial spread of a volatile struggle. Fi-
nally, success may entail constructing building blocks for a settlement or even obtaining full
implementation, complete with resolution of the underlying issues (Crocker and Hampson,
1996, 62).
At present, defining success as the signing of an agreement or the creation of a lasting peace aligns
with the first two components of success that Crocker and Hampson identify. What is needed, is the
exploration of the third dimension of success, a systematic and empirical effort to assess how success
in conflict resolution is not only the cessation of war but also the creation and consolidation of a quality
peace.
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Why, more specifically, are current definitions of civil war success not enough? What are the impli-
cations of continuing to measure success as has been done in the past? If scholars and policy-makers
do not conceptualize success in longer-term or more nuanced ways, they will remain bound to pro-
cesses that end violence but stop short of creating political environments that provide broader forms
of personal security. By relying on short-term and/or minimalist definitions of success, scholars are
identifying ways to avoid war recurrence but they are not identifying ways to create a sustainable and
self-enforcing quality peace. Current work offers a vast number of recommendations to increase the
likelihood that a negotiated settlement will put an end to war, but it does not adequately say how ne-
gotiated settlements generate peace. The factors that end war are not necessarily sufficient to create
peace; ending war is but the first step of many needed to create peace. This dissertation focuses on what
happens when war ends and how the settlement process shapes positive peaceful outcomes.
Of course, the distinction between the end of war and the creation of peace is not entirely new but it
has yet to be studied in a rigorous way. Galtung (1969), for example, discusses definitions of peace and
violence and writes of the concepts of negative and positive peace. Negative peace, which captures the
current conceptualization of successful civil war resolution, is simply the absence of personal violence.
Positive peace, on the other hand, describes a state that is free from structural violence as well. A
positive peace relies on concepts such as social justice and a more egalitarian distribution of power,
resources, and opportunity. As an example, Galtung (1969) writes: “if people are starving when this is
objectively avoidable, then violence is committed, regardless of whether there is a clear subject-action-
object relation” (171). Empirical work within political science needs to pay more focus to this idea of a
positive peace or, to use the term that will appear throughout this work, the quality of the peace. If the
ways currently identified to resolve civil wars merely create a negative peace but do nothing in terms
of social, economic, and political justice, then scholars and practitioners are missing a key component
in long-term, durable civil war resolution. Peace research, as Galtung wrote nearly half a century ago,
must strive for more.
Current definitions of resolution success may help explain why numerous peace agreements and
negotiated settlements are so prone to failure. Scholars and policy-makers have identified a number
of key mechanisms that minimize the risk of war recurrence in the immediate wake of conflict, but
they have done little to explore the type of peace that is created. The Sudanese Comprehensive Peace
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Agreement, for example, ended violence at levels associated with war between the government’s forces
and the SPLM/A, but it did not create a peace that spread to all groups in the country nor did it generate
a stability amenable to economic growth, political and social inclusivity, or general human development
and security. As such, I have tasked myself with generating a better understanding of the quality of
peace emerging from civil war resolution and the ways in which such a quality peace can be achieved.
How can civil wars be resolved and peace agreements be designed so as to create a quality peace that
is more than the absence of war? Ending war, although essential, should not be seen as the end game.
Giving attention to the quality of peace is a necessary second step in helping societies truly escape the
grips of civil war.
While much research has been done to investigate how peace is reached following civil wars, much
less is known about the nature or quality of peace emerging from civil conflicts. Many countries are
stuck in a conflict trap, experiencing recurring instability and civil war. Are there shortcomings in
the civil war resolution process and ensuing peace that preclude lasting peace and leave countries in the
conflict trap? I argue that the quality of post-conflict peace is a crucial component in preventing recurring
conflict. Peace is not peaceful for some; although the physical fighting may end in countries recovering
from civil war, many post-civil war societies still experience ongoing conflict and struggle. The main
research question I seek to explore, then, is how a high-quality peace can be established following a civil
war. In approaching this question, I am pushing further than previous studies of civil war resolution.
By answering these questions and creating this extension of the civil war resolution literature, I hope to
generate a more nuanced understanding of what a quality peace is and how, in practice, a quality peace
can be created. In sum, this work explores the way in which the post-civil war peace can become more
peaceful for those people who are living in countries recovering from the atrocities of civil war.
Definitions and Overview of a Quality Peace
With the puzzle now established and the motivations for studying the quality of post-civil war peace
outlined, I now turn to address the definition of a quality peace. In the broadest sense, a quality peace is a
peace that is politically, economically, and socially inclusive in nature. In other words, it is one that is not
marked by systematic exclusions, discriminations, or violence based on gender, race, ethnicity, religion,
social class, or political leaning. Within the empirical chapters that follow, the quality of peace is more
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specifically defined as the extent to which the majority of citizens in a country enjoy basic political rights
and freedoms.5 In his own work on political inclusion and civil war recurrence, Call (2012) defines
political inclusion as the opposite of exclusion, or more specifically, “behavior that does not exclude
former parties...from access to state positions in ways contrary to their expectations” (39). I extend
Call’s definition in that I do not exclusively focus on warring parties. Instead, the dependent variable of
interest within this dissertation is one that looks at political inclusion as the extent to which groups in
society can securely exercise political voice and access positions of political power. As countries move
toward greater political inclusion, they are making strides away from the legacy of war toward a higher
quality peace.
Before proceeding further, I must emphasize that a quality peace has many dimensions; a quality
peace encompasses the entirety of positive peace and social justice outlined by Galtung (1969). I choose
to focus on the political dimensions of a quality peace for the following reasons: (1) political inclusion
and exclusion shape the stability and legitimacy of the post-conflict state and are thus a crucial pillar of
quality peace, and (2) most peace settlements are themselves focused on political goals and reforms so
one would expect that, if peace agreements influence the quality of peace, their effects should manifest
themselves first and foremost in the political life of the state. Future work on quality of post-conflict
peace must, undoubtedly, investigate the economic and social dimensions of quality peace.6 As the
field of peace research moves beyond definitions of peace that rely on the negative conception of peace,
research must strive to broaden the scope of quality peace so as to better understand the many pathways
through which countries can be guided out of the conflict trap.
The quality of peace is not only important in that a high quality peace takes countries out of the
grips of the conflict trap; a high quality peace also brings benefits to the people on the ground who
have lived through the destruction of war. Ending violence brings relief to those who have survived a
civil war, a relief whose importance cannot be adequately captured in words. But as days, months, or
even years pass without the quality of peace improving, people become disillusioned and dissatisfied;
5At the same time, I want to emphasize that I do not intend to conflate quality of peace with democracy, per se. As will
be discussed in later chapters, prescribing democratic institutions as a one-size-fits-all solution can be both dangerous and
destabilizing. While a quality peace may be democratic, it need not be.
6For example, any number of the following measures could also serve as indicators for the quality of peace and represent
a more positive way to define conflict resolution success: socioeconomic (in)equality, educational opportunities, health care
provisions, level of corruption, rule of law, access to justice, and basic infrastructure.
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peace is not peaceful for many if the political, social, and economic situation does not improve for
most of the population. Systematic political exclusion, corruption, and insecurity do not qualify as war
recurrence and therefore they would go unnoticed by Correlates of War or UCDP databases. They do
qualify, however, as a form of violence against a population (Galtung, 1969). Although countries such
as Angola, Sudan, and Coˆte d’Ivoire are no longer at war, peace remains elusive.
Literature
In what follows, I discuss extant literature falling under two broad categories. First, I focus on what
is known about negotiated settlements and their role in ending violence. In general, work on negotiated
settlements has focused on two key components of civil war peace agreements. Research has found
that both third-party enforcement as well as power-sharing institutions contribute to the successful and
durable resolution of civil wars. Second, I present the very limited work that has thus far been done
regarding the quality of post-conflict peace. Perhaps more accurately, I highlight how a number of
scholars have suggested that the quality of peace is a crucial dimension of civil war resolution, but that
little systematic work has been done to pursue such research. I emphasize in this section, as I have
previously, that more work must be done to extend the bounds of current definitions of civil war reso-
lution success. If scholars and practitioners want to strive to end both personal violence and structural
violence, then greater focus must be placed on the means to establish a quality peace.
Resolving Civil War Through Negotiated Settlement
Negotiated settlements are incredibly difficult to achieve and even more difficult to sustain. Of the
65 civil wars that were fought between 1900 and 1989, only 11 were resolved through negotiation.
Moreover, only one-third of negotiated settlements of “so called ’identity’ civil wars” have resulted in
a lasting peace (Crocker and Hampson, 1996, 55). A more recent study by Walter (2002) finds that 62
percent of all negotiations that occurred between 1940 and 1992 resulted in a signed bargain however
only half of these bargains were actually enforced and implemented. The most dire challenge, then, is
not necessarily getting disputants to the negotiating table or even getting disputants to sign an agreement.
Instead, Walter (2002) and others recognize that the most difficult phase of civil war resolution is the
implementation of agreements and the subsequent creation of a sustainable and durable peace. To
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this, I add that another challenge is not only creating agreements and peace processes that create a
durable end to war; agreements and peace processes must also be concerned with creating a quality
peace that extends basic political rights and freedoms to all portions of society and that is inclusive of
underrepresented segments of the population.
Given that peace agreements have a less-than-stellar history as a mechanism for ending wars, do
such negotiated settlements matter and if so, how? Fortna (2003), looking at interstate wars, finds evi-
dence that agreements are more than just scraps of paper. Scholars and practitioners alike cannot write
off negotiated settlements as a means for resolving conflict. Works by the likes of Walter (2002), Fortna
(2003), and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) thus confirm that the content of peace agreements matters
greatly. When agreements include specific mechanisms such third-party guarantees or specific insti-
tutional arrangements, the agreement will render a durable peace more likely. The research on peace
agreements, then, has moved from whether or not peace agreements work at all to a more nuanced
analysis of how they work and what conditions increase their likelihood of success in the long term.
Research on peace agreements and peace implementation has emphasized the unparalleled impor-
tance of giving attention to the mechanisms embedded within peace agreements. Much work has focused
on the importance of revising the security and military environment in the wake of civil war (see e.g.
Stedman, 2002; Mattes, 2008; Mattes and Savun, 2009, 2010; Walter, 2002). Crocker and Hampson
(1996) posit that “a well-led implementation can transform the climate that develops among the parties,
making possible compromises and deals that would have been unthinkable before the settlement” (57).
Similarly, Hampson (1996) asserts: “For peace settlements to succeed third parties must entrench and
institutionalize their role...” (23). Why should agreements be sure to include provisions for verifica-
tion or enforcement by third parties? Most prominently, Walter (2002) posits that third-party security
guarantees serve as a promise that the third party will intervene if one group decides to renege on a
bargain and take advantage of its opponent. Thus, the third party serves to mitigate commitment prob-
lems and reduce incentives of belligerents to renege on their agreement.7 More broadly, third parties
7While I do not dispute the importance of third-party enforcement, I do push back on Walter’s assertion that the resolution
of the underlying issues of a conflict is not sufficient to convince combatants to accept and implement a peace agreement. As
an agreement addresses more of the disputants’ grievances and establishes a web of institutions to consolidate peace in the
post-conflict period, the likelihood of implementation will also increase. My claim finds some support in the literature (see e.g.
Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, 2007; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001; Sisk, 1996). In fact, Mason and Fett (1996) find no
evidence that international intervention increases the likelihood of a negotiated settlement of civil war. However, Mason and
Fett (1996) concede that this finding is “surprising, given the pervasiveness with which outside intervention is mentioned in
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“verify and monitor compliance with an agreement, provide security for combatants..., and reduce in-
centives to cheat” (Walter, 2009, 255). Outside parties can actually serve to “manipulat[e] the utility
function of combatants,” a process which renders fighting or war recurrence to be a less attractive option
(Addison and Murshed, 2002, 499). Mattes and Savun (2009) refer to such third-party guarantees as
a fear-reducing provision in that third-party guarantees “are designed to reduce belligerents’ insecurity
and fear about future actions of their adversary” (740). Moreover, monitoring and enforcement by third-
parties can reduce uncertainty and thus mitigate the information asymmetries which often lead to civil
war recurrence (Mattes and Savun, 2010).
On the other hand, a broad line of research has also argued that the institutional arrangements set
forth in agreements matter for the probability of conflict resolution success; power-sharing institutions
have been flagged as a crucial component to rebuild peace in divided societies (see e.g. Hartzell and
Hoddie, 2003, 2007; Walter, 2002; Mattes and Savun, 2009). For durable peace, a civil war settlement
must be generated in a way that includes new or revised institutions that reduce the security fears of
disputants. The most common institutional focus is on power-sharing institutions, or institutions that
offer guarantees that all groups control some share of political, economic, territorial and/or military
power. Using the model of consociational democracy as a foundation (see Lijphart, 1969), the literature
on power-sharing generally argues that the institutional distribution of power between former belliger-
ents has clear and important implications for the trajectory of civil war resolution. As Hartzell and
Hoddie (2007) suggest, power-sharing and power-dividing institutions offer “an opportunity for former
combatants autonomously to overcome mutual distrust and lay the foundations for an enduring peace”
(92). Beyond assuaging mutual distrust, Mattes and Savun (2009) emphasize that power-sharing pro-
visions, by ensuring that no group single-handedly controls the government or security forces, reduce
the fear of former belligerents. Such institutions signal to disputants that they will not become victims
of systematic discrimination, exclusion, or violence. The very willingness of an agreement’s signato-
ries to endure and enforce the implementation of power-sharing institutions entails costs that signal the
peaceful intentions of disputants (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, 2007).8
the literature as a determinant of civil war outcomes” (561). The non-finding could be indicative that international intervention
is not a necessary component of civil war resolution; on the other hand, the non-finding could be a by-product of a mediocre
measure. In certain cases, then, third-party enforcement may not be a necessary condition for the successful resolution of war.
8While recognizing the importance of power-sharing provisions, Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) assert that not all power-sharing is
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Beyond the formula of third-party guarantees and power-sharing institutions identified above, I sug-
gest that greater attention must be given to the contextual needs of the disputants and the civil war
environment. While power-sharing and third-party guarantees are two examples of provisions that tend
to increase the durability of settlements, their utility varies from case to case. Werner and Yuen (2005),
in this vein, do not argue in favor in any particular institutional arrangements per se; instead, they
posit that the arrangements of a negotiated settlement must “reflect broadly the belligerents’ convergent
expectations about the military consequences of no agreement” (2005, 262). In other words, Werner
and Yuen argue that certain agreements are vulnerable to failure as belligerents update their beliefs
post-agreement and conclude that renewed fighting would create greater gains than remaining at peace.
Agreements, then, must be designed to mitigate the danger of such revisions to belligerents’ beliefs.
Agreements must address the underlying causes of conflict and reflect the distribution of power of the
disputants in a way that both minimizes the utility of war in comparison to peace and creates costs for
reneging on the settlement.
A peace agreement can serve many functions, as highlighted above, ranging from providing in-
formation and reducing uncertainty to increasing the likelihood of commitment to peace. Negotiated
settlements hold the potential to alter the incentives of disputants, put an end to conflict, and as I will
explore in more detail, lay the foundations for a quality peace. With that said, agreements are not a
panacea to conflict – they are but one component of a web of mechanisms that contribute to the gener-
ation of a quality peace. In the following section, I engage the limited body of work that has thus far
pushed beyond negative conceptions of peace.
The Quality of Post-Conflict Peace
Above, the discussion of negotiated settlements suggests two key findings. For civil war resolution
to be “successful,” settlements should include provisions for different types of power-sharing institutions
and assurances of third-party monitoring and enforcement. A key area that warrants greater research
created equally; military and territorial power-sharing generate more durable peace but the implementation of political power-
sharing provisions does not necessarily increase prospects for a self-enforcing peace. The authors argue that the underlying
mechanisms behind this dynamic revolve around the costs of implementing different types of power-sharing. Because military
and territorial pacts entail such high costs and great concessions, they serve as stronger signals of a commitment to peace. The
work by Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) indicates the need for a more nuanced understanding of the contents of peace agreements
and how different provisions have the potential to influence the prospects for peace in very different ways. Even power-sharing,
then, cannot be treated as a one-size-fits-all solution for civil conflicts.
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Table 1.1: A Sample of Studies of Civil War Resolution and their Measures of Success
Study Dependent Variable Explanatory Variables Definition of War
Mason and Fett (1996) Negotiated War duration and COW
settlement prob. of victory
Hartzell (1999) Peace endures Settlement COW
at least 5 years institutionalization
Walter (2002) “Peace Process” Third-party enforcement COW
(categorical) and power-sharing
Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) Peace duration Power-sharing COW
in months
Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) Peace duration Military pacts UCDP
in years and territorial pacts
Mattes and Savun (2009) Peace duration Political power-sharing, COW & UCDP
in months third-party guarantees, (1,000+ BDs/yr)
and cost-increasing provisions
Mattes and Savun (2010) Peace duration Uncertainty-reducing provisions COW
in months (includes third-party monitoring)
Nilsson (2012) Peace duration Civil society inclusion UCDP
in years
is how peace agreements and their contents influence not only the end of war but also the quality of
peace. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the definitions of successful resolution as found in a number of
prominent studies of civil war resolution. Most of the studies’ dependent variable – successful resolution
of civil war – is operationalized as the duration of peace, either in months or in years. As I have stated
already, though, these studies are measuring success as the absence of war recurrence, a negative peace.
They do not consider the nature of the peace following conflict; in other words, extant work does not
consider the quality of peace in their measures of success. Of course, this is not a flaw of existing
studies; it is undoubtedly important to understand when and how wars can be ended. On the other hand,
it is equally or perhaps more important to understand how peace can be consolidated and a quality peace
can be established so as to truly remove countries from the grips of civil war. A pessimist would contend
that in most countries recovering from civil war all one can hope for is the avoidance of violence. If
that is all one hopes for, however, that is all one gets. Places such as Northern Ireland and South Africa
still struggle with the legacies of violent conflict yet they have moved beyond the shadow of conflict to
achieve a more inclusive and higher quality peace. These societies and others that are on the trajectory
away from civil war demonstrate that the quality of the peace post-conflict is a measure of success worth
striving for.
Of course, the United Nations has already recognized the need to think about the nature or quality
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of peace. Moreover, the UN has repeatedly emphasized that the creation of a quality peace will, beyond
improving the lives of those within post-conflict societies, reduce the likelihood of violence in the long-
run. A United Nations Security Council (2001) Presidential Statement on peacebuilding posits:
The Security Council recognizes that peacebuilding is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the
recurrence or the continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of
political, development, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms. This
requires short- and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies
sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustain-
able development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable
governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and
the promotion of a culture of peace and nonviolence (UNSC, 2001).
Policymakers at the international level, then, have recognized the need to address inequalities, generate
a respect for human rights, and create institutions that promote “a culture of peace.” Empirical work in
political science, however, has been slow to integrate these recommendations. The preponderance of
work on civil war resolution focuses on ending violence. This dissertation takes a big step to engage the
call of the United Nations by considering how to achieve a quality peace that is socially, politically, and
economically inclusive in nature.
Limited scholarly work has considered the quality of post-conflict peace and its importance for civil
war resolution. Crocker and Hampson (1996) concur with the works discussed above regarding the
importance of strong, well-crafted political institutions and third-party oversight; they also, however,
recognize the need to consider the nature of the post-conflict environment. They write: “Without peace
there can be no justice. Without justice, democratic institutions, and the rule of law, the peace itself will
not last” (Crocker and Hampson, 1996, 68). For peace to be sustained, then, it is necessary to strive
for more than a negative peace. Call and Cousens (2008) reiterate this point, writing that a significant
number of armed conflicts relapse to war, and many ‘new’ wars occur in countries that have failed to
consolidate peace. Call (2012), in seeking to assess why peace fails in post-civil war societies, identifies
a key variable that plays a causal role in civil war recurrence: political exclusion (even more so than
social and economic factors). Political inclusion, he writes, does not have to be in the form of power-
sharing; whatever form it comes in, political inclusion contributes to the consolidation of peace. Walter
15
(2004), as well, cites political variables as mitigating the risk of conflict recurrence. She finds that
higher quality of life and greater access to political participation do decrease the likelihood of civil war
recurrence. Additionally, she demonstrates that countries with higher levels of economic well-being and
more open political systems are, again, less likely to face civil war recurrence. The need to think beyond
the cessation of violence to the ways in which a quality peace can be established and consolidated is
thus evident.
Beyond political and economic aspects that influence the quality of post-conflict peace, scholars
have also pointed to human rights protections as a key goal in peace processes. Crocker and Hampson
(1996) point out that third parties involved in peace processes can and should help to promote new norms
and codes of conduct in post-conflict societies. They write that both economic and social reconstruction
are essential in pursuit of successful peace processes. Their work provides initial support for the need to
look more deeply into the quality of peace, broadly defined, in studies of civil war resolution. Stedman
(2001), without using the term quality, gets at the quality of peace issue and confirms the importance
of human rights in consolidating a quality peace. He posits: “Two low-cost opportunities that should
be pursued during implementation are civilian security, through police and judicial reform, and local
capacity-building for human rights and reconciliation” (3). Why, though, are such security and human
rights mechanisms important, if not to end conflict? Stedman (2001) continues on to state: “Although
the study did not identify a single case where a failure to pursue these opportunities undermined imple-
mentation, it found that the potential long-term benefits of security reform and local capacity-building
for peace building warrant the relatively inexpensive investments that such measures require” (3). Cer-
tain policies are not necessary to end conflict, but they are necessary to bolster the quality of the peace.
In sum, peace agreements that are aimed not only at ending war but at strengthening the quality of the
peace must include these “extra” policies of human rights, security, and inclusivity, even though they
are not in and of themselves necessary to stop the fighting.
Within the past couple of years, an increasing focus within peace research has turned to the quality
of peace. Wallensteen (2015) asserts that, in the absence of dignity, a country has not achieved a quality
peace, but has only reached a postwar period. The end of violence does not directly translate to the
creation of peace. Wallensteen (2015) goes on to write:
The negative formulation [of peace] has the advantage of being clear, easy to understand,
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and even to measure universally over time and space. But the postwar situation may still
be unsatisfactory in other respects... Thus the quality of the relationships is of importance.
Equity may mean deliberate redistribution of resources from rich to poor, for the purpose
of improving quality of life for the latter... It may serve to reduce ostentatious inequalities
in society that otherwise may prompt opposition (16-17).
Wallensteen thus captures the necessity of pushing beyond negative conceptions of peace. Both re-
searchers and policymakers must keep in mind the dignity, equity, and security of all people as they
seek to achieve settlements to conflict.
Although scholarship is beginning to catch up to calls by the international community to focus on
not only peace but quality peaceful outcomes, much more research is needed to better understand the
sources of a quality peace. In particular, this dissertation analyzes how peace processes and their content
influence the quality of peace. In the next section, I present an overview of the theory. Peace agreements,
I argue, are quasi-constitutional documents (Bell, 2006) and as such, they establish the legal framework
for the post-conflict state. I thus expect the contents of peace agreements to directly and indirectly shape
what peace looks like for those living in post-conflict societies. Beyond ending violence, the contents of
peace agreements have tangible effects on what peace looks like for those in post-conflict societies. The
policy implications of the theory and findings herein, while complementary to extant works on civil war
resolution, are important on their own for they show that actors can increase the likelihood of achieving
a quality peace if they pay close attention to the contents and substance of negotiated settlements.
Theory
Thus far, I have addressed what is meant by the quality of peace, why its study is important in moving
forward scholarly understanding of civil war resolution, and how extant work has yet to achieve any
systematic study of quality peace.9 This section presents the theoretical framework of this dissertation,
a framework which identifies peace agreements as instrumental in shaping the quality of peace. First, I
further discuss what is meant by the quality of peace and why, in a global sense, a deeper understanding
of peace (beyond the cessation of violence) matters for theories of war and peace. Second, I consider the
9With the exception of Wallensteen (2015).
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ways in which the quality of peace can be bolstered, and I give specific attention to how peace processes
and agreements influence the quality of peace. Whereas countless theories of war exist, a more nuanced
theory of peace – specifically, the quality of peace – will generate much new insight into the occurrence
and consolidation of peace following civil war.
The establishment of a quality peace represents a move by a formerly war-torn country away from
the grips of war. It demonstrates that peace, in a positive sense, is consolidating or consolidated. It
represents a deeper goal, one that does not stop at the cessation of violence but pursues opportunity
and protection for broad portions of a population. I define the quality of peace as the extent to which
the majority of a population enjoys basic political rights as well as the extent to which historically
excluded and underrepresented groups such as women and minorities are free from systematic political
exclusions in the wake of conflict. Quality peace, then, is taken to be a positive formulation of peace
in this framework, to use the words of Galtung (1969). I do not reject the extant notions of civil war
resolution success that rest on negative conceptualizations of peace. I do, however, posit that scholars
and policymakers must consider a wider, or loftier, definition of peace when considering how best to
guide countries away from civil war.
Generating a new definition of conflict resolution success is crucial for longer term solutions to
conflict. Civil wars are deadly and violent in a physical sense, but they also wreak havoc on country’s
infrastructures, economies, educational resources, political systems, and other basic institutions and
opportunity structures. The resolution of wars, then, requires actors to not only end violence but also
address the institutional and structural damage of war. War does not end when the violence ends;
war ends when society has achieved peace. Little is known about how peace processes can be shaped
to generate institutions and structures that bolster the quality of peace. The following discusses the
theoretical framework for the study of a quality peace.
Crafting a Quality Peace
In building a theory of quality peace, I consider how the resolution of conflict influences the nature
of the post-conflict environment. I focus on how international and domestic actors can influence the
nature of peace in the wake of civil war through the crafting of peace agreements. The focus on peace
agreements has been chosen for a number of reasons including but not limited to: (1) Much work in
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political science identifies international peace efforts and actors as highly influential players in con-
flict resolution; (2) From a policymaking perspective, identifying pathways through which international
actors can bolster the quality of peace is practical and prudent; (3) Peace agreements come in many
different shapes and sizes, and this variation is likely to have implications for the nature of peace in
the wake of war; and (4) Peace agreements are the most tangible byproduct of the overall formal peace
process. Existing works on civil war resolution focus on the ways to end violence at levels associated
with war.10 What is less known, though, is how common techniques of civil war resolution influence
the nature or quality of post-conflict peace. What can practitioners and peacemakers do throughout the
peace process to increase the quality of peace in addition to generating a sustainable negative peace?
Do comprehensive peace agreements or power-sharing arrangements, for example, sow the seeds for
positive aspects of peace such as human rights protections or political opportunity?
The theoretical focus of this dissertation is thus on one tangible component of peace processes, the
peace agreements themselves. I consider how peace agreements can be crafted by international and
domestic actors to lay the foundations for a quality peace. Based on existing work, it is unsurprising
to state that peace agreements can help disputants overcome the bargaining failures that lead to war
and war recurrence. Within this dissertation I assess peace agreements along two main dimensions:
gender-specificity and context-specificity.11 Gender-specificity and context-specificity are two avenues
through which peace agreements can create a more inclusive, just, and meaningful peace. These two
typologies need not be mutually exclusive; indeed, the agreements which lay the strongest foundations
for quality peace are likely to be gender-specific and context-specific. Gender-specific agreements con-
tain provisions for the protection of women’s rights and/or clauses for gender equality. Context-specific
agreements are those agreements that address the main grievances of the disputants. In other words, a
context-specific agreement is one that is designed to meet the unique needs of disputants.12 The greater
10In so doing, the political science literature has identified key determinants of civil war resolution, some short- and some
long-term. Ceasefires and third-party mediation efforts, for example, tend to put an end to conflict, at least in a short-term way.
Power-sharing arrangements and third-party enforcement, on the other hand, increase the likelihood of a durable end to war.
International actors, then, play a clear role in both short- and long-term solutions to violence.
11This dissertation focuses on these two dimensions, because I argue that they hold the greatest capacity to shape levels of
political inclusivity and opportunity following civil war. In future research on quality of peace, scholars may choose to focus
on other peace agreement dimensions as are appropriate given their particular focus within quality of peace outcomes.
12An agreement that is inclusive and contextual need not be comprehensive, but comprehensive agreements are more likely
to address these elements than partial agreements or ceasefires. With that being said, a partial agreement that clearly outlines
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the gender- and context-specificity of peace agreements, the more likely they are to lead actors’ toward
higher quality peaceful outcomes.
I address the two aforementioned dimensions of peace agreements in turn in the following sections.
I argue that the contents of peace agreements are not only important for putting an end to conflict but
they have strong implications for the quality of peace as well. Just as peace agreements render peace
more durable when crafted in an appropriate manner, I argue that peace agreements can also be crafted in
ways so as to increase the quality of peace in the wake of war. Peace agreements are quasi-constitutional
documents that lay the framework or roadmap for the institutions and practices of the post-conflict state
(Bell, 2006). In the transformative period that occurs during and after civil war, the legal provisions of
the peace agreement have the power to set in motion the transformation of institutions or to reinforce the
status quo. If actors and policymakers are striving for higher quality peaceful outcomes, they must take
advantage of the opening for change and shape peace agreements accordingly. Peace agreements serve
as a type of commitment mechanism, and they incentivize and constrain actors’ behavior in the post-
conflict period. I expand upon these mechanisms throughout the chapters of this dissertation.13 When
peace agreements include provisions that provide protections for women or address grievances of the
disputants, the agreements not only lay the foundation necessary to improve the quality of post-conflict
peace but they also tie the hands of signatories and future leaders to higher quality and more inclusive
outcomes.
Gender-Specific Peace Agreements
Gender-specific agreements are defined as those peace agreements which make specific references to
protections for women in the post-conflict period. Slowly – but increasingly – scholars and policymakers
have been shining a spotlight on the role of women in the peace process, either as mediators or political
women’s rights and addresses one of the key grievances of the disputants may be more effective at generating a quality peace
than a comprehensive agreement that does none of the above. I have taken time to point this distinction out so as to be clear
that my analysis is not restricted to comprehensive agreements; I want to be as inclusive as possible so as to be able to truly
assess the variations in agreements and the implications of these variations.
13While I am only looking at two dimensions of peace agreements, I expect the theoretical mechanisms linking peace agree-
ments to the quality of peace to be similar across many issue areas. Specifically, I expect peace agreements to constrain actors’
behavior and to also incentivize changes in behavior (whether the incentives be through norms shifts, empowerment, or more
material and/or political incentives). Thus, extensions of this work should build upon the theoretical framework presented
here.
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actors who help pave the path for peace following civil war. A growing corpus of work identifies gender
inequality as being associated with higher likelihoods of violent conflict, at both the inter- and intra-state
levels (e.g., Caprioli, 2005). Women’s equality and women’s inclusion in peace processes, then, is more
than a moral good but a step that holds tangible implications for decisions of conflict and cooperation.
I argue, in this vein, that the inclusion of protections for women’s rights in an agreement is a crucial
step in establishing a quality peace. Not only does the inclusion of women’s rights signal some level
of commitment to change, but it also opens the door for new actors to become involved and invested
in consolidating peace through political, social, and economic means. Because a quality peace is, for
purposes of this research, defined as a peace that is politically inclusive and one that protects the rights
of all groups of the population, it is rather self-evident that a gender-sensitive peace agreement will lead
to a higher quality peace.
Why, more specifically, are women’s rights important for a quality peace? Perhaps the more blunt
version of this question is simply: why care about women’s rights? In countries torn apart by years of
civil war, why should time be spent investing in women’s rights? First, civil wars kill disproportionate
numbers of men; women are often needed in post-conflict societies to fill the roles that men formerly
held. At the same time, though, women rarely are extended the rights, privileges, or empowerment
required to move up in society or to assume roles of political power. In short, it is prudent to extend
rights to women so that they may perform more functions outside of the home and be more productive
members of society. Second, women have a lot to offer. In places such as Liberia, a women’s peace
movement was instrumental in encouraging and shaping the peace process in 2003. Women have the
potential to be agents for peace. When war ends, women must be granted equal political, social, and
economic rights so that they may continue to exercise their influence. In the case of Liberia, women
played an active role in the peace process yet still struggle for political and economic equality, in partic-
ular, in the post-conflict period. While the country has a female president, there are still many changes
to be made in the search for a higher quality peace.
In the real world, has the inclusion of women’s rights, for example, bolstered the inclusivity and op-
portunity for women in the wake of conflict? The Accra Peace Agreement for Liberia, signed in 2003,
was inclusive in its contents, containing protections for both women’s and human rights and detailed
timelines for implementation and mechanisms to verify the agreement’s implementation. While Liberia
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is still on the long and arduous path out of the conflict trap over a decade later, the society is marked by
some dimensions of a quality peace. Women, particularly President Sirleaf, have achieved positions of
influence in politics. Elections have proceeded freely and fairly, according to the international commu-
nity, in both 2005 and 2011; the 2011 elections were held without direct involvement of international
actors, rendering their transparency and legitimacy an ever greater success. While much more needs to
be done to provide basic services to Liberians and generate greater economic opportunities, the country
does seem to be on the path to a higher quality peace through the more inclusive nature of peace in the
wake of the Accra Peace Agreement.
Overall, the gender-specificity of peace agreements is likely to have serious implications for the
nature and quality of post-conflict peace. Agreements that address the belligerents’ grievances and
provide protections for women’s rights will do more than end violence; they will create a quality peace
that is more politically, economically, and socially inclusive. Specifically, I argue that gender-specific
peace agreements influence women’s political rights through three mechanisms, one direct and two
indirect. Directly, gender-specific peace agreements hold the potential to tie actors’ hands to change. In
other words, the gender-specific language of peace agreements directly translates into changes in laws
and practices toward women in post-conflict states. The words within the peace agreement render it
more difficult for actors to renege on their commitment. Similarly, the provisions within the agreement
may make it less politically costly to adopt potentially unpopular changes. As such, gender-specific
peace agreements have led to direct and positive improvements in the status of women in countries such
as Burundi, where the gender-specific language of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
appeared in the country’s post-conflict constitution.
The indirect mechanisms, on the other hand, posit that peace agreements generate norms shifts as
well as positive externalities in the form of women’s empowerment. By having gender-specific lan-
guage within peace agreements, the peace process changes the way women and women’s roles are
perceived. Indeed, the presence of women’s rights within such an important document indicates that
women have been legitimized as actors within society (particularly in comparison to antebellum per-
ceptions of women). In South Africa, evidence indicates a strong shift in perceptions of women’s roles
following the adoption of a number of gender-specific peace agreements in the early 1990s. Beyond
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spurring norms shifts, I also argue that gender-specific peace agreements may have positive external-
ities in that they empower women and other groups to push for greater inclusion. Because women’s
rights appear within an agreement, women’s groups, international observers, or civil society groups will
be empowered to hold leaders accountable. Moreover, their voices will be legitimized by the agree-
ment’s text. In Liberia, for example, women’s groups were empowered to push for change and hold
leaders accountable to the promises that they made within the Accra Peace Agreement. Through the
three preceding mechanisms, I expect that women’s rights are more likely to improve following the
signing of a gender-specific peace agreement than following an agreement that is devoid of women’s
rights.
Context-Specific Agreements
Context-specific agreements are those that include provisions that directly address the grievances
of disputants. Peace agreements vary greatly in their character; whereas some follow what seems like
a barebones formula to demobilize and separate forces, others go into great detail regarding political,
social, economic, and military plans for the post-conflict period. Additionally, settlements vary in the
extent to which they reflect the needs and preferences of belligerents, ranging from one-size-fits-all
solutions to highly specific plans for resolving the particular conflict. I argue that agreements that
address the underlying grievances that contributed to conflict onset will be more successful than those
agreements that address few or none of the belligerents’ grievances. By addressing the grievances of
belligerents, these agreements will not only be more successful in the traditional sense – in the sense
that they reduce the likelihood of war recurrence – but they will also be successful by contributing to a
higher quality peace.
How might context-specific agreements influence the likelihood of conflict resolution success? The
grievances that spur conflict vary greatly from case to case. Some civil wars such as the ones in East
Timor and Aceh were largely territorial in nature; the key grievances of belligerents revolved around
a desire for territorial autonomy and self-rule. Other civil wars tend to be driven by economic and
political exclusion and a fight over national power, such as those conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, and
Djibouti. When agreements are tailored to address the needs of the disputants as opposed to placing a
one-size-fits-all solution on a conflict, whether it be driven by territorial autonomy or political exclusion,
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they increase the benefits felt by disputants and render reneging a less attractive option. An agreement
that, in short, solves the most pressing problems for the warring parties generates benefits for complying
and costs to reneging; war becomes a less attractive option.
While grievances evolve over time, I argue that it is crucial that an agreement address the origi-
nal causes of conflict. By including provisions that seek to remedy the underlying causes of conflict,
peace agreements can minimize the likelihood of commitment problems and reduce the incentives of
disputants to renege on the agreement. As such, contextual agreements help overcome commitment
problems that plague conflict resolution. Thus, the relationship between contextual agreements and the
generation of a negative peace seems quite evident. A settlement that is sensitive to the context of the
conflict and the specific grievances of the belligerents, however, is also expected to bolster the quality
of peace post-conflict. Such agreements will not only end conflict and stop the violence, but they will
also tend to generate a peace that is more inclusive in nature and more sensitive to the rights of various
societal groups.
The specific mechanisms linking context-specific agreements to a higher quality peace fall into
two main categories: constraints and (dis)incentives. Peace agreements create a web of new political,
economic, social, and security structures; by creating a new state apparatus, the agreements greatly
limit actors’ behavior and the amount of power any single actor or group can wield. As such, the webs
of new institutions created by context-specific peace agreements inhibit continued exclusions or unjust
policies, and limit the extent to which actors can deviate from new structures. In Northern Ireland, a
society which struggles daily with divisions and legacies of conflict, new institutions laid forth in the
Good Friday Agreement have constrained any single group from taking a monopoly of power.
Context-specific peace agreements also disincentivize the perpetuation of structural violence, injus-
tice, and exclusion. Actors who have signed context-specific peace agreements will be more likely to
choose strategies that work within the new political system; the perpetuation of exclusion and structural
violence may actually impose greater political costs than would the opening of the political system. By
addressing the causes of conflict, actors have little reason to deviate from the new status quo; there is lit-
tle remaining uncertainty about the distribution of power and resources or the extent to which groups can
access state power. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, there is evidence that President Ellen Johnson-
Sirleaf of Liberia made efforts to maintain a fair and just system, so as to avoid angering opponents
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and/or spurring a return to war.
Roadmap
The following study of the quality of peace proceeds with a combination of quantitative chapters
and qualitative case illustrations. The next two chapters, Chapters 2 and 3, focus on the question of
women’s rights as one key component of quality peace. Specifically, the chapters assess the role that
gender-specific peace agreements play in spurring improvements in women’s rights. Chapter 2 further
develops the causal mechanisms that lead gender-specific peace agreements to improve women’s rights.
The chapter then presents a quantitative analysis of civil war peace agreements that were signed be-
tween the years 1981 and 2011 (Ho¨gbladh, 2011). The results offer strong support for the hypothesized
relationship: peace agreements that include provisions for women’s rights do indeed work. Chapter 3
looks at the cases of Burundi, Liberia, South Africa, and Angola to further assess the plausibility of the
causal mechanisms proposed herein. While not intended to be a test of the theory, Chapter 3 reaffirms
the links between gender-specific peace agreements and women’s rights improvements and illustrates
that the relationship exists through a number of causal pathways, both direct and indirect.
Chapters 4 and 5 shift focus away from women’s rights to political rights more broadly. In particular,
I assess how context-specific peace agreement lead to improvements in the political rights and opportu-
nities within post-conflict states. In Chapter 4, I further discuss extant literature and the causal mecha-
nisms that render context-specific peace agreements more likely to generate rights improvements. The
chapter quantitatively tests the expectations on the same universe of peace agreements as is included in
Chapter 2. I find that the context-specificity of peace agreements positively and statistically significantly
influences political rights in post-conflict periods. Chapter 5 presents the cases of Burundi, Liberia, and
Coˆte d’Ivoire to illustrate the causal mechanisms and further investigate the role peace agreements play
in shaping the quality of peace. Taken together, the four substantive chapters that follow offer strong in-
dication that peace agreements are tools that can be used to shape and construct a higher quality peace.
The words on paper matter for the post-conflict period; as domestic and international actors strive to
achieve the goals laid forth by Galtung (1969), they can and should embrace the transformative power
of peace agreements. The final chapter of the document will thus conclude with a discussion regarding
the implications of this research, plans for future research, and immediate policy implications.
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CHAPTER 2
PEACE AGREEMENTS AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
No society will know peace if it leaves half its population behind. Women’s voices are a
critical part of coming to terms with the past by investing in a shared future that rejects
conflict and promotes dignity. Women have been subjected to rape and sexual violence as
tactics of war. Now we must enlist and empower them as agents of peace.
– John Kerry and William Hague1
Following the resolution of civil wars in countries such as Liberia and Burundi, women became
more active members in the political life of their respective states. Liberia elected a female head of
state, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, to lead it through its post-conflict reconstruction, while in Burundi, women
have been guaranteed seats and representation across many dimensions of politics. While the conclusion
of civil wars provides a clear opportunity to revise the status quo, such improvements in women’s
rights should not be treated as inevitable. What spurred countries such as Liberia and Burundi to take
strides toward greater gender equality? Why, on the other hand, were women largely excluded from
the post-conflict political apparatus in countries such as Angola? As John Kerry and William Hague
note above, societies are not at peace when they exclude fifty percent of the population. Johan Galtung
(1969) identifies widespread exclusion, repression, and inequality as forms of structural violence and as
societal ills that inhibit the achievement of peace. Peace, he notes, cannot truly take hold when portions
of society remain excluded and marginalized. The perpetuation of structural violence and inequality,
particularly with respect to gender, reinforces conflict and renders peace more fragile (Caprioli, 2005);
the goal of gender equality, then, is more than a normative goal but also one that brings tangible benefits
to societies as a whole. With this in mind, this chapter assesses the conditions under which women
1From “Preventing Sexual Violence Is a National Security Imperative,” 25 February 2014. See:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johnkerry/preventing-sexual-violenc b 4856070.html
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experience greater equality in post-conflict societies. Women’s equality is a key step in in establishing
a quality peace and guiding countries on the path away from war.
To gain an understanding of how a quality peace can take hold and how, more specifically, women’s
rights might improve, I focus on the role peace agreements play in shaping peace. While much is
known about how agreements may be crafted to end violence at levels associated with war, more needs
to be done to understand the implications of peace processes for the post-conflict environment. Peace
agreements, as quasi-constitutional documents, have the potential to lay the framework for the political,
social, and economic structures of the post-conflict period. Do peace agreements, however, actually
work beyond ending war? Do they tie actors’ hands to new policies so as to generate a higher quality
peace post-conflict? In answering these questions, this chapter considers one component of post-conflict
quality of peace: women’s political rights. For the purposes of this chapter, then, I focus on quality peace
as the extent to which women experience freedom from discrimination and equal access to political
opportunities in the post-conflict environment.2 Women’s political rights are an important dimension
of the post-conflict environment, even if only one piece of the puzzle. By extending rights to women,
actors in the peace process generate the foundations for a more open, inclusive, and secure post-conflict
environment.
In what follows, I first engage extant work on civil war resolution and peace agreements. I highlight
that the study of civil war resolution would benefit greatly from a better understanding of how peace
processes influence the quality of peace following war. Moreover, I discuss how existing work on gender
and conflict has shown that women’s rights are instrumental in creating more peaceful societies. Second,
I develop a theoretical framework of peace agreements and argue that they not only tie actors’ hands to
change but that they also generate externalities that diffuse into the post-conflict society. In particular,
I hypothesize that peace agreements that are gender-sensitive in nature will generate positive outcomes
for women’s post-conflict political rights. Rather than scraps of paper, the theory herein argues that
the contents of peace agreements shape post-conflict structures. I quantitatively test this expectation
using the universe of peace agreements from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Ho¨gbladh, 2011).
2Of course, a quality peace is a phenomenon that encompasses a broad number of dimensions, ranging across political,
economic, and social realms. In other parts of my dissertation, I also assess the extent to which peace processes lay the
foundations for greater respect for human rights more broadly. Future work should also address how post-conflict societies
can build infrastructures, improve human health, and reduce socioeconomic inequality, to name a couple other examples of
quality of peace indicators.
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My findings speak to the ongoing push by the United Nations and others to conduct peace processes in
ways that are more inclusive of women. Indeed, peace agreements that contain specific provisions for
women’s rights do actually work to generate more inclusive outcomes following conflict. I conclude
with a number of extensions of this research as well as policy implications of the paper’s findings.
Civil War Resolution, Quality Peace, and Women’s Empowerment: What We Know
Thus far, little systematic empirical work has been done to explore the sources and foundations
of a quality peace. Below, I present an overview of work on civil war settlements, quality of peace,
and women and conflict. I highlight that while scholarship has shown that peace agreements and their
contents matter for putting an end to war, little is known regarding how peace agreements influence the
post-conflict environment.3 I argue that more must be done to bridge the work on civil war settlements
and quality of peace indicators such as human rights and women’s rights. It is time to know how
the substance of peace agreements shapes the resolution process beyond the cessation of violence. I
emphasize the need to better understand the long-term implications of peace processes for the post-
conflict environment and women’s post-conflict political rights, in particular.
Negotiated Settlements and Negative Peace
The settlement of civil wars is a process wrought by uncertainty and instability. An increasing
number of civil wars end through negotiated settlement; nonetheless, negotiated settlements have an
inconsistent history as a mechanism for resolving wars. To what extent, then, are peace agreements an
important focal point for the resolution of civil wars? I argue that peace agreements can and do lay
the foundations for a higher quality peace, and more specifically, I posit that gender provisions within
peace agreements create tangible benefits for women’s empowerment following conflict. Indeed, a long
history of research on war settlements has suggested that agreements are more than “scraps of paper,”
and that “their content affects whether peace lasts or war resumes” (Fortna, 2003, 365). The research on
peace agreements has moved from whether or not peace agreements and negotiated settlements work at
3Empirical work, however, is moving towards a focus on civil war settlements and quality of peace indicators. Hartzell and
Hoddie (2015), for example, investigate how power-sharing provisions within the settlement process influence the likelihood
that democratic institutions take root.
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all to a more nuanced analysis of how they work and what conditions increase their likelihood of success
in both the short and long term.4
While past works on civil war resolution focus on success as the end of war, I build upon this
research to develop a framework for how peace agreements generate more positive conceptions of peace.
A peace agreement works to reduce uncertainty and increase actors’ commitment to peaceful outcomes.
I also argue that the content of peace agreements shapes not only the achievement of negative peace
but also the extent to which a quality peace takes hold. In the following section, I review current
works on quality peace and human rights, more broadly, to understand the role peace agreements might
play in influencing these outcomes. The following section identifies political inclusivity and human
rights as two key dimensions for the consolidation of peace; moreover, the works discussed in the
following section identify the specific legal structures of agreements as one mechanism for facilitating
improvements in political and human rights.
Civil Wars and a Quality Peace
Research on civil wars and their resolution, by and large, operationalizes resolution success as the
absence of war and/or the duration of peace. These studies, then, measure success as the absence of war,
a negative conception of peace. They do not consider, as this dissertation does, the nature of peace or
the extent to which the peace that is established is meaningful for those living in post-conflict societies.
As I have already stated, this is not a shortcoming or flaw of existing work; understanding the factors
that lead to a negative peace is crucial in hopes of ending the death and destruction of civil war. At
the same time, however, it is equally important to expend resources on identifying the factors that lead
to a quality peace. In other words, research must now focus on how to create peace after the end of
war. Post-conflict societies vary dramatically in their treatment of political, economic, and social rights;
whereas some have made strides toward more inclusive systems, others remain marked by widespread
injustices, inequalities, and structural violence. What accounts for these differences? What mechanisms
exist to generate a higher quality peace in the wake of conflict?
4According to a number of studies, third party enforcement is a necessary condition in generating more durable peaceful
outcomes (see e.g. Stedman, 2002; Mattes, 2008; Mattes and Savun, 2009, 2010; Fortna, 2003; Walter, 2002). Research has
also shown that peace agreements that generate power-sharing institutions are more durable than those agreements without
power sharing provisions (see e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, 2007; Walter, 2002; Mattes and Savun, 2009).
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A number of studies focus on political-institutional mechanisms that influence the longevity and
nature of peace following civil war. Call (2012), for example, writes that political exclusion inhibits
the consolidation of peace. Inclusion, he argues, can come in any number of forms, but regardless of
the form, inclusion is a necessary component to escape the conflict trap. Nilsson and Kovacs (2005)
write that political instability and lack of good governance undermine the success of peace in many
post-conflict states. Munck and Kumar (1995) identify the inclusiveness of parties to the peace process
as a key factor in achieving successful peace outcomes in El Salvador, for example, as opposed to in
Cambodia. To achieve truly peaceful civil war resolution, then, countries must move toward greater
political inclusivity, stability, and more responsive and responsible governance. In addition to domestic
actors and institutions, Crocker and Hampson (1996) argue that international actors involved in peace
processes should promote new norms and institutions in post-conflict societies, particularly in the area
of human rights.
While not solely focusing on countries that have experienced civil wars, research on human rights
also suggests how domestic and international actors may contribute to higher quality peace post-conflict.
In particular, the works on international laws offer insight into how peace agreements – legal documents
themselves crafted most frequently by international and domestic actors – influence human rights, and
women’s rights more specifically. Both Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2007) and Neumayer (2005), for
example, find that human rights treaties are ineffective at changing state behavior. Such findings are
critical of human rights treaties insofar as these documents hold little formal capacity to enforce their
provisions (because, according to Hafner-Burton (2005), they lack the coercive influence that is neces-
sary to push change). Lutz and Sikkink (2000), however, are more optimistic in their assessment of the
effects of human rights law; they write that human rights norms tend to be implemented through a wide
array of “judicial, quasi-judicial, and political channels.” They continue on to say that “the enforce-
ment of international norms through multiple legal and political mechanisms successfully influences
human rights behavior...” (654). Following from the work by Lutz and Sikkink (2000), I posit that peace
agreements are a legal-political mechanism that may spur change in baseline levels of human rights and
women’s rights, more specifically.
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Women’s Inclusion in War and Peace
A focus on women’s rights is particularly important for any study of a quality peace. Gender equal-
ity and inequality shape a broad spectrum of human health and well-being metrics, economic outcomes,
and political stability. Moreover, gender inequality is associated with societies that are more prone to
conflict and are more violent in nature. Research has identified a link between gender inequality and
war; on average, countries marked by higher levels of gender inequality are more likely to be involved
in both inter- and intrastate conflicts (Tessler and Warriner, 1997; Caprioli, 2000, 2003, 2005). Caprioli
(2005) writes that Galtung’s theory of structural violence can be readily applied to the violence and
marginalization experienced by women in many, if not all, states. Gender inequality is itself a manifes-
tation of structural violence and is thus antithetical to peace. Indeed, Caprioli asserts that gender rela-
tions are marked by exploitation in terms of “highly differential possibilities for personal development,”
processes of socialization that reinforce exploitation and violence, inequality in access to political roles,
and gendered hierarchies that promote male domination and female subordination (Caprioli, 2005, 164).
Gender inequality and “the malignant norms of domination and subordination” reinforce structural vi-
olence, systems of exploitation and repression, and thus breed a worldview that is competitive rather
than cooperative (Caprioli, 2005, 165). The structural violence within societies creates systems where
violence on intrastate and interstate levels becomes justifiable. To achieve a sustainable and higher
quality peace, countries must “overcome[e] social relations of domination and subordination” (Tickner,
1992, 128).
In a recent study on female participation and the success of civil war resolution, Demeritt, Nichols
and Kelly (2014) find that improvements in women’s participation following conflict reduce the risk of
civil war relapse. The authors write that “civil war reinforces and may exacerbate women’s marginaliza-
tion” while at the same time, the end of civil war brings a “breakdown in status quo traditions, morals,
customs, and community” (Demeritt, Nichols and Kelly, 2014, 347). As such, the post-conflict recon-
struction period is a time in which gender norms and roles can be revised and improved. When (if)
women are given the opportunity to exert an inherent pacific influence, the likelihood of war recurrence
is decreased. When, however, women are pushed to the outskirts of the economic, social, and political
life of the state, the resulting “male-dominated environment leads to more war” (Demeritt, Nichols and
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Kelly, 2014, 362). The aforementioned studies make clear, then, that gender inequality does more than
harm the women and men within societies, and it does more than harm domestic health, economic, and
social outcomes. Gender inequality and the structural violence within societies lead not only to higher
likelihood of war but also to a higher likelihood of war recurrence. As such, policymakers and scholars
alike have placed an increased focus on integrating women into peace processes and empowering them
as agents of peacebuilding.
A growing body of research on gender and civil war resolution corroborates that “the success of
post-conflict reconstruction can be seen as dependent on the inclusion of women and the pursuit of
gender equity” (Hudson, 2009, 288).5 For example, United Nations peacekeeping operations are more
successful at establishing peace in countries where women’s empowerment is relatively high (Gizelis,
2009). Hudson (2009) advocates for the empowerment of women’s groups to build capacity at the local
level to match gendered processes at the national level. Gizelis (2011) further asserts that women’s
status has a direct and independent effect on post-conflict reconstruction; like Hudson (2009), Gizelis
(2011) cites the efficacy of local mechanisms of empowerment. While women’s organization do not
always have access to state power, women in places such as Liberia have been able to mobilize local
processes of peace and reconciliation.
Ellerby (2013) focuses on peace agreements and assesses the extent to which UN Security Council
Resolution 1325 has led to the (en)gendering of negotiations, agreements, and peacebuilding processes.
Like the framework used within this dissertation, Ellerby identifies that peace agreements are a road
map for peacebuilding efforts. By looking at the gender provisions within agreements, she concludes
that there is not yet a unified approach to women’s security or women’s empowerment. She writes that
beyond empowering women as political decisions makers, agreements must also create stable institu-
tions and must offer “an explicit recognition of [women’s] already essential participation in maintaining
day-to-day life” (Ellerby, 2013, 452). After a closer analysis of Sudan’s peace processes, Ellerby con-
cludes that “women’s physical presence at formal talks is not enough to guarantee (en)gendered security,
especially when there are norms and strategies used to marginalize their activities and ideas” (Ellerby,
2013, 456). Ellerby’s research as well as the aforementioned works illustrate that the institutionalization
5Interestingly, Hudson (2009) writes that peacebuilders and scholars alike must be cautious to treat women and their empow-
erment as a one-size-fits-all process. While recognizing the strategic and normative importance of gender equality, she also
states that context and local support is key.
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of gender equality and female empowerment are essential components of conflict prevention and peace
consolidation. To empower women and to create a more inclusive society helps countries move beyond
a negative peace. In what follows, I build a theory and test the extent to which gender-specific peace
agreements lead to tangible improvements in women’s rights.
With the aforementioned literature on peace agreements, quality peace, and women’s empowerment
in mind, I move forward to build a theory that focuses on how peace agreements may lay the foundations
for improvements in women’s rights. Importantly, I move forward with skepticism. Peace agreements
are not a panacea for civil war; moreover, the human rights literature offers a number of reasons to
question the extent to which pieces of paper can alter respect for rights. With this skepticism in mind,
I nevertheless maintain the argument that peace agreements and their contents have important implica-
tions for the conflict resolution process. Ellerby’s (2013) analysis of Sudan suggests as much. I also
maintain that political inclusion is a key component of a higher quality peace. Civil wars and their
resolution represent times of major change for societies. This process of change and recovery may be
particularly conducive to new political, social, and economic structures. Civil wars and their resolution,
then, may create the necessary opening through which women’s rights may improve in the post-conflict
period.
Theory: Peace Agreements as “Quasi-Constitutional” Documents
To what extent can the negotiated settlement of civil war have a positive impact on the quality of
peace post-conflict? How can the nature of peace agreements increase the extent to which governments
respect women’s rights in the aftermath of conflict? A quality peace does not come about spontaneously;
the destruction and destabilization created by civil war, however, generates a situation in which the status
quo can change. Bell and O’Rourke (2007) contend: “Peace agreements document a constitutional ‘big
bang’ providing for radical overhaul of political and legal institutions to an extent rarely found [else-
where]” (295-296). Civil wars do not create a “big bang” in that existing structures change overnight;
they do, however, create a situation in which – through transformative peace processes – existing in-
stitutions can be totally restructured and revised. The opening for change following a civil war creates
a situation which is, in some ways, quite malleable. While a change from pre-conflict institutions and
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norms is not guaranteed, the trajectory of the peace process6 has the capacity to shape and shift the ways
in which governments accord and protect rights in the post-conflict environment. As such, I consider
the formal ways in which actors (both domestic and external) can commit to more inclusive outcomes
in the wake of war. In particular, I consider how peace agreements, as manifestations of this domestic
and international peace collaboration, can serve as contracts to implement change.
Using the terminology of Bell and O’Rourke (2007), I argue that peace agreements and their effects
on society can be theorized through a “quasi-constitutional” lens (306). As a quasi-constitutional doc-
ument, a peace agreement “typically aim[s] to establish or extend a ceasefire by linking the ceasefire
to new political and legal structures, through what is essentially a constitutional framework or ‘power
map’ for the state” (Bell and O’Rourke, 2007, 293). Thus, conceptualizing of peace agreements as
quasi-constitutional documents is to assert that peace agreements create a framework or map for the
post-conflict state; peace agreements, in other words, lay out (to greater or lesser extents) the rules,
institutions, and norms that are to be set up. Situating my research question and theory within the
framework of bargaining theories of war, I posit that through their quasi-constitutional nature peace
agreements are able to constrain and shape actors’ behaviors. Peace agreements, then, are contracts that
create incentives for compliance and structures that tie actors’ hands to change. By including specific
provisions, those crafting peace agreements will be able to commit actors to higher quality peaceful out-
comes. In the following, I elaborate on the specific mechanisms through which gender-specific peace
agreements lead to greater respect for women’s rights in the aftermath of civil war.
Women’s Rights Guarantees in Peace Agreements
Peace agreements are gender-specific to the extent that they contain direct references to protections
and rights for women in the post-conflict period. A growing focus has been placed, for example, on the
need to include women in every stage of the peace process; this call, by the United Nations and others,
is clear in stating that all processes and agreements must be gender-inclusive and gender-sensitive. The
framework and analysis of this chapter assesses the extent to which these calls actually work and the
6The term peace process here is used to refer to the period of formal negotiations and their outcome. Undoubtedly, the peace
process in a civil war is open-ended and in some ways synonymous with the concept of bargaining, which is ongoing before,
during, and after conflicts. Given information constraints, however, I restrict my theory and analyses to the formal negotiation
processes.
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extent to which they lead to benefits for women’s equality. A number of peace agreements, such as the
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi which was signed in 2000,7 contain provisions
for the protection and/or extension of rights to women. The agreement states:
Women’s advancement, and their equality with men, are one aspect of human rights – one
that is a condition for social justice and essential to building a viable, just and developed
society. The empowerment of women is an essential prerequisite for the political, social,
economic, cultural and ecological security of the entire population. Equality between the
sexes does much to enhance the well-being of women, men, girls and boys, and is indis-
pensable for achieving people-centred sustainable development. The Government should
pay special attention to the status of women and combat all discrimination against them.8
Specific provisions for inclusivity such as the one seen above will, I argue, will render peace agreements
more likely to contribute to quality peace in the aftermath of conflict. This effect occurs through three
mechanisms, one direct and two indirect. The direct mechanism linking gender-specific agreements to
a higher quality peace comes from their precision; more precise calls for inclusion of women render
conflict actors’ less likely to renege and more likely to commit to rights extensions. Political actors
in Burundi, then, were tying their hands to a more gender-inclusive outcome by including specific
provisions for women’s rights within the agreement. Indirectly, inclusive agreements may lead to rights
improvements through one (or both) of the two following mechanisms: (1) positive externalities; and/or
(2) norms shifts. I explain these three mechanisms in greater detail in the following paragraphs.9
Gender-specific peace agreements will have a direct and positive effect on women’s rights exten-
sions, because they increase actors’ level of commitment. In short, the specific nature of agreements
and the institutions which they create tie actors’ hands to change. Because gender inclusivity is explicitly
enumerated on paper, former disputants will have a harder time deviating from expected reforms. In the
7Source: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/minority-rights-arusha-peace-and-reconciliation-agreement-burundi
8Source: Found within the full text of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (Ho¨gbladh, 2011).
9I also want to note that these mechanisms need not be mutually exclusive. In some cases, direct legal changes may be
accompanied by mechanisms of empowerment, for example. In other cases, only one mechanism may be at work. Future
work should do more to identify the causal process and pinpoint the sequencing and existence of various mechanisms. At
this point, however, I argue that the mechanisms at work, while falling within three main families, are shaped by the specific
dynamics of each case.
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context of national constitutions, Davenport (1996) argues that specific mentions to rights in domestic
legal documents has a strong and positive effect on government respect for human rights. He explains,
however, that “It is readily apparent...that not all constitutions discuss political and civil rights or do so
to the same degree. These differences might account for variations in state practices” (Davenport, 1996,
631). There are differences in the extent to which peace agreements tie governments’ hands to rights
extensions. For example, of the 34 agreements in the Peace Accords Matrix, only 7 of these contain
specific provisions for women’s rights (Joshi and Darby, 2013). That subset of agreements, however,
should generate a higher quality peace by tying hands of actors and increasing their level of commit-
ment to the agreement’s framework. New rules, institutions, and norms regarding women’s rights that
are included in peace agreements limit actors’ ability to deviate.
As evidence of the direct mechanism, I return to the case of Burundi, a case which will be further
explicated in Chapter 3. In Burundi, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement which was signed
in 2000 contained specific references to women’s rights and gender equality. The agreement’s text
vis-a`-vis women was then directly included in the country’s post-conflict constitution. In Burundi,
the same actors who excluded women from the negotiating table then complied with the provisions for
women’s rights protections within the agreement. Thus, I argue that the peace agreement itself generated
a commitment mechanism; with women’s rights provisions within the agreement, actors became less
likely to renege.10 Political leaders in Burundi, constrained by their promises in the Arusha Peace
and Reconciliation Agreement, revised and implemented post-conflict institutions to reflect the peace
agreement. Recognizing, however, that leaders may not always remain truly committed to the provisions
of peace agreements, I also identify two indirect causal pathways through which gender-specific peace
agreements can lead to improvements in women’s post-conflict rights.
Indirectly, gender-specific peace agreements contribute to tangible gains for women’s rights by
generating positive externalities in post-conflict societies. Specifically, I argue that gender-specific
peace agreements create positive externalities in that they empower societal actors to push for change.
Women’s groups, civil society actors, and other groups, knowing that women’s rights were considered
10This process could be further explained in a number of ways. On the one hand, actors’ commitment levels to gender-
inclusivity may have increased because they would face greater costs for backing down than for following through on the
agreement. On the other hand, actors might find rights extensions less costly following a gender-specific agreement, because
they can deflect any opposition by blaming the agreement or even the third-parties that helped to negotiate the agreement.
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and formalized within the context of the peace agreement, may feel empowered to push for rights. Peace
agreements that include women’s rights within them both legitimize women as political actors and legit-
imize advocates’ demands for greater inclusivity. For example, in the case of Liberia, actors were slow
to follow through on promises for improvements in women’s political rights following the signing of
the Accra Peace Agreement in 2003. However, knowing that women’s rights protections were outlined
within the agreement, women’s groups felt as if they had a legal footing to stand on and a legitimate
reason to push for change. Thus, in Liberia women were further empowered to hold actors accountable
and push for improvements in women’s rights, because the peace agreement legitimized their voice and
their role in the political life of the state.
Finally, I posit that gender-specific peace agreements spur norms shifts within societies. Hafner-
Burton (2005) discusses how persuasion, defined as the attempt to teach actors new ideas or socialize
actors to believe and respect new sets of norms, is one mechanism through which government respect
for human rights can be altered. Lutz and Sikkink (2000) also point to the role of changing norms in
conjunction with revised legal frameworks as means to improve respect for human rights. In a similar
vein, I argue that peace agreements shape the ways in which actors view what is normatively and polit-
ically right.11 By discussing women’s rights within peace negotiations and codifying the rights within
the peace agreement, the conflict actors and negotiators signal that they view women as having suffi-
cient legitimacy to warrant attention. Simply put, the legitimization of women within a peace agreement
signals to society more broadly that women can and should be treated as relevant and capable political
actors. In the case of South Africa which will be discussed in the following chapter, the Interim Consti-
tution of 1993 spurred a noticeable shift in the ways in which women’s roles were perceived by South
Africans. The direct and indirect processes described above will facilitate improvements in women’s
rights following the signing of gender-specific peace agreements.
Through both direct and indirect means, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis: Peace agreements that are gender-inclusive in nature are expected to have a
11Hafner-Burton (2005) is clear in stating that persuasion alone may not provide strong enough incentives to change actors’
behavior; instead, she points to the power of coercion in attempts to alter governments’ respect for human rights. Lutz and
Sikkink (2000) emphasize, however, the dual role of coercive legal frameworks in conjunction with the persuasion of norms
cascades. Coercive legal frameworks alone may do little, according to Lutz and Sikkink (2000).
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positive effect on government’s respect for women’s rights following civil war when com-
pared to those peace agreements that are not gender-inclusive.
Table 2.1 provides a sample of civil war peace agreements, all of which contain specific provi-
sions for extending rights to women and building gender equality in the post-conflict period. Within
the universe of agreement cases where gender provisions are included (26 in total in the UCDP Peace
Agreement Database), nineteen contributed to an increase in government respect for women’s politi-
cal rights following conflict. In other words, in just over 73 percent of peace agreements with gender
provisions, actors actually follow through on their commitments. On the other hand, women’s rights
Table 2.1: Peace Agreements and Women’s Post-Conflict Political Rights (Select Examples)
Agreement Name Post-Conflict Women’s Rights Increase
Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace yes
(Guatemala, 1996)
Good Friday Agreement yes
(United Kingdom, 1998)
Accra Peace Agreement yes
(Liberia, 2003)
Abuja Ceasefire Agreement yes
(Sierra Leone, 2000)
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement yes
(Burundi, 2000)
Comprehensive Peace Agreement yes
(Nepal, 2006)
Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord no
(Bangladesh, 1997)
Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement no
(Sudan, 2005)
Note: Examples of peace agreements which include gender provisions.
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improvements occurred in only 41 percent of cases when gender provisions were not included in agree-
ments.12 As mentioned already, civil wars create an opening for change. Peace agreements, however,
can increase the likelihood of change and shape the direction of that change. By generating a specific
roadmap for the post-conflict period, peace agreements can spur greater respect for women’s rights.
Women, in places such as Guatemala, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, and Burundi all benefited from
the gender-awareness and rights-extensions granted to them within their countries’ peace processes.
Research Design
I test my expectations regarding peace agreements and women’s post-conflict political rights us-
ing the universe of cases identified within the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme Peace Agreements
Database (UCDP PAD) (Ho¨gbladh, 2011). The UCDP PAD contains approximately 200 peace agree-
ments (including peace process agreements, partial agreements, and comprehensive agreements) signed
between at least two of the primary warring parties to a conflict between the years 1975 and 2011. Be-
cause my theory relies on peace agreements’ quasi-constitutional nature, the main legal-political causal
mechanisms linking agreements to rights improvements cannot take root unless peace agreements sur-
vive, so to speak.13 Therefore, I limit my universe of cases to those peace agreements that have not
ended. A peace agreement ends, according to the UCDP PAD, when one of the primary parties is no
longer party to the agreement; an agreement that “ends” cannot be implemented.14 Because of limited
data availability on my main dependent variable of interest, women’s post-conflict political rights (Cin-
granelli, Richards and Clay, 2014), the time period of my analysis is further restricted to the 1981-2011
period. My unit of analysis is the peace agreement within a civil war dyad.15
12These numbers are derived from the universe of cases where the peace agreement, according to Ho¨gbladh (2011), did not
end.
13In an extension of this chapter, however, I will investigate how gendered agreements fare in their durability.
14While I take this step for theoretical reasons, I still run the analyses on all cases (regardless of whether or not the agreements
ended). On a theoretical level, an agreement that has ended may still generate norms shifts, although it is less likely to create a
legal framework that ties actors’ hands to change. The results are robust to either analysis. Again, this is an issue I will explore
in more detail in future extensions of this dissertation.
15For purposes of this dissertation, I make the simplifying assumption of coding peace agreements as independent units of
analysis. Of course, I recognize that several civil wars have a succession of peace agreements that cumulatively contribute
to the settlement of conflict. In future revisions of my research on peace processes and the quality of peace, then, I plan to
aggregate the data to the peace process-level.
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Dependent Variable
I use two dependent variables, both measuring the improvement in women’s political rights in the
post-conflict period. To code each of the dependent variables, I use the women’s political rights data
from the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI) (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014).
CIRI codes a categorical variable on governments’ respect for women’s political rights. The variable
captures government practices and national laws designed to protect the following political rights: the
right to vote, the right to run for political office, the right to hold elected and appointed government
positions, the right to join political parties, and the right to petition government officials. The CIRI
women’s political rights variable is coded from 0 to 3, where 0 represents no rights and high levels of
restrictions by governments while 3 indicates a society that has political equality guaranteed by law and
in practice.
The first dependent variable, rights improvements (any), captures whether or not women’s political
rights improved as a result of a peace agreement at any time during the five years following either
the signing of an agreement or the end of civil war, whichever is later. The variable is coded as 1 if
governments’ respect for women’s political rights is higher following an agreement than it was prior to
the civil war.16 If women’s political rights do not improve in the five years following an agreement, I
code the dependent variable as 0. The coding of the quality of peace indicators is thus relative to the
realities on the ground rather than an absolute comparison across countries.
Second, I generate another dependent variable in hopes of providing a tougher test of my hypothesis.
The dichotomous variable, durable rights improvements, is coded as 1 if the improvement in government
respect for women’s political rights is durable for the entire five year window following conflict.17 If
the level of women’s political rights does not maintain a durable improvement over pre-conflict levels
of women’s rights, the variable is coded as 0. This dependent variable is important insofar as initial
improvements in women’s rights may quickly fade as societies move further away from the signing of
16I look at the five-year time scope because changes in political rights may take some time to take hold. I have coded the
variable in alternative ways, to capture both immediate changes following conflict as well as durable improvements to women’s
rights in the post-conflict period. The results are robust across specifications. I judge improvements based on a comparison
with the pre-war period, because pre-war levels are a better indication of a society’s rights and opportunities than those levels
during a civil war. Moreover, many cases do not have data recorded for years while they are at war.
17Or the signing of an agreement, whichever is later.
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a peace agreement. If peace agreements lead only to a temporary spike in women’s rights, the first
dependent variable of this study may provide falsely positive findings. If, on the other hand, peace
agreements actually do institutionalize change within societies, I expect gender provisions within an
agreement to have a positive and statistically significant effect on each of the two main dependent
variables.
Initially, given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, I ran the analyses using logistic
regression models. The results, however, have the potential to be biased by endogeneity. In other words,
the same factors that are contributing to women’s political rights improvements in the post-conflict pe-
riod may also be contributing to the likelihood that agreements will be crafted in a gender-sensitive man-
ner. If unobserved variables are simultaneously influencing the gender-inclusivity of peace agreements
as well as the improvements in women’s post-conflict rights, then I cannot accurately attribute women’s
post-conflict rights improvements to peace agreements. To deal with the potential for endogeneity, I rely
on a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model.18 The bivariate probit model simultaneously estimates
two equations of univariate probit models – the occurrence of rights improvements for women in the
aftermath of civil war (outcome equation) and the presence of gender protections with peace agreements
(selection equation). Bivariate probit models correct for correlation in the random error terms of each
equation.19 The model, then, allows me to attribute any improvements in women’s post-conflict political
rights to the gender provisions in peace agreements.20 Below, I discuss the variables used in each stage
of the model.
Explanatory Variable and Controls
The outcome equation estimates the factors that affect the likelihood of improvements to women’s
political rights following conflict. The primary explanatory variable in this study is the inclusion of
women’s rights protections in peace agreements. For each peace agreement within the UCDP PAD,
I have read the text of the agreement to determine whether or not women’s rights were referenced
18This technique is common within works on conflict resolution (see e.g. Beardsley, 2008; Gartner, 2011, 2014; Hartzell and
Hoddie, 2015; Reid, 2015).
19For a thorough, applied discussion of seemingly unrelated bivariate probit models, see Hartzell and Hoddie (2015).
20To help account for the non-independence between peace agreements within the same conflict episode, I cluster standard
errors by peace process.
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within the agreement. For example, Liberia’s 2003 Accra Peace Agreement guaranteed women spots
in a Governance Reform Commission, the National Elections Commission, as well as the National
Transitional Legislative Assembly. The agreement goes on to state that parties must reflect national
and gender balance in all elective and non-elective appointments. Such language offers clearly defined
political rights for women in the post-conflict period. For agreements that include references to women’s
rights and gender issues, I code the primary explanatory variable as 1. If gender is not mentioned in any
way in an agreement, the variable for gender-inclusivity is coded as 0.21
In the outcome equation, I control for a number of variables that may also influence the likelihood
that governments’ respect for women’s rights will improve following civil war. To control for attributes
of the conflict, I include a variable for conflict duration. This variable measures how long, in months,
a conflict lasted; I derive data for the variable from UCDP’s conflict termination database (Kreutz,
2010). Longer conflicts may generate greater openings for women following conflict insofar as the
toll wrought on society requires the involvement of all members to rebuild. Second, I control for the
presence of peacekeeping operations (Ho¨gbladh, 2011). I expect peacekeepers to, at a very minimum,
provide sufficient external pressure so as to prevent gross violations in women’s rights. Third, I control
for the average global level of women’s political rights in the year that the agreement was signed or that
the conflict terminated, whichever was later (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014). Fourth, I control
for a state’s GDP per capita (log value, lagged); wealthier, more developed countries are expected to, on
average, have greater respect for women’s rights (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2009). Finally, I control
for whether or not the agreement occurred following UNSCR 1325. Signed in 2000, the resolution
pushed for gender sensitive peace processes and greater inclusion of women at every stage of the peace
process.
In the selection equation, the dependent variable is the dichotomous gender provisions variable as
described above. I control for the same variables as are present in the outcome equation: war duration,
peacekeeping operations, global levels of women’s political rights, GDP per capita, and post-UNSCR
1325. I expect each of these variables to increase the likelihood that women’s rights provisions will be
21There is some variation in the specificity and count of gender protections embedded within peace agreements. I have run
the models with several alternative codings of the independent variable. For example, one alternative is to use a count variable
of the number of provisions for women (ranging from 0 to 3; social, political, and/or economic). The results are robust to
alternative forms.
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included in peace agreements. In addition to these variables, I also employ an instrumental variable.
In estimating seemingly unrelated bivariate probit models, one must include in the selection equation
a variable that is excluded from the outcome equation. As applied to this research, I must identify a
variable that I expect to influence the likelihood of a gender-specific peace agreement, but that I do not
expect to affect the levels of rights accorded to women following war. In this vein, I use the number of
third-party female signatories to the agreement as my instrumental variable. Third-party female signa-
tories should increase the likelihood that women’s provisions will be discussed at the negotiating table
and be codified in agreements. I expect female third-party signatories to increase the perception of a
gendered peace process; additionally, they may be representative of the international community’s push
for gender-sensitive peace processes. On the other hand, I do not expect third-party female signatories
to have any effect on the likelihood that women’s rights will improve following conflict. Third party
female signatories are not indicative of women’s rights on a domestic level; in fact, third party female
signatories show up in cases ranging from Northern Ireland to Liberia to Afghanistan. As Ellerby (2013)
notes, women’s physical presence is often insufficient to guarantee real strides toward gender equality.22
I coded data on female signatories to agreements as I was reading the peace agreements in the UCDP
PAD. The measure is a count variable that ranges from 0 to 11.
Results
Before presenting and discussing the results of the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model, I
show the bivariate relationship between gender-specific peace agreements and improvements in govern-
ment respect for women’s political rights following civil war. Figure 2.1 displays a statistically signif-
icant correlation between the two variables in the absence of any controls (χ2 = 6.6193; Pr(χ2)=.010).
Approximately 64 percent of gender-specific peace agreements lead to improvements in government’s
respect for women’s political rights. On the other hand, only 41 percent of non-gender-specific peace
agreements lead to women’s rights improvements. This first look confirms the prior discussion of civil
war resolution processes. Civil wars and their resolution create an opening for change; thus, women’s
22Alternatively, I would expect female signatories from either the government or rebel side to correlate with rights improve-
ments post-conflict, because they represent a society that is open to some level of gender equality or women’s involvement in
the political life of a country.
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rights and other indicators of inclusivity hold the possibility to improve during this process of transfor-
mation. The cross-tabulation makes clear, however, that peace agreements’ contents shape the trajectory
of that change and can increase the likelihood that countries get on the path toward a higher quality
peace.
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Figure 2.1: Gender-Specific Peace Agreements and Improvements in Women’s Political Rights
Moving beyond the simple bivariate analysis, Table 2.2 presents the results of the seemingly unre-
lated bivariate probit model. Models 1 and 2 provide the first-cut analysis which examines whether or
not gender-sensitive peace agreements generate improvements to government respect for women’s po-
litical rights at any point in the five years following conflict. In Models 3 and 4, I test the extent to which
women’s protections in peace agreements have durable effects on women’s rights improvements follow-
ing conflict. The outcome equations are presented in the top of the table, while the selection equations
are at the bottom. In each of the models the ρ term for the bivariate probit model is approaching -1 and
is significant at the .01 level. The significant ρ term indicates that the random errors of each equation are
indeed correlated and that regular logistic or probit regression estimation would likely produce biased
results; thus, the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit is the appropriate model choice given the theory
44
Table 2.2: Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit: Peace Agreements and Women’s Rights
DV: Rights Improvements (Any) DV: Rights Improve. (Durable)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Outcome Equation
Gender Provisions 1.9554∗∗∗ 2.6900∗∗∗ 1.8980∗∗∗ 1.6862∗∗∗
(0.3994) (0.5332) (0.3415) (0.2740)
Conflict Duration 0.0032 0.0093∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0039)
PKO 0.3760 0.1216
(0.4308) (0.5703)
Global Levels of Women’s -0.5758 3.2085
Political Rights (3.6861) (3.5568)
GDPpc (lag, log) 0.0308 -0.6206∗∗
(0.2434) (0.3076)
Post-UNSCR 1325 0.7180 -0.4579
(0.9255) (0.9229)
Selection Equation
Conflict Duration 0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0029)
PKO 0.1128 0.1166
(0.3091) (0.3412)
Global Levels of Women’s 6.2104∗∗ 14.9630∗∗∗
Political Rights (2.7190) (3.8512)
GDPpc (lag, log) -0.2042 -0.6616∗
(0.2468) (0.3401)
Post-UNSCR 1325 -0.4331 -2.4986∗∗∗
(0.8491) (0.7943)
Third-party Female 0.1150∗∗∗ 0.0557∗ 0.1347∗∗∗ 0.0763∗∗∗
Signatories (0.0323) (0.0315) (0.0369) (0.0247)
N 105 78 100 73
χ2 10.6406∗∗∗ 267.146∗∗∗ 155.708∗∗∗ 8555.65∗∗∗
Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels: ∗∗∗p < .01 ;∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
and data.
The results in Model 1 offer support for the main hypothesis of the paper; without any control
variables, gender provisions have a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood that
government respect for women’s political rights will improve following conflict. As expected, third-
party female signatories increase the likelihood that peace agreements will be crafted to include gender
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provisions. Model 2 adds all control variables. With control variables included in the model, gender
provisions maintain their positive and statistically significant effect on women’s post-conflict political
rights. Gender provisions has a coefficient of 2.690 and is significant at the p <.01-level. The duration
of conflict, the presence of peacekeepers, and agreements that were signed following UNSCR 1325 also
have a positive effect on women’s rights. Global levels of women’s rights as well as a country’s levels
of economic development have negatively signed coefficients. The control variables in the outcome
equation, however, do not reach traditional levels of statistical significance.
In the selection equation of Model 2, the instrumental variable, female third-party signatories has
a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood that gender provisions will be included
in an agreement. Agreements that are signed following longer conflicts and that are signed in a global
environment of higher women’s rights tend to also have a positive effect on the generation of gendered
peace agreements (p <.01 and p <.05, respectively). On the other hand, a peacekeeping presence
and a country’s GDP per capita do not have distinguishable effects on the gendered nature of peace
agreements. Taken as a whole, Model 2 offers support for the assertion that the contents of peace
agreements matters; if women’s rights are specifically enumerated in peace agreements, the political
environment for women following conflict will be more open. This result holds in spite of endogeneity
concerns.
Models 3 and 4 assess whether or not gendered peace agreements also increase the likelihood of
durable improvements to women’s political rights following conflict. In the absence of controls, Model
3 shows that gender provisions do have a positive and statistically significant effects on the likelihood
that women’s rights improvements will be durable for the five years following conflict. Model 4 presents
the results with all control variables. In the outcome equation, gender provisions maintain a positive and
statistically significant effect on women’s post-conflict political rights (coefficient = 1.686, p <.01).
Gendered peace agreements, then, not only generate benefits for women post-conflict, but they also
create sustainable improvements for women’s political rights. This indicates that peace agreements and
their contents are not fleeting; mediators and other actors at the negotiating table must be aware that
peace agreements can create the foundation for durable changes to the quality of post-conflict peace.
Turning to the control variables in Model 4, war duration and a nation’s economic development each
have statistically significant effects on women’s post-conflict rights; longer wars increase the likelihood
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that women’s rights will improve in a durable manner whereas increases in a nation’s levels of economic
development decrease the likelihood that women’s rights will improve in a durable war.23 Peacekeep-
ers and global levels of women’s political rights also have a positive effect on the durable increase
in women’s political rights, however these effects do not attain statistical significance. Finally, agree-
ments that are signed in the post-UNSCR 1325 period are less likely to experience a durable increase in
women’s political rights; this finding is not statistically significantly different than zero.
The results of the selection stage in Model 4 are similar to those found in Model 2. The instrumen-
tal variable, female third party signatories, has a positive and statistically significant effect on gender
provisions in peace agreements. With respect to the control variables, agreements signed following the
adoption of UNSCR 1325 as well as agreements signed in wealthier countries are less likely to contain
gender provisions (p <.01 and p <.1, respectively).24 As global levels of women’s political rights,
on the other hand, increase so too does the likelihood that women’s rights protections will make their
way onto the pages of a peace agreement. The presence of peacekeepers does not have a statistically
significant effect on the presence of gender provisions in peace agreements. Across all models, then,
the results of my analyses indicate that the content of peace agreements matters. Peace agreements,
as quasi-constitutional documents, can tie actors hands to new policies and they can open the doors
for greater opportunity for particular groups following conflict. Moreover, it is possible that the gen-
der awareness generated at the negotiating table generates positive externalities for women following
conflict.
To assess the substantive effects of gender provisions within agreements, I calculate the predicted
probability of achieving improvements in women’s political rights following conflict. In particular,
I assess the substantive effects of achieving a durable increase in women’s political rights following
conflict. Taking endogeneity concerns into account, the substantive effects of the results, shown in
Figure 2.2, are quite striking. In cases where gender provisions are absent from peace agreements, the
likelihood of women’s political rights improvements in the wake of conflict is approximately 25 percent.
23This finding is not expected and is one that I would like to explore more fully. One possible scenario, however, is that
wealthier countries may feel less pressure or be less willing to make major changes to their political system.
24The UNSCR 1325 finding, in particular, is important albeit unsettling for the increasing focus on gender by the international
community. While more research needs to be done on this topic, this offers indication that the UN and other actors must do
more if they truly want to increase women’s representation in peace processes.
47
This number, of course, is not surprising insofar as one would expect civil wars to generate openings for
change in and of themselves. More importantly, however, the probability of durable rights improvements
in cases where gender provisions are present in an agreement is close to 85 percent.25 Gender-specific
peace agreements, then, work most of the time. As the theory predicts, agreements tie actors hands
to new policies, generate new norms for gender relations within countries, and empower groups to
push for change. While change is not assured, peace agreements can serve as strong foundations for a
more inclusive political environment following conflict. Conflict actors and third parties, then, must be
cognizant of the role they play not only in ending violence but in shaping the very nature of peace.
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Figure 2.2: Predicted Probability of Improvements in Women’s Political Rights
Robustness Checks
A number of questions regarding alternative explanations remain. While I delve further into the
sources and effects of gender-specific peace agreements in the following chapter, I do include a couple
of analyses here for purposes of assuaging concerns about alternative causal pathways. The results for
25All other variables are held either at their mean (continuous variables) or modal (dichotomous variables) values.
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the following can be found in Appendix 1. A first question that arises is whether or not the type of
agreement influences the quality of peace. Extant research indicates that comprehensive agreements are
the most durable; as such, one might suspect that comprehensive agreements, through their stability, lay
the foundations for more inclusive outcomes as well. This line of questioning would posit that women’s
rights provisions are not the sole pathway to improvements in women’s rights and that comprehensive
agreements revise the status quo sufficiently so as to bring diffuse benefits to marginalized groups such
as women. Table A.1 presents the results of a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit analysis. I add a
dichotomous variable for comprehensive agreements in each stage of the model; the variable is coded 1
for those agreements that are comprehensive in nature and 0 for those agreements that are either partial
or process. The results indicate that comprehensive agreements do have a positive and statistically
significant effect on the presence of gender provisions within agreements. Comprehensive agreements
are more likely than other agreements to contain protections for women’s rights within them. On the
other hand, comprehensive agreements do not have a distinguishable effect on the likelihood of rights
improvements for women; while the coefficient for comprehensive agreements illustrates a negative
effect, the variable is not statistically significant in the outcome equation. The results thus confirm the
importance of specific gender provisions; the words on paper increase the commitment of actors and
generate indirect processes of women’s empowerment.
Second, one may question the extent to which third party observers create situations in which
women’s rights are more likely to improve. The international spotlight, for example, may reduce the
possibility of perpetuating exclusionary practices and may increase the likelihood that women gain a
voice in, at the very least, the political life of the state. The variable for United Nations peacekeeping
does not attain statistical significance in the main model (Table 2.2); indeed, while peacekeepers have
a positive effect on both the inclusion of gender-specific provisions within the agreement as well as on
the likelihood that rights will improve, the effects do not reach statistical significance. A glance at the
bivariate relationships between peacekeeping and both gender provisions as well as improvements in
women’s rights confirms the results of the more advanced analyses. Tables A.2 and A.3 illustrate that
there is no clear relationship between peacekeeping and gender-specific agreements or improvements
in women’s rights, respectively. While I posit that third-party observers should be embraced as tools
to increase accountability and improve prospects of agreement implementation, they are insufficient to
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generate tangible benefits for women’s rights.26
Discussion and Conclusion
Can peace agreements lay the groundwork for a higher quality peace following conflict? This current
research approaches one piece of this puzzle by analyzing the role peace agreements play in shaping
women’s political rights following conflict. When peace agreements such as the Arusha Peace and
Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi or the Lome´ Peace Agreement for Sierra Leone include women’s
rights provisions in their texts, does it work to generate improvements in gender relations in society? In
Sierra Leone, for example, conflict actors agreed: “Given that women have been particularly victimized
during the war, special attention shall be accorded to their needs and potentials in formulating and
implementing national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development programmes, to enable them to
play a central role in the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Sierra Leone” (Ho¨gbladh, 2011)
The theoretical framework developed in this dissertation argues that such statements matter within peace
agreements. They generate incentives and constraints on actors’ behavior, empower groups to push for
change, and may even spur norms shifts within societies. As such, I argue that agreements that include
gender-specific provisions generate positive effects for women’s rights in the aftermath of conflict.
My findings suggest that the contents of peace agreements play an unique role in shaping the polit-
ical environment for women following conflict. In particular, I find that gender-sensitive peace agree-
ments increase the likelihood of improvements to government respect for women’s political rights. Of
course, CIRI’s women’s political rights measure focuses on but one aspect of women’s rights. One
may even argue that improvements in political rights may be the easiest or fastest area for rights to be
extended. As such, I plan to extend this research to consider other women’s rights measures. In the
following chapter, within the case illustrations of Burundi, Liberia, South Africa, and Angola, I also
discuss broader gender equality metrics beyond CIRI’s strict conception of women’s political rights.
The policy implications stemming from this research are two-fold. First and foremost, it offers
support for the international community’s push for more gender-sensitive and gender-inclusive peace
26I have also explored running models that take into account a possible interaction effect between third-party enforcers and
gender provisions; the small number of observations, however, limit the possibilities for such analyses. Initial models do
suggest, however, that gender provisions have an independent effect on women’s rights.
50
processes. The United Nations, in particular, has gone to great lengths to encourage women’s inclusion
in all stages of conflict resolution. This paper’s findings speak to one component of the resolution
process: peace agreements. The results indicate that a gendered approach to peace agreements spurs
benefits for women following conflict. The words on paper matter and can be used as a tool to inspire
improvements in women’s rights. Of course, the number of peace agreements that include women’s
rights as provisions is still quite small. More must be done, then, to continue to approach peace as a
gender-inclusive process. In so doing, the international community and conflict actors can increase the
chances of a more open and equal environment following conflict.
Second, my work offers further support for the assertion that the content of peace agreements mat-
ters. More importantly, though, I show that the content of agreement has implications beyond the
cessation of war; agreements shape the trajectory of the post-conflict environment. Therefore, when
crafting agreements, actors must be aware that the words within the peace agreement matter beyond the
end of the conflict. The language and provisions within peace agreements hold potential to make a path
for new social, political, and economic structures. The international community, then, should continue
to pursue peace processes in a way that is not only focused on ending war, but also in a way that is
forward-thinking with respect to the quality of peace.
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CHAPTER 3
PEACE AGREEMENTS AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: CASE ILLUSTRATIONS
The empowerment of women is an essential prerequisite for the political, social, economic,
cultural and ecological security of the entire population. // Equality between the sexes does
much to enhance the well-being of women, men, girls and boys, and is indispensable for
achieving people-centred sustainable development. // The Government should pay special
attention to the status of women and combat all discrimination against them.
– Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (2000)
Since 1975, forty-eight of some two-hundred civil war peace agreements contain references to
women’s rights and gender equality.1 Agreements such as the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agree-
ment for Burundi set forth specific goals and steps to be taken to improve women’s standing in the
political, economic, and social lives of their country. Given that efforts on gender equality and women’s
empowerment by the United Nations have often been viewed as cheap talk rather than genuine commit-
ment,2 it is only right to question the strength of such provisions within peace agreements. Are peace
agreements effective mechanisms for generating a quality peace in the aftermath of civil war? Following
the widespread destruction and death of civil war, can negotiated settlements not only end war but also
create a peace that is meaningful?
The right of women to freely and equally enter into the political life of a country is a fundamental
dimension of a quality peace. When a country protects and extends rights to women, that country is
extending dignity and voice to half of the population. Such a move, as noted by Inglehart, Norris and
1Based on the coding I have done by reading all peace agreements in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Peace Agreement
Database (Ho¨gbladh, 2011). These numbers are from the universe of cases regardless of if the agreement ended or not.
2United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions on women, peace, and security have been
largely viewed as “show.” In spite of positive intentions, peace practitioners and scholars have found little evidence for their
efficacy in improving women’s status during and after conflicts.
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Welzel (2002), improves the quality of life and strength/legitimacy of democratic governance within
a country. Research by Caprioli (2005) points to structural violence in the form of gender inequality
as a key predictor of intrastate instability and conflict. Wallensteen (2015) asserts that women are a
significant resource for building peace in war torn societies. When women continue to be repressed and
marginalized, countries remain trapped in a cycle of exclusion and structural violence. In sum, I focus
on women’s rights to gauge the extent to which countries have not only ended personal violence but also
the structural violence that marginalizes large portions of society and undermines prospects for peace
(Galtung, 1969).
The quantitative analysis presented within Chapter 2 begins to answer the aforementioned questions.
In particular, Chapter 2 gains traction on whether or not the content of peace agreements matters for
what peace looks like following conflict. We know, from existing works on peace agreements, that the
content of agreements matters for the durability of peace (See, e.g. Walter, 2002; Fortna, 2003; Hartzell
and Hoddie, 2003; Mattes and Savun, 2009). Building upon these works and others, I have argued that
the content of agreements shapes the extent to which societies make strides toward a more positive or
quality peace following war. The quantitative results in the previous chapter confirm that women’s rights
protections within agreements work; when peace agreements contain provisions to protect and extend
rights to women, the likelihood of improvements to women’s post-conflict political rights increases.
While the resolution of civil war on its own provides an opening for change, gender-specific peace
agreements greatly increase the likelihood that women will benefit from the waves of change.
I argue that the causal pathways linking gender-specific peace agreements to improvements in
women’s rights are multifaceted and complex. In brief, the causal mechanisms cannot be reduced to
a single story; instead, peace agreements set in motion a number of social, legal, and psychological
processes that all hold the potential to influence the post-conflict period. I categorize the causal mech-
anisms within three categories, one direct and two indirect. The direct mechanism, I argue, stems
from the precision of language within peace agreements. Through precise references to women’s rights
and/or gender equality, peace agreements tie actors’ hands to change. In other words, the legal precision
renders deviations from the agreements more difficult. With clarity and specificity of language, actors
will be less able to deviate; specificity of language is a form of accountability, and actors can be held
accountable if they do not comply.
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Alternatively, I also recognize that peace agreements set in motion indirect processes that nonethe-
less lead to tangible benefits for women. Peace agreements, depending on their contents, hold the po-
tential to (1) generate positive externalities in the form of women’s empowerment, and (2) spur norms
shifts in gender relations within societies. Gender-specific provisions lead to positive externalities for
women’s post-conflict rights by empowering women and other actors to push for change. Because
women’s groups know that rights have been extended within agreements, they will be able to hold lead-
ers accountable to change. Gender-specific peace agreements also facilitate norms shifts by changing
how women and their roles are perceived. If gender enters the agenda of peace processes, that serves as
a signal to warring parties and to society as a whole that women’s voices matter and that women can be
legitimate political actors.
This chapter delves into a number of case illustrations to assess the plausibility of the causal story.
Tarrow (2010) emphasizes the important of bridging quantitative and qualitative work, writing:
...a single minded adherence to either quantitative or qualitative approaches straightjackets
scientific progress. Whenever possible, we should use qualitative data to interpret quanti-
tative findings, to get inside the processes underlying decision outcomes, and to investigate
the reasons for the tipping points in historical time-series (Tarrow, 2010, 109).
As I proceed with qualitative accounts of Liberia, Burundi, South Africa, and Angola, I seek to high-
light the causal processes set in motion by peace agreements. More broadly, this chapter answers the
following questions through the qualitative analysis: First, how do gender-specific peace agreements
change the incentives and behavior of actors in the post-conflict period? Which mechanisms appear to
be at work in each case? Second, are peace agreements the impetus for changing gender relations, or
do some underlying societal factors instead contribute to improvements (or lack thereof) in women’s
rights? This second question focuses on the issue of causal identification: how can we be certain that
peace agreements are the drivers of change rather than some other endogenous processes? A serious
consideration of these questions is necessary to illustrate the utility and scope of peace agreements’ ef-
fects. While I do not view peace agreements as a panacea to societal ills nor do I view them as the only
tool for shaping the quality of peace, I do argue that peacemakers must be cognizant of agreements’
potential power. Peace agreements should not only be seen as tools to end war, but they should also be
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recognized for their capacity to outline a new legal/political framework for post-conflict societies.3
A Note on Case Selection
The goal of this chapter in both selecting and analyzing specific cases is to better assess the causal
processes linking gender-specific peace agreements to changes in women’s rights following conflict.
The proposed causal mechanisms discussed above are varied; while the quantitative analysis in the
second chapter of this dissertation offers strong support for the hypothesized relationship, it is unable
to speak to the plausibility of each specific causal story. I therefore turn to a more in-depth analysis of
four cases make observations about context, process, and mechanisms. By focusing on causal-process
observations rather than data-set observations, this chapter eschews “breadth of coverage” for “depth of
insight” (Collier, Brady and Seawright, 2010a, 24). The four cases chosen herein – Angola, Burundi,
Liberia, and South Africa – offer depth of insight into the causal processes at work. As Collier, Brady
and Seawright (2010b) write, “A small number of causal-process observations, that seek to uncover
critical turning points or moments of decision making, can play a valuable role in causal inference.
Making an inference from a smoking gun does not require a large N in any traditional sense” (196).
With a focus on causal process observations, this chapter strengthens the inferences already set forth
throughout the quantitative analysis.
Before moving to the specific cases, I will briefly discuss the logic of case selection. I have chosen
four cases that exhibit variation across both the independent and dependent variables. While the cases
of Burundi, Liberia, and South Africa are cases where gender-specific peace agreements contributed to
improvements in women’s post-conflict political rights, the case of Angola demonstrates how the lack
of gender protections within agreements may inhibit improvements in women’s rights. Moreover, the
cases of Burundi, Liberia, and South Africa offer a variety of dialogues regarding causal process. These
cases each demonstrate different causal process observations which allow me to assess the mechanisms
at work. The Burundian cases illustrates the direct mechanism at work: the Arusha Peace and Recon-
ciliation Agreement led to direct policy changes within the country’s post-conflict laws. Liberia and
South Africa, on the other hand, each illustrate how peace agreements have indirect effects on gender
3See Bell and O’Rourke (2007) for an elaboration on the quasi-constitutional nature of peace agreements.
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relations, through positive externalities and norms shifts, respectively.
Beyond choosing the cases for their variation on both explanatory and outcome variables, I have
also chosen the cases of Angola, Burundi, Liberia, and South Africa to minimize variance in confound-
ing factors. In choosing these cases, I take into consideration the following variables: culture/region,
pre-war levels of women’s rights, women’s role in the conflict and peace process, and time period. By
choosing all Sub-Saharan African countries, I minimize variance caused by regional and/or cultural
differences in the status of women.4 Although within the same region, the chosen cases do exhibit
variance in the extent to which women experienced political rights in the period prior to conflict (Cin-
granelli, Richards and Clay, 2014). Women were completely excluded in pre-conflict South Africa.5
In pre-conflict Liberia, women’s rights were guaranteed by law but severely limited in practice. Given
traditional gender roles, then, we may expect little from those two countries’ peace processes. On the
other hand, in both Angola and Burundi, women were moderately involved in the political life of the
pre-conflict state. As such, improvements should face less resistance. In all cases, I want to point out
that improvements in women’s rights should never be assumed to be inevitable. I argue that women’s
empowerment is not a phenomenon that just happens. Instead, gender equality is a goal that societies
and political actors must work toward and spur through political processes.
The cases also exhibit variance on a potential alternative explanatory variable: women’s involve-
ment as both fighters and advocates for peace. An essential question to ask when analyzing the causal
relationships and findings put forth in the quantitative analyses is as follows: are peace agreements the
drivers of change in gender relations or does women’s involvement in the conflict or peace process lead
to tangible gains for women following conflict? In other words, are the observed effects driven by legal
mechanisms or by the presence of powerful female actors in society? While these questions warrant in
depth research in their own right, I have chosen cases to account for concerns about endogenous treat-
ment effects. For example, Angola had a number of female fighters throughout the country’s conflict, a
4I want to emphasize that I am only claiming to minimize the variance; I am by no means claiming that there is not within-
region variation in the status of women. Moreover, when I say that there are variances in the treatment of women by culture,
this is not to offer a free-pass to gender-based discrimination or violence. Galtung (1990), for example, is quite clear in stating
that cultural violence – structural and/or personal violence justified by cultural norms – is still violence.
5According to the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Database, women’s political rights were restricted by law and in
practice. With a score of zero, South African women had no political rights under law and/or the country had laws to prohibit
women’s participation in government, the political process, or public life (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014).
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signal of an active and (at least somewhat) empowered women’s role. Yet, Angolan women saw their
rights ignored in the peace processes of that country and as a result, they experienced no improvement
in their status following conflict. Liberia, as well, had an active women’s movement throughout the
conflict; that country, however, saw women’s rights codified in the Accra Peace Agreement and increas-
ingly respected following conflict. Just a brief discussion of two cases, then, offers indication that peace
agreements, rather than women’s involvement in the conflict or peace process, lead to improvements
in women’s post-conflict rights.6 I will discuss these questions, however, in more detail in the case
illustrations below.
Finally, the chosen cases exhibit variance across time periods. In particular, I want to account
for the potential counter-explanation that increasing pressure by the international community in the
post-UNSCR 1325 world has led to both an increase in gender-sensitive peace agreements as well
as an increase in the likelihood that women’s rights will actually improve following conflict. One of
my positive cases, South Africa, was crafted, signed, and implemented in the early 1990s prior to
the ”Women, Peace, and Security” time period. On the other hand, Angola’s Luena Memorandum
of Understanding was signed and implemented in the post-UNSCR 1325 period, a time when peace
practitioners and peace agreements were expected to look at peace through a gendered lens. Again, I
recognize the importance in accounting for the potential confounding effects of international pressure.
Ultimately, however, I argue that the peace agreements themselves are the drivers of changes in gender
relations. I now turn to the qualitative accounts of the civil wars, peace processes, and post-conflict
gender relations in Angola, Burundi, Liberia, and South Africa to assess causal mechanisms and the
true role of peace agreements in shaping a quality peace.
Qualitative Illustrations
With the case selection process now outlined, I turn to an analysis of each of the cases. I provide
historical context of the conflict, the peace process, and the resulting peace for each case. Throughout,
6There are several cases in my dataset in which women held a seat at the negotiating table, but the peace agreement did
not include women’s rights provisions. In turn, the cases of Guinea-Bissau, Uganda, Papua New Guinea, and the Philippines
saw initial conditions that should have been favorable for both a gender-specific peace agreement and the improvement of
women’s rights. Because women’s rights were not legally specified within the peace agreements, however, women’s rights
saw no improvements following those conflicts.
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I assess the role of the peace agreement(s) and consider how the presence or absence of gender specific
provisions led to shifts in women’s post-conflict political rights. I begin with the case of Burundi, a
case in which the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement directly led to a shift in the country’s
laws and protections for women. The second and third cases, Liberia and South Africa, illustrate the
two indirect mechanisms. In Liberia, the Accra Peace Agreement generated positive externalities by
empowering Liberian women to push leaders to extend greater rights to women. South Africa, on the
other hand, saw a shift in norms in the post-conflict period; societal opinions toward women became
more favorable following the signing of the Interim Constitution in 1993. Angola serves as the final
case. In Angola, a series of peace agreements maintained a narrow focus on the military dimensions of
conflict, leaving gender and other societal questions unanswered. As such, the case of Angola illustrates
how the absence of women’s rights in peace agreements may serve as a roadblock in the development
of a more gender egalitarian society. The cases demonstrate that the peace process is an opportunity to
generate change and that peace agreements, through a variety of causal pathways, hold the potential to
shape the nature of post-conflict societies.
Tying Hands: The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi
Civil war and violence has engulfed Burundi for much of the country’s post-colonial period. Under
the control of German and later Belgian colonizers, Burundian society transitioned into one that was
marked by systematic division, exclusion, and repression. Much as they did in neighboring Rwanda,
German and Belgian colonizers exploited and exacerbated ethnic differences in Burundian society.
Specifically, colonizers placed power in the hands of the minority Tutsi group, leaving the majority
Hutu population in marginal roles, at best.7 In contrast to Rwanda, however, the Tutsi minority retained
a stronghold on power when the country gained independence from Belgium in 1962 (Uppsala Conflict
Data Program, 2016). Following independence, the government, under Tutsi leadership, systematically
excluded Hutus from the political and economic life of the state (Sambanis, 2004). A 1965 coup attempt
was swiftly put down, but nonetheless catalyzed high levels of violence against the Hutu population.
During both the 1970s and the 1980s, the government perpetrated large-scale Hutu massacres. By the
7Tutsis made up approximately ten to fourteen percent of Burundi’s population, while Hutus hold a large majority with 85 to
90 percent of the population. The country is also home to a very small proportion of Twa.
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early 1990s, a number of Hutu militant groups rebelled against the minority Tutsi government, leading
to almost two decades of civil conflict (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016).8
In the years leading up to and during the conflict in Burundi, women’s social status was subordinated
through a system of patriarchal norms and laws (Falch, 2010). For example, Burundian women faced
discriminatory inheritance laws, and although not legally limited, the experiences and opportunities of
women in the political and economic life of the state were greatly unequal to their male counterparts
(United States Department of State, 1999). Falch (2010) notes that women were the most dispropor-
tionately affected group during the country’s civil war: “Targeted for their role in reproducing the ethnic
group to which they belonged, women and girls were subjected to rape and other forms of sexual abuse”
by all sides of the conflict (Falch, 2010, 9).
In spite of the obstacles and violence that systematically repressed women, Burundi’s female pop-
ulation exerted efforts to gain a stronger and more equal voice in society. During and following the
conflict, an increasing number of women – out of necessity – adopted new roles in both private and
public spheres, as both heads of household and as grassroots activists. According to Anderson (2015),
Burundi’s women responded publicly to the conflict in 1993, forming non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) that bridged the country’s ethnic divide with a goal of working toward peace.
Although women’s involvement in politics was on an upward trajectory leading up to the signing
of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, their continued success and empowerment was not
inevitable. Women in Burundi faced daily discrimination, both through legal limitations and through
practices that marginalized and stifled their voices. As late as 1999, the year prior to the signing of the
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, the United States Department of State identified women
as underrepresented in government and political life and as victims of discriminatory social, security,
and educational practices (United States Department of State, 1999). Even with the proliferation of
women’s organizations, women’s status remained largely marginal. When negotiators met to organize
peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania, they granted seats to a vast array of civil society groups but decided
8According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, the conflict varied in intensity between 1991 and 2009, at times qualifying
as a minor conflict (25+ battle deaths) and other times reaching levels of full-scale war (1,000+ battle deaths). In total, it is
estimated that the conflict caused the deaths of over 300,000 people and the displacement of another 1.3 million (Sullivan,
2005).
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to exclude women’s groups (UN Women, 2012).9 Indeed, while women’s involvement in political life
increased throughout the 1990s, negotiators argued that “no group could claim to represent women or
speak on behalf of all Burundian women” (UN Women, 2012, 10). If key actors in Burundian society
remained resistant to women’s empowerment as late as 1998 and 1999, then what caused the shift in
legal protections for women and an increase in women’s political opportunity? In the following sections,
I analyze the contents of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi and assess the
extent to which the peace agreement served as an impetus for real and positive change in Burundi’s
gender relations. I then move on to consider the strength of the causal process observations as well as
the plausibility of alternative explanations.
Women’s Rights Within the Peace Agreement
Burundi serves as an example of a case where gender protections and provisions within the peace
agreement led directly to a change in government policies toward women. Specifically, I argue that the
peace agreement tied actors’ hands to change and increased the probability that actors would respect
and/or protect women’s rights in the post-conflict period. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agree-
ment for Burundi, through its quite extensive and specific references to women’s rights, changed the
political incentives of actors such that they extended greater rights to women following conflict. As evi-
denced through the make-up of the negotiating table and the signatories of the agreement – which were
all male – Burundi’s women faced discriminatory and exclusionary practices. The peace agreement,
however, set forth a new framework for post-conflict gender relations which became legally codified in
the post-conflict state apparatus.
What reforms, specifically, are present in the final draft of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation
Agreement for Burundi? Although the negotiators did not concede on every point raised by female ob-
servers or the concurrently occurring All-Party Burundi Women’s Peace Conference, the final agreement
is perhaps the most thorough example of a gender-specific peace agreement. For example, the agree-
ment grants “Equal opportunities of access to [public administration] for all men and women through
9The exclusion, although only temporary, is indicative of the prevailing systems of marginalization and repression of women
in Burundi.
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strict respect for, or the introduction of, laws and regulations governing the recruitment of State per-
sonnel and the staff of public and parastatal enterprises, as well as through transparency of competitive
entrance examinations” (p. 19). The agreement also enumerates (1) equal access to education (p. 19);
(2) judicial reforms to correct gender imbalances (p. 20); (3) an adherence to CEDAW, the Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (p. 26); and (4) freedom of marriage
(p. 26), property rights (p.27), and protection for female-headed households (p. 80). The agreement
does not, however, grant women guarantees for specific thresholds of involvement. The ambiguity of
some of the language thus reiterates the resistance to change demonstrated by conflict actors.
Beyond the provisions included in the main body of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
for Burundi, the agreement also includes an Annex with further details on the political, economic, and
social laws and practices to be implemented following the conflict. Perhaps driven by the pressure of
domestic and international actors, the Annex includes the question: “Why the advancement of women?”
Within this section, the agreement states:
Burundian women have suffered greatly from the various crises that have taken place in
the country from independence to the present. Thousands of women have been widowed
and traumatized. Their property has been looted and their children, have dropped out of
school. Fearing for their lives, some of their husbands have fled the country, abandoning
them with little or no means of survival. Over half of the refugees and sinistre´s are women
and children for whom the future looks bleak. This situation has had dire consequences
for the lives of children: some have become orphans, vagrants and street children. Their
quality of life has deteriorated considerably (Chapter 2.5.2.1; Page 122).
Spurred by the hardships of women described in the preceding statement, the Annex also provides a list
of “tangible” steps conflict actors have agreed to take in order to further the advancement of women.
These steps can be found in Table 3.1.
Effects of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, which was signed in 2000, provides
an extensive set of goals and responsibilities for gender relations in the post-conflict period. While
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Table 3.1: Annex to the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, Chapter 2.5.2.2
Tangible actions for the advancement of women:
(a) Women must be included in all management bodies established as part of the reconstruction
process;
(b) Women must be made aware of national reconciliation activities and must be mobilized to
take part in them. Women must be promoted as peace mediators;
(c) Meetings between women in Burundi and women of the diaspora should be held so that
they can exchange ideas about their respective problems and the future of the country;
(d) Women and children who find themselves in the special position of heads of household must
be taken into account. The entitlements of those widowed and orphaned by Burundis various
crises must be restored;
(e) A body should be established to identify women’s problems in the context of the Burundian
crisis and suggest appropriate solutions to the Government;
(f) Legislation on women’s inheritance rights must be drafted, adopted and promulgated;
(g) Destroyed homes must be rebuilt for homeless women;
(h) Help should be provided to women to engage in income-generating activities;
(i) Counselling, training and assistance with reintegration should be provided to girls and women
who have been subjected to sexual abuse and forced marriages during and after the crisis.
progress still remains slow, the case of Burundi illustrates the hypothesized relationship, that a gender-
specific peace agreement will lead to the increase in the relative quality of peace in terms of women’s
opportunity and inclusivity. As evidence of initial progress, one can look to the transitional government
that was installed in 2001. Women held 15.3% of ministerial positions, 9.1% of seats in the National
Assembly, and 18.5% of seats in the Senate (Falch, 2010). These numbers, while still low, are an
improvement over the single cabinet position held by a woman earlier in the country’s history (and that
position was as Minister of Women, Welfare, and Social Affairs) (United States Department of State,
1999).
The more apparent evidence of the efficacy of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
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came, however, when the country adopted a new constitution in 2005. The Constitution directly reaf-
firmed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (and thus its goals and provisions for women).
Moreover, the Constitution “stipulated that there should be a minimum of 30% female representation
in the government, the National Assembly and the Senate (Article 129, 164, 180), [and] also included
provisions regarding party lists for elections, requiring that at least one of every four candidates should
be a woman” (Falch, 2010, 12). By the time elections occurred during the summer of 2005, the number
of women in political power had further increased over the levels of 2001, achieving over 30 percent
of seats in the National Assembly, Senate, and cabinet positions. Throughout the post-conflict period,
Burundi’s government guaranteed women’s political rights both in law and in practice; according to
the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Database, Burundi moved from a score of 2 prior to conflict
to a score of 3 following the signing of the Arusha Agreement, where three is the best possible score
according to their coding (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014). The agreement, through its gender-
specific provisions, set in motion a series of events that improved women’s political status in Burundian
society. While there is still progress to be made toward gender equality, the Arusha Peace and Recon-
ciliation Agreement and its direct reaffirmation within the Constitution indicate the legal potential of
peace agreements.
Comments on Causality and Confounders
From the above accounts of the contents of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and
the status of gender relations in the post-conflict period, I argue that the contents of the peace agree-
ment played a driving role in facilitating change. The peace agreement led, through its gender-aware
language, to a higher quality peace. Although I will address this more fully below, I argue that it was
the agreement – as opposed to the presence of a women’s peace movement – that served as the imme-
diate impetus for change.10 Moreover, the evidence suggests that the causal mechanism at play within
the case of Burundi was the direct mechanism; the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement led to
specific legal commitments by actors to extend rights to women in the post-conflict period.
To identify the causal process, I have presented information on both the main explanatory variable,
10At the same time, however, the women’s movement was fundamental in attracting the international attention of UNIFEM
and placing constant pressure on conflict actors at the negotiating table.
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gender-specific peace agreement, and the dependent variable, improvements in women’s post-conflict
rights. By considering the language of the agreement and the processes of change following the con-
flict, it is apparent that the language of the peace agreement played a formative role in levels of women’s
rights following conflict. In the peace agreement, women were promised “equal opportunities of access
to [public administration]” and political roles. Following the conflict, women experienced a modest but
immediate increase in their representation across branches of government. Political actors in Burundi,
still predominantly men, then went on to codify the gender provisions of the Arusha Peace and Recon-
ciliation Agreement into law. The Constitution of 2005 reaffirms the agreement and further guarantees
women access to executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Women are guaranteed
spots on party lists and in national governmental positions. Through its language, the Arusha Peace and
Reconciliation Agreement laid the legal-political framework for the country’s post-conflict constitution.
While I cannot comment on the counterfactual – the extent to which the Constitution would have had
so many protections for women in the absence of the Arusha Agreement – I can comment on the par-
allels between the two documents. In spite of resistance by male actors in society (at the negotiating
table and following negotiations), the same gendered language of the Arusha Agreement appeared in
the Constitution. Actors tied their hands to change, and these changes were evident in the Constitution
of 2005. Moreover, the potential domestic and/or international costs of reneging decreased incentives to
back down or expend energy undermining the provisions of the Arusha Agreement.
Alternatively – or perhaps complementarily – the analysis of the events leading up to and during
the peace process in Burundi allows me to identify an additional causal process at work. The Arusha
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, in addition to directly shaping the legal status and opportunities
for women, also created positive externalities in the form of greater female empowerment. As afore-
mentioned, Burundi was home to a growing number of women’s NGOs who were working for peace
and for a greater voice in the country’s politics. Following the Arusha Agreement, women “continued
to pressure for increased women’s political representation...and the calls for guaranteed representation
in decision-making bodies were eventually accepted and incorporated into the new post-transitional
Constitution” (Falch, 2010, 11). Therefore, while the gendered language of the Arusha Peace and Rec-
onciliation Agreement led to direct legal changes in the post-conflict period, the extent of those changes
may be explained by the empowerment of female actors to continue their push for change.
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The final proposed causal pathway in Chapter 3, norms shifts, does not seem to be at work in
the case of Burundi. Many male politicians and party leaders remain resistant to women’s voices and
even threaten women who become too outspoken (Falch, 2010). Therefore, while both in law and in
practice women’s rights have improved and women’s groups have continued to push for greater equality,
predominant perceptions toward gender remain unequal and patriarchal.
While I have identified the causal processes linking gender-sensitive peace agreements to improve-
ments in women’s rights, I expect a number of questions to remain with respect to confounding variables.
Specifically, the question comes to mind regarding how women’s groups or female negotiators may have
served as agents for change. Was it the peace agreement driving changes in women’s rights, or was the
growing women’s movement the true driver for change? I argue that while the women’s movement was
instrumental in placing ongoing pressure on conflict actors, their efforts were insufficient to guarantee
change in the post-conflict period. The agreement was a necessary component to ensure that the dreams
and goals of the women’s movement became reality in the post-conflict period.
Falch (2010) writes that “notable changes in women’s political role[s] were initiated during the
peace negotiations, which took place in Arusha, Tanzania, between 1998 and 2000” (10). Women’s
NGOs worked tirelessly for peace in Burundi. Time and again, however, women were excluded or
dismissed from the formal peace processes (Anderson, 2015). Although initially excluded, women
were eventually granted the role of observer. Through this role, women exerted some influence over the
peace process. Burundian women were able to remain aware of all progress, liaise between negotiators
and women’s groups, and lobby for women’s rights to be included within the agreement. With the help
of the United Nations, (UNIFEM, specifically) an All-Party Burundi Women’s Peace Conference met
in 2000 and occurred parallel to the negotiations in Arusha. The conference resulted in a declaration
urging warring parties (read, male negotiators) “to adopt a gender perspective in all issues raised during
the talks, and to guarantee women 30% representation” in all branches of government (Falch, 2010, 11).
While many of the demands made by women were ultimately met through ongoing pressure following
the signing of the agreement, the male negotiators refused to guarantee a particular level of women’s
representation in decision-making bodies.
Anderson (2010) points out that negotiating parties rejected women’s demands for a seat at the table,
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arguing that women had no right to participate in talks given their limited representation in political bod-
ies at the time. In reaction to demands for quotas and/or specific levels of representation, the negotiators
“adamantly argued that there were insufficient qualified women to hold political office” (Falch, 2010,
11).The predominant attitude by male political actors in Burundi, it seems, was one in which women
held a subordinate role. Based on the accounts of the atmosphere during the Arusha peace process, I
argue that Burundi was not initially a candidate for improvements in women’s rights. Key conflict actors
were hesitant/resistant to women’s political involvement, and therefore the country faced clear obstacles
on the path to a higher quality peace. Although women’s groups were influencing the agenda, many of
their efforts were falling on deaf ears.
The preceding suggests that while women’s voices were loud throughout the peace process, they
were not always taken seriously by those at the negotiating table. The question I must still address,
however, is the extent to which the processes of improvements in the quality of peace were driven by
societal groups or by the peace agreement. If pressure by women’s groups drove the presence of gender-
specific provisions within the peace agreement, then is it still possible to identify the peace agreement
as the driver of causal processes? The sources of women’s rights provisions within the Arusha Peace
and Reconciliation Agreement stem from both domestic pressure and international focus. According to
Anderson (2015), “women’s rights were included in the Arusha Accords largely because of the inter-
ventions of UNIFEM” (74).11 Based on prevailing sexist and exclusionary norms and perceptions by
conflict actors, I argue that the women’s movement would have been insufficient to secure change in
the absence of legal provisions within the agreement. The legal, quasi-constitutional status of the peace
agreement was necessary to ensure an improvement in women’s rights.12
Admittedly, the case of Burundi renders it difficult to completely untangle the effects of women’s
groups on post-conflict rights from the effects of peace agreements on post-conflict rights. I am the
11Anderson (2015) goes on to recognize, though, that while UNIFEM was essential in getting conflict actors to take women’s
rights seriously, UNIFEM may not have been able to exert any pressure if there were not also well-organized women’s groups
within the country. This highlights an issue I will discuss below with regards to causality: the causal process is highly complex,
and many times, unique to a specific case.
12Would the peace agreement have been so thorough in its provisions for women in the absence of international pressure and/or
the women’s movement? Perhaps not. My hypothesis, however, is about the effects of gendered peace agreements; regardless
of their source, I expect peace agreements to lead to an increase in the quality of peace. Peace agreements, in many ways,
should be seen as tools for women’s movements and international actors to codify their goals. Without such legal assurances
within agreements, the calls of women’s groups and international actors will remain talk rather than reality.
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first to recognize the potential for endogenous effects. While women actively pressured conflict actors
to engage issues of gender, women were left marginalized from the peace process. Would women’s
rights have improved in Burundi in the absence of a gender-specific peace agreement? Would a vibrant
women’s movement be sufficient to spur change? I argue that women’s presence in civil society or
in negotiations cannot be taken as a sign that improvements in women’s rights following conflict are
inevitable. A vibrant women’s movement is not sufficient to lead to legal changes for women’s status
in society. The evidence from Burundi suggests the utility in codifying women’s rights into a legal
document. While the male negotiators still viewed women as marginal and lacking political power, the
presence of women’s rights in the agreement tied leaders’ hands to change. The effects of the peace
agreement are directly evident in the post-conflict constitution for Burundi.
Assessing the causal process in Burundi illustrates the direct power of peace agreements and their
provisions. At the same time, however, it highlights the complexities of the peace process. I do not want
to assert that women’s groups play no role; to the contrary, I would argue that this question warrants
further systematic research. I will state, however, that the effects of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation
Agreement are clear. The agreement was reaffirmed by the country’s constitution, thus solidifying an
improved status for women in the post-conflict society.
Conclusions
The post-conflict status of women is not perfect in Burundi. Although women hold a more visible
and prominent role in the country’s politics, they still experience exclusion from key decision making
processes. For example, a female member of the legislature explained: “decisions in political parties
are usually taken by a small group of men behind closed doors, and women have to wait for their
male leadership to take its decisions before voting in the Parliament” (Falch, 2010, 14). The lesson
to be taken, then, is that in many cases, peace agreements may generate legal changes but they do not
always generate drastic or immediate changes in attitudes toward women. Hopefully, with continued
political involvement and ongoing activity by women’s groups, gender relations will further improve
within Burundi. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement helped spur a shift in Burundian
society; while women were not even granted a seat at the table in 2000, women now make up more
than thirty percent of many national government positions. Even though women are still excluded from
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leadership roles through explicit and implicit biases, their role is one that is much improved over pre-
conflict realities. A peace agreement is not a magic bullet for exclusions, bias, and repression, but the
case of Burundi also illustrates that the positive effects of the peace agreement cannot be brushed aside
or diminished.
Positive Externalities: Liberian Women Empowered to Push for Change
Africa’s first republic, Liberia has been a free and independent state since 1847. From its earliest
years, however, the political, social, and economic structures of the country were marked by marginal-
ization and exclusion. Americo-Liberians, a group of freed American slaves and free-born blacks from
the United States, made up a small (approximately five percent of the population) but elite group who
governed the country. The indigenous populations were heavily marginalized and excluded from po-
litical and economic life in the state (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). Tensions came to a head
in the 1970s as economic struggles struck the country. In 1980, a coup led by Samuel Doe overthrew
the minority-ruled government, with Doe declaring a desire to liberate the masses from poverty. Doe’s
time in power did little, however, to improve the lives of indigenous Liberians; indeed, Doe continued
to exploit the natural resources of the country and funnel resources to the elites (Paris, 2004).
In 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), under command of Charles Taylor, entered
into Liberia to oust Doe from power. By 1990, rebel forces had taken Monrovia and killed Doe. The
fighting, however, would continue until 1995, with numerous rebel groups fighting across the country
to gain control of national power and resources. In 1996, warring factions signed the Abuja II Peace
Agreement, paving the way for elections and new leadership within Liberia. The years following the
resolution of this first conflict episode were unstable and uncertain; Charles Taylor was elected president,
but low-levels of fighting continued throughout the country. During this time, the Liberians United
for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) began mobilizing. In 2000, full-scale war had once again
erupted between LURD and the forces of Charles Taylor’s government (Uppsala Conflict Data Program,
2016). The Liberian civil wars are ones which truly affected all members of society. In the first episode
of conflict alone, from 1990 to 1997, an estimated ten percent of the country’s pre-war population of 2.5
million people died, one-third became refugees, and the vast majority of others were displaced (Paris,
2004).
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What was the role and status of Liberian women prior to and during the country’s civil war? Fuest
(2008) writes that Liberian women were subjected to traditional gender roles of child rearing, domestic
work, and food production. As a patriarchal and conservative society, Liberian women took a secondary
role to men in all dimensions of life (Aning, 1998). Women experienced limited access to public political
roles, although on the local level women were able to exert greater voice as female chiefs and elders.
While women did hold ministerial positions under the rule of President Tolbert (1971-1980), the status
of their political rights remained quite restricted in practice at the start of the country’s civil war (Fuest,
2008). According to Cingranelli, Richards and Clay (2014), Liberia earned a score of one for women’s
political rights in 1989, a score which represents a country in which political equality is guaranteed by
law but severely limited in practice.
In spite of Liberian women’s limited political role in the years leading up to conflict, the Women
in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) began to mobilize women as agents for peace as early as 1991
(Bekoe and Parajon, 2007). Women’s peace efforts intensified following the resumption of civil war in
Liberia in 2000. Together with the Mano River Women’s Peace Network and other women’s groups,
WIPNET pushed for peace during negotiations in Accra, Ghana (UN Women, 2012). Like the case
of Burundi, women’s groups were excluded from the negotiating table and instead given the status of
permanent observers to the peace process. Still marginalized in Liberian society, then, women had a
ways to go before achieving equality of political opportunity in Liberia. In what follows, I discuss the
extent to which the peace agreements in Liberia contained provisions for women’s rights. I go on to
address whether or not these provisions contributed to improvements in women’s post-conflict rights,
and if so, how.
Women’s Rights Within Liberian Peace Agreements
Provisions for women’s rights made an appearance in both of Liberia’s comprehensive peace agree-
ments, the Abuja II Peace Agreement in 1996 as well as the Accra Peace Agreement in 2003. The first
major (and moderately “successful”) peace agreement to end conflict was signed in 1996. This agree-
ment, the Abuja II Peace Agreement – in conjunction with its predecessor, the first Abuja Agreement
– laid forth plans for a transitional government. The Abuja II Peace Agreement guaranteed a woman,
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Ruth Perry, the position of Chairwoman of the Transitional Council.13 While the agreement does not
extend rights to women as a whole, it does represent a slight shift in gender relations. By promising the
role of Chairwoman of the Transitional Council to Ruth Perry, who would go on to head the transitional
government until Charles Taylor’s election in 1997, the agreement signals that women have the capacity
to be influential political leaders. At the same time, the agreement systematically ignores wider calls for
a more inclusive political system.
The Accra Agreement, which was signed in 2003, filled many of the gaps that were present in the
earlier peace agreements in Liberia. The agreement reaffirmed the need for a transitional power sharing
government, it restructured the security forces in Liberia, and contained specific provisions to ensure
that former warring factions would have a role in the transitional government. Beyond inclusion of
former warring parties, the agreement also reserved spots in the transitional government for civil society
groups and special interest groups. Within the agreement, women are guaranteed spots in a Governance
Reform Commission as well as on the National Elections Commission and the National Transitional
Legislative Assembly. Specifically, the Accra Peace Agreement includes the following provisions:
The NTGL, in formulating and implementing programs for national rehabilitation, recon-
struction and development, for the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Liberia in
the post-conflict period, shall ensure that the needs and potentials of the war victims are
taken into account and that gender balance is maintained in apportioning responsibilities
for program implementation (Article XXXI)
Under the NTGL, all new judicial appointments shall be made by the Chairman of the
NTGL and approved by the NTLA. Nominations for such judicial appointments shall be
based on a shortlist of candidates for each position recommended by the National Bar As-
sociation, including the female lawyers (Article XXVII)
The [Governance Reform] Commission shall be established as an independent Commis-
sion with seven (7) permanent members appointed by the Chairman and confirmed by the
13It is important to note, however, the shortcomings in this agreement. Charles Call, for example, notes that this agreement
ultimately failed the Liberian people insofar as it did not sufficiently extend political inclusion to all politically relevant actors
(Call, 2012). Charles Taylor was able to consolidate power amongst his own elites, leading to de facto exclusion of other
groups.
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NTLA, from a list provided by civil society organizations. It shall have a chairperson who
must be from civil society. Its membership shall include women. (Article XVI)
While not nearly as extensive as those rights provided in the case of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation
Agreement for Burundi, the Accra Peace Agreement nonetheless makes efforts to build a post-conflict
political system that is more gender-balanced. Moreover, the agreement went much further than previous
agreements in Liberia. Even if references to women’s involvement in the political process are “thin”
or limited, I argue that they will still hold implications for the post-conflict quality of peace. In the
following section, I discuss the extent to which both the Abuja II Peace Agreement and the Accra Peace
Agreement led to changes in women’s post-conflict political rights.
Effects of the Accra Peace Agreement
Did either of the aforementioned peace agreements generate positive shifts for the status of women
in Liberia? The Abuja II Peace Agreement was quite limited in its extension of rights to women; indeed,
the agreement is better characterized as extending rights to a woman rather than to women as a whole.
As noted previously, however, by placing a woman in a prominent governmental position, the peace
agreement does lay the foundation for changing perceptions of and roles for women. Following its
signing, the Abuja II Agreement was implemented, and Ruth Perry became the first female African to
serve as head of state. According to Cingranelli, Richards and Clay (2014), Liberia transitioned from a
score of 1 prior to conflict to a score of 2 in the aftermath of the Abuja II Peace Agreement. News reports
from the time period indicate that Perry did not seek the position (Rupert, 1997), and she revealed in an
interview that “the proposition frightened [her] a bit” (Tostevin, 1996). Under pressure from women’s
groups, the rebel factions who chose Perry did so because she was politically credible, having served in
Liberia’s Senate in the 1980s, but also because she seemed to represent no danger to the warlords, since
she had never been part of the conflict (Rupert, 1997). Regardless the circumstances surrounding her rise
to power, Perry was committed to running the country with strength and pursuing efforts to consolidate
peace. Adams (2008) characterizes Perry’s appointment as “and important victory for women peace
activists in Liberia” (476). One can argue, even, that her appointment helped to further empower and
embolden the women’s movement to continue their peace efforts in the subsequent conflict episode.
While the gendered context and effects of the Abuja II Peace Agreement were relatively limited, the
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Figure 3.1: Women’s Civil Liberties, Liberia 1980-2014
Accra Peace Agreement went further in outlining the need for a gender balance in the state’s political
institutions. To what extent did the Accra Peace Agreement continue the process of change in Liberian
society? Did the agreement slow or reverse processes of gender empowerment, or did it serve as a
springboard to further improve Liberian women’s rights? The initial evidence from post-2003 Liberia
indicates that the Accra Peace Agreement, as hypothesized, spurred improvements in women’s post-
conflict political rights. According to Cingranelli, Richards and Clay (2014), prior to the second conflict
episode in Liberia, women’s rights stood at moderate levels; women were guaranteed political rights
legally but their rights were restricted in practice. Following the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement
in 2003, women’s rights improved to a score of 3.14 The political rights of women, then, shifted from
legally respected but marginalized in practice to being respected both in law and in practice. Women
began to engage more fully in national politics, and by 2005, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf became the first
female elected head of state in the region.
Of course, one should be careful to infer from the election of a female head of state that Liberia
14Here, I must note that the shift was not immediate; the transition from 2 to 3 occurred after a couple of years, largely because
the transitional period following the conflict took time. Once the legal-political structures outlined in the agreement took hold,
government respect for women’s rights improved.
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had overcome its gender biases and exclusions. To what extent did the post-conflict political rights of
women reflect a “gender balance” as is called for in the Accra Peace Agreement? Like Burundi, many
male leaders and former conflict actors in Liberia remained resistant to greater change. Adams (2008)
writes that many key actors and legislators in the transitional government were opposed to electoral
quotas for women. A proposed bill in December 2004 that would have implemented quotas failed to
pass, and although a bill was finally approved in 2005, members of the Liberian National Elections
Commission refused to enforce the new law. While on the one hand the majority of Liberian leaders
seemed to not take calls for “gender balance” seriously, on the other hand women continued to use their
voices to push for real change.
The transitional institutions following the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement left much to be
desired, but the peace agreement did nevertheless generate an opening and a platform through which
women’s groups could continue to push for greater rights and representation. Data from Coppedge et al.
(2015) illustrates a sharp improvement in women’s broader civil liberties following the signing of the
Accra Peace Agreement. Figure 3.1 presents levels of women’s civil liberties in Liberia from 1980 to
2014. The rating, ranging from 0 to 1, measures the extent to which women have the ability to make
meaningful decisions in their lives; more specifically, the measure includes information on freedom
of domestic movement, the right to private property, freedom from forced labor, and access to justice.
Beyond political rights, then, there has been a clear improvement in women’s rights in comparison to
pre-conflict levels. The following section goes on to assess the extent to which the peace agreements
themselves spurred improvements in women’s standing.
Comments on Causality and Confounders
To explore and assess the validity of the causal processes at work in Liberia I consider the underlying
assumption that it was the peace agreements – rather than some other variable – that spurred improve-
ments in Liberian women’s political rights. In the case of both of the peace agreements that include
gender provisions, I argue that one primary causal mechanism was at work: positive externalities. In
other words, the peace agreements in Liberia generated positive externalities by further empowering
the women’s movements in Liberia. At the same time, the peace agreements also offered legal legiti-
macy and political opening for women’s calls for equality. As Fuest (2008) writes, the war in Liberia
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may, in spite of all of its hardships and horrors, have increased the legitimacy of women’s claims to
political participation. From an interview, Fuest (2008) learns: “the war has made an enabling atmo-
sphere for women to strive for leadership” (202). As I have noted throughout this dissertation, war
generates an opening for change by destabilizing and often destroying the status quo. This opening does
not, however, guarantee change. Instead, the structures and systems of power that are generated in the
post-conflict period are dependent on the legal-political framework developed during a country’s peace
processes. The civil war and the development of a strong women’s movement created powerful initial
conditions for improvements in women’s post-conflict rights, but the peace agreements served as a step
that codified efforts to establish a more gender balanced society.
With the opening for change created by the peace process and the gender-aware foundations gener-
ated within the Accra Peace Agreement, women made their voices heard in the post-2003 transition pe-
riod. Women’s groups used the language and provisions of the Accra Peace Agreement as justifications
to push for greater political access. In the year following the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement,
seeing little change being made, Liberian women called for a minimum 30 percent electoral quotas and
for 30 percent representation for women in decision-making positions within parties (Dukuly, 2004).
Women – aware of and empowered by the agreement’s provisions for gender balance – sought to hold
leaders of the transitional government accountable. Because leaders were not initially following through
with the outlined reforms, women seized the opportunity to push for change. Women’s groups and other
political actors took advantage of both the opening for change as well as the legal framework outlined
within the Accra Peace Agreement.
I have thus far argued that the Accra Peace Agreement, in particular, set in motion an improvement
in women’s political rights. Specifically, I argue that the agreement generated these improvements indi-
rectly, by creating positive externalities that led empowered women to push for change. The agreement
gave increased legitimacy to women’s cause and made it more likely that political leaders would follow
through on more gender-balanced policies.
Like the case of Burundi, however, the Liberian case presents the possibility of an alternative causal
pathway: a vibrant women’s movement. As with the case of Burundi, I recognize the importance of the
women’s movement in shaping the agenda for the peace processes. As early as 1993, women’s groups
became involved in mobilizing for peace in Liberia. Groups such as WIPNET and the Mano River
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Women’s Peace Network pushed conflict actors to the negotiating table and implored warring factions
to take negotiations seriously.15 Although largely excluded from the table, Liberian women lobbied
for the appointment of Ruth Perry as Chair(wo)man of the transitional government and they made sure
that gender was on the agenda during the Accra peace negotiations. Hayner (2007) writes: “Every day,
between 150 and 200 refugee women arrived at the hotel where the [Accra peace] talks were being held.
Women activists also sought out family members of rebel leaders, including the mother of one, to attend
the talks and make a personal plea to stop the shelling of Monrovia” (12). Indeed, without women’s
involvement, outside observers are skeptical that gender-specific provisions would have been included
in the Accra Peace Agreement: “[The gender balance provisions] cannot be ascribed to inspiration
from the warlords at the negotiating tables; they are to be credited to influential women’s organizations
lobbying to some extent successfully against odds of formal exclusion for female representation in the
peace-building process” (Fuest, 2008, 214). At the same time, women’s organizations were only granted
the status of observers, a decision which reiterates conflict actors’ perceptions of women as marginal
and subordinate.
To what extent does the instrumental and influential role of Liberian women’s movements undermine
causal claims with respect to the peace agreements? As with the case of Burundi – and perhaps even
more so – the case of Liberia illustrates the complexity of analyzing the peace process. While I cannot
claim, based on this case illustration, that the gender-specific peace agreements were the sole cause of
improvements in post-conflict political rights for women, I can assert that the peace agreements made
a difference. The primary goal of the case analysis is to assess the plausibility of causal mechanisms.
The evidence indicates that the women’s movement in Liberia was empowered and legitimized by both
the Abuja II Peace Agreement and the Accra Peace Agreement. The agreements, through indirect
mechanisms, empowered women to continue to push for equality and to hold actors accountable. The
peace agreements legitimized women’s voices in a way that would not have happened in the absence of
the peace agreement. In sum, the peace agreements served as a critical component in shifting gender
discussions from rhetoric to reality.
15Aning (1998) writes that women were also instrumental as conflict actors as well, serving in intelligence and managerial
roles. In spite of their roles both as mobilizers for war and for peace, women were given few official roles during the peace
negotiations.
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Conclusions
A number of lessons become evident by looking at the case of Liberia. First, the case illustrates
the plausibility of one of the proposed indirect causal mechanisms: positive externalities. Although
women’s groups pushed for peace as early as 1993, their efforts redoubled following the Abuja II Peace
Agreement and remained persistent even after the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement. The peace
agreements, one of which named a woman head of the transitional government and the second of which
called for gender balance in all aspects of political life, increased the legitimacy of women’s calls for
equality and set legal precedent for increased equality. Admittedly, I cannot completely rule out the
alternative explanation that purports peace agreements to be scraps of paper and women’s movements
to be the driver of rights improvements. However, I can identify the implementation of gender-specific
peace agreements as key moments in which the legal standing of women improved in Liberia.
Second, the case of Liberia reaffirms the positive role that women’s movements play throughout
peace processes. By arguing that peace agreements spur changes in women’s rights, I am not arguing
that international and domestic actors should ignore the capacity of grassroots women’s organizations.
Indeed, the case of Liberia offers indication that the interaction of a vibrant women’s movement along-
side gender-specific peace agreements leads to success. At the same time, I emphasize the importance
that the legal codification of women’s rights holds. The cases of Uganda and Papua New Guinea, for ex-
ample, both had vibrant women’s movements at many different levels16; because women’s rights were
not codified in the agreements, however, women’s rights remained stagnant in those societies. Peace
agreements set forth a new legal-political framework for the post-conflict period; by including women’s
rights in that framework, a peace agreement legitimizes women as stakeholders.
Third, the Liberian case contrasts significantly from Burundi in the language of the peace agree-
ments. In contrast to the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi which is quite ex-
tensive and detailed in its provisions for women’s rights, the Abuja II Peace Agreement and the Accra
Peace Agreement are “thin” or superficial in nature. Nonetheless, these two Liberian peace agreements
set in motion or amplified processes of change. As such, policymakers and negotiators should keep in
mind that even small provisions have potential to make a difference. While more detailed frameworks
16See: http://www.c-r.org/accord/women-and-peacebuilding-insight
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for women’s rights are ideal for both legal and normative reasons, all efforts should be made to include
some references to women’s rights. By knowing their rights are included within an agreement, women’s
groups will be empowered to push for change and be more legitimized in holding actors accountable.
Norms Shifts: Changing Perceptions of Women in South Africa
The Dutch settled the territory that would become South Africa in 1652. The British, however,
began claiming parts of the territory in 1806 and throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, expanded
their control of South Africa. The Union of South Africa was created in 1910; by 1961, however,
the Republic of South Africa gained independence and fully separated itself from the United Kingdom
(Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). Both during and following colonial rule, South Africa was
marked by widespread exclusion and structural violence along racial and cultural lines. The “apartheid”
regime, which was formally created in 1948, created an “oligarchic society organized around extreme
social, economic, and political inequality enshrined in a tripartite racial structure that privileged the
White minority at the expense of the black majority” (Waylen, 2007, 526). The National Party (NP) led
a Whites-only parliament in which any opposition was severely restricted.
Extreme political disenfranchisement coupled with economic and social exclusion led to the creation
of opposition groups, particularly amongst the country’s black population. Groups such as the African
National Congress (ANC) initially led campaigns of civil disobedience but soon faced violent repression
from South Africa’s government. The ongoing patterns of conflict and violence in the country thus
escalated into a war lasting from 1981 to 1988. In the early 1990s, the government under the NP began
to negotiate with the ANC for a transition to a democratic government; the transitional period, however,
was marked by large-scale violence as groups and political parties clashed for power in the transitional
period. The transition to democratic rule in South Africa finally occurred with the accession to power
of the ANC in 1994 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016).
To assess the extent to which women were – or were not – included in the political, economic, and
social life of the South African state, Waylen (2007) writes that one must consider the racial divisions in
the country. Under apartheid, white women were given the right to vote but were nonetheless discrimi-
nated against in comparison to the status of white men. Within the black majority, women were subject
to customary law, which “technically denied them adult status” (Waylen, 2007, 526). Kadalie (1995)
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notes that majority of black women were unemployed and lived in impoverished rural areas, whereas
white women had greater access to jobs and lived in more developed urban areas. Like women in the
other cases considered in this analysis, however, South African women began mobilizing early on to
challenge inequalities and to combat increasing violence in their country.
Women from all races organized to fight apartheid; indeed, their influence endured throughout the
country’s transition to democracy. Women were permitted as full members of the ANC beginning in
1943 and went on to form the ANC Women’s League (ANCWL) (Geisler, 2000). Women were also
integrated into the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC. Although women comprised
20 percent of the MK’s ranks by 1989, they were never were granted access to commanding or leading
roles. Through its continued efforts, the ANCWL facilitated the formation of the Women’s National
Coalition (WNC). Formed in April 1992, the WNC included 92 national organizations ranging from
political parties, rural organizations, and religious and professional groups. Geisler (2000) notes that
the WNC helped to inform the Bill of Rights and served as an inspiration for women’s movements in
countries across the region. While women’s groups had thus made strides in the period leading up to
the peace agreements, their rights were still restricted both in law and in practice (Cingranelli, Richards
and Clay, 2014). As such, the peace process was an opening in which groups were able to enumerate
and consolidate rights for women.
Women’s Rights Within the Interim Constitution
A series of peace agreements to end the outstanding conflict and violence in South Africa com-
menced with the signing of the Groote Schuur Minute on May 4, 1990 (Ho¨gbladh, 2011). As a peace
process agreement, the Groote Schuur Minute set in motion a series of negotiations which would even-
tually include the signing of the Pretoria Minute, the CODESA Declaration of Intent, the Record of
Understanding, and finally, the Interim Constitution which was signed at the end of 1993. Of the preced-
ing peace agreements, both the CODESA Declaration of Intent and the Interim Constitution contained
specific provisions for women’s rights.
The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) brought together 238 delegates from
19 political parties alongside nearly 1,000 international observers. Of those 238 delegates, women
comprised approximately five percent of the group (Barnes and De Klerk, 2002). Barnes and De Klerk
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(2002) note that Helen Suzman, a parliamentary “veteran,” pointed out the gender imbalance by drawing
the spotlight to “the parallels between gender discrimination and racism” (27). As a result, parties began
to make a stronger effort to increase gender representation. On paper, the CODESA Declaration of
Intent began the process of reshaping South Africa into a state that would be free from both racial and
gender-based discrimination. The agreement, which was signed on December 20, 1991, contains the
following:
To bring about an undivided South Africa with one nation sharing a common citizenship,
patriotism and loyalty, pursuing amidst our diversity, freedom, equality and security for all
irrespective of race, color, sex or creed; a country free from apartheid or any other form of
discrimination or domination.
To set in motion the process of drawing up and establishing a constitution that will ensure,
inter alia: (a) that South Africa will be a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist
state...
As the preceding text makes clear, the language to extend rights to women is thin within the CODESA
agreement. Instead of extending specific rights and protections to women, the CODESA Declaration
of Intent functioned to set the agenda for a new South African state which would be non-sexist and
non-discriminatory. By setting the agenda, however, this first gender-sensitive peace agreement laid
a foundation for more specific provisions in following agreements. Although the CODESA talks col-
lapsed by June 1992, gender equality had effectively been established as a fundamental component of a
new South African state.
The next agreement to contain provisions for women’s rights in South Africa was the Interim Consti-
tution, which was signed on November 18, 1993. A Multiparty Negotiating Process (MPNP), attended
by 208 delegates from 26 political groups, worked to resolve the country’s incompatibilities and draft
a plan for a transition to democratic governance. More fully than the CODESA negotiations, the In-
terim Constitution addressed the need to extend and protect women’s rights. Specifically, the Interim
Constitution states:
No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly, and, without dero-
gating from the generality of this provision, on one or more of the following grounds in
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particular: race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disabil-
ity, religion, conscience, belief, culture or language (Chaper 3, Section 8.2).
(1) There shall be a Commission on Gender Equality, which shall consist of a chairper-
son and such number of members as may be determined by an Act of Parliament; (2) The
Commission shall consist of persons who are fit and proper for appointment, South African
citizens and broadly representative of the South African community; (3) The object of the
Commission shall be to promote gender equality and to advise and to make recommenda-
tion to Parliament or any other legislature with regard to any laws or proposed legislation
which affects gender equality and the status of women (Chapter 8, Section 119.1-3)
The Interim Constitution thus used a rhetoric which tied actors’ hands to change and signaled a shift in
the role of women in South African society. As a quasi-constitutional document, the Interim Constitution
demonstrated the intent of conflict actors and political parties to set up a gender-inclusive political
system following the post-conflict period.
Effects of the South Africa’s Peace Agreements
To what extent did the gender-specific peace agreements in South Africa work to inspire change in
the country’s gender relations? A comparison of women’s rights prior to the conflict in South Africa
to rights levels following the signing of the peace agreements signals a notable shift. According to
Cingranelli, Richards and Clay (2014), women’s pre-conflict rights in South Africa were virtually non-
existent. In the early 1980s, CIRI codes women’s political rights as zero: restricted by both law and
practice. By 1994, however, the year following the signing of the Interim Constitution, women’s polit-
ical rights had improved such that they received a score of 2. In 1996, with the shift from the Interim
Constitution to the country’s new constitution, government respect for women’s political rights further
improved to a score of 3, a score which is representative of a situation in which rights are protected
by law and respected in practice (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014). The progression of women’s
rights from fully restricted to widely respected demonstrates the immense changes that can be ushered
in during periods of civil war and post-conflict transition. As I have already noted, however, such im-
provements in women’s rights were not inevitable. Instead, they required the efforts of many actors and
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the legal protections codified by the country’s peace agreements.
Qualitative accounts of women’s rights in South Africa also offer support that women’s rights
improved vastly in the years following the signing of the peace agreements. Waylen (2007) writes:
“Women’s descriptive and substantive representation were improved by the adoption of a new con-
stitution with gender equality enshrined within it, the establishment of a package of state women’s
machineries (SWMs)... and policy outcomes such as more progressive laws on domestic violence and
reproductive rights” (522).17 Following the country’s 1994 elections, 111 women entered into parlia-
ment (Geisler, 2000). Seidman (1999) describes the post-conflict transitional period as one in which
perceptions of gender equality were redefined and one which led to the establishment of more equal
political institutions.
Women’s rights undoubtedly improved in the post-conflict period. Data from Coppedge et al. (2015)
indicates that improvements in women’s rights moved beyond political participation and political rights.
Figure 3.2 shows the progression of women’s civil liberties in South Africa over the time period, 1980-
2014. Women’s civil liberties – a function of movement rights, property rights, labor rights, and access
to justice – experienced a drastic increase around 1993. Thus, women not only gained political voice
but also gained broader access to civil liberties. As the preceding accounts suggest, women experienced
a marked improvement in rights and protections in the aftermath of the Interim Constitution and the
preceding peace processes. In the following section, I assess the plausibility of identifying the country’s
gender-specific peace agreements as a driving causal force behind these improvements in women’s rights
and opportunities.
An Analysis of Causality and Alternative Explanations
I argue that the South African case illustrates the plausibility of two key mechanisms: tying hands
(direct mechanism) and norms shifts (indirect mechanism). Through their calls for a non-sexist and non-
discriminatory state, gender protections, and the creation of a Commission on Gender Equality, both the
CODESA Declaration of Intent and the Interim Constitution facilitated a society that was more open
and inclusive for women. Because I have already discussed the plausibility of the direct mechanism
17Waylen (2007) contrasts this to cases in Latin America and Central Europe where constitutions remained unchanged (i.e.
the legal framework for the state remained the same).
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Figure 3.2: Women’s Civil Liberties in South Africa, 1980-2014
with the case of Burundi, I will only engage this point here briefly. I then turn to data from the World
Values Survey to illustrate how South Africa’s gender-specific agreements spurred major shifts in norms
and perceptions of women’s roles.
With respect to the direct mechanism, tying hands, I look for evidence of peace agreements’ provi-
sions entering into the laws of the post-conflict society. As Waylen (2007) notes, the period following
the signing of the Interim Constitution, in particular, saw a the creation of a network of policies and
laws to support women’s rights. Perhaps most importantly, the language and gendered goals of the In-
terim Constitution directly entered into a post-conflict Constitution that was considered exceptional in
its protections for women’s rights (Waylen, 2007). For example, the Commission on Gender Equality,
which was enumerated in Chapter 8, Section 119 of the Interim Constitution was then institutionalized
by Act 39 in 1996. The body still functions today to monitor government policies and practices, investi-
gate inequality in the private and public sector, and monitor compliance with international conventions,
among other duties.18
18See the webpage of the Commission for Gender Equality: http://cge.org.za/functions/.
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Beyond leading to direct policy changes in the post-conflict period, the South African case illustrates
the role peace agreements can play in altering the gender norms and perceptions in society. In brief, the
gender-specific peace agreements changed how women’s roles were perceived in South African soci-
ety. In this vein, Seidman (1999) asserts that the explicitly gendered democratization process and the
gendered nature of the interim constitution, in particular, “affected the character of democracy and cit-
izenship, with important implications for men and women’s participation in the public arena” (289).
Through gender-specific language and by carving a clear role for women in the political, social, and
economic life of the state, the peace agreements changed the realm of possibilities for women. Addi-
tionally, the peace agreements changed the realm of what was seen as possible for women by society at
large. When society perceives women to be legitimate and equal members, then the overall quality of
peace will improve as well.
To better assess the extent to which perceptions of women truly changed in South African society,
I turn to the World Values Survey (World Values Survey, 2014a,b). In both 1990 and 1996, the survey
asked a random sample of South Africans the following question: “Do you agree or disagree with the
following statement?: When jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women.”19 See
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 for a summary of responses. In 1990, shown in Figure 3.3, close to 45 percent of
all respondents agreed that men should be favored for jobs in tough economic times. Only 20 percent
of respondents disagreed. At the most basic level, such responses represent a society in which women’s
economic role is seen as subordinate. Indeed, the responses represent a society in which women are
seen as secondary or marginal members. By 1996, however, following the signing of a series of gender-
sensitive agreements, the responses given by South Africans are markedly different. As Figure 3.4
shows, in 1996 only 35 percent of respondents agreed with the same statement and almost 50 percent
of respondents disagreed with the statement. Therefore, by 1996, almost half of respondents held the
view that men should not be favored for employment positions. Such a shift signals that the perceptions
of women’s roles had changed. Whereas women were widely seen as subordinate to men in 1990, the
1996 survey represents a society in which women were seen to be deserving of more equal roles.
19In 1990, the question was asked to 2,736 people of which 48.1 percent (1,316) were male, 51.9 percent (1,420) were female,
63.9 percent (1,749) were black, 21.5 percent (590) were white, and 14.5 percent (417) identified as a difference ethnicity. In
1996, the question was asked to 2,935 individuals of which 47.6 percent (1,398) were male, 52.4 percent (1,537) were female,
73.3 percent (2,151) were black, 15.8 percent (463) were white, 8.4 percent (245) were colored, and 2.6 percent (75) were
Indian.
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Poll: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.
Figure 3.3: Gender Perceptions in South Africa, 1990
Figure 3.4: Gender Perceptions in South Africa, 1996
84
As with the previous cases, I assert that the South African case illustrates the plausibility of the
proposed causal mechanisms. The peace agreements in South Africa both tied actors’ hands to policy
changes and spurred a norms shift with respect to gender roles. Nevertheless, I recognize the presence
of potential confounding variables. Similar to the other cases included in this analysis, South Africa
was home to a vibrant women’s movement. The South African case, however, is unique in that women
actually held a fairly large number of seats at the negotiating table.20 Barnes and De Klerk (2002) write
that during the MPNP, which was tasked at drafting the Interim Constitution, the Negotiating Council
was composed of two delegates from each of the 26 parties involved. At least one of each set of delegates
was required to be a woman.
Although women’s movements and female delegates were active particularly in the crafting of the
Interim Constitution, their presence as serious political actors was doubted by many. Geisler (2000)
offers an overview of headlines from the media, including the following examples:
“Women do have a place in the struggle – it’s behind typewriters”
“Women’s League: Giving a voice to the powerless, mute and exploited or... the koeksuster
tannies of the ANC?”21
At the same time, the ANC – the party that would go on to rule in the post-transition period – was
quite supportive of the women’s agenda. According to Waylen (2007), “the nature of the ANC as a left-
wing party committed to equality based on equal citizenship for all made it easier for feminists within
it to get gender issues incorporated into ANC policy and get ANC support within negotiations, but not
without some struggles” (532). The strength and persistence of the women’s movement had undoubted
implications for the agenda, but as I note in the following paragraph, women’s progress should not be
treated as inevitable or purely as a byproduct of women’s involvement in peace processes.
To what extent can I attribute women’s rights improvements after conflict to the peace agreement
versus the women’s movement? I argue that the peace agreements in South Africa certainly were shaped
by persistent pressure by women’s groups, but I also take the stance that women’s mobilization on its
20Currently, however, the case of South Africa’s coding of female signatories within my own dataset is missing, because the
peace agreements do not indicate names of the signatories. Greater research must be done to more accurately know who was
at the table, in what capacity were they at the table, and to what extent were their voices respected or marginalized.
21Koeksuster tannies seems to translate roughly to a demeaning term for older women.
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own does not guarantee that women’s rights would improve more broadly in South African society
(Waylen, 2007). Waylen (2007) indicates that “the constitution acted as an important enabling frame-
work in a number of areas contributing to substantial legal changes in women’s civil and political rights”
(538). The codification of women’s rights within the country’s peace agreements legitimized an agenda
of gender equality, making it more likely that predominantly male politicians would keep their word
and making it more likely that women would be perceived as equal actors within society. Geisler (2000)
provides a striking comparison to drive home this point. She writes of the “missed opportunity” of the
transitional period in Zimbabwe; despite women’s involvement in the Zimbabwean transitional period,
women experienced little improvement because their goals were not addressed or codified during that
time. As will be shown with the Angolan case as well, a strong network of women’s groups are insuffi-
cient to secure gains if women’s rights are left out of key transitional documents, peace agreements.22
Conclusions
The above analysis offers further support for the theory presented in the second chapter of this dis-
sertation. When peace agreements include provisions for women’s rights, they set in motion processes
of change for gender relations within society. In the South African case, the CODESA Declaration of
Intent and the Interim Constitution directly shaped the nature of post-conflict laws and contributed to
changing perceptions towards women. Survey data from South Africa reveals strong shifts in gender
perceptions; I argue that gender empowerment during the peace process demonstrated that women were
influential and worthy of equal treatment. Taken together with the cases of Burundi and Liberia, the three
cases illustrate the plausibility of both the direct and indirect causal linkages between gender-specific
peace agreements and women’s post-conflict rights.
Although the above illustration supports the plausibility of the causal mechanisms, the case of South
Africa also raises the question of alternative explanations. In particular, it leads me to question whether
post-conflict improvements in women’s rights are a result of strong women’s movements or a result of
the language within peace agreements. Like Burundi and Liberia, women mobilized both to improve
22In further extensions of this research, I also plan to assess the role of international pressure or spotlight on shaping gender
provisions within agreements. South Africa – after years of international condemnation under apartheid – was particularly
scrutinized during the transitional period. To what extent, then, did pressure by international actors such as the UN drive both
the strength of women’s movements and the gendered nature of the peace agreements?
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their status and to push for peace. Unlike those cases, South African women were granted a large
number of seats at the negotiating table, particularly in the negotiations for the Interim Constitution.
Qualitative accounts from South Africa, however, indicate that their presence may not have been suffi-
cient to secure improvements in women’s rights. The gender provisions within the peace agreements –
which were themselves a function of domestic women’s pressure, international pressure, a reaction to
apartheid, and the anti-sexism stance of the ANC – legitimized calls for women’s empowerment. Be-
yond legitimization, the peace agreements also ensured that anti-sexist rhetoric translated into tangible
gains. As with the other cases, then, I argue that gender-specific peace agreements are a necessary step
to secure tangible improvements in women’s rights. In the following section, I present the case of An-
gola, a case that supports the assertion that a women’s movement is insufficient to secure improvements
in women’s rights following conflict. Even though Angola had women actively involved in all stages of
the conflict, the peace agreements did not adopt gender-specific language and thus did not set in motion
processes of change.
Missing a Seat at the Table: Women’s Exclusion in Angola
Like the cases of Burundi and South Africa, Angola has a long colonial history, having been colo-
nized by the Portuguese. Although they arrived as traders and explores as early as 1483, the Portuguese
colonial regime was not consolidated until the early 20th century. The Portuguese pursued policies of
racial and cultural discrimination which in turn exacerbated social tensions and mistrust. After the Por-
tuguese colonial regime led a violent and bloody repression of a protest in the northern part of the coun-
try, a strong and more organized wave of nationalism swept across Angola (Meijer and Birmingham,
2004). Beginning in 1961, anti-colonial sentiment led to the creation of several, rival pro-independence
groups: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Lib-
eration of Angola (MPLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
(Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). Although war ensued between the Angolan nationalist groups
and the Portuguese colonial regime, little progress toward an independent Angolan state was made until
a military coup ended the Salazar regime in Portugal and in turn ended the country’s colonial ambitions
(Pearce, 2012; Meijer and Birmingham, 2004).
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Angola officially gained its independence in 1975, however the country was already deeply en-
trenched in a brutal civil war. The MPLA, a Marxist-inspired group, installed Agostinho Neto as An-
gola’s first president and formed a one-party regime (Meijer and Birmingham, 2004). From the very
beginning, however, the new government in Angola faced challenges from the FNLA as well as UNITA.
Like many other colonial societies, Portuguese colonial rule generated the creation of a small elite who
enjoyed elevated rights at the expense of the vast majority of Angolans. Throughout the 1970s, rule
in Angola was marked by corruption and repression. In 1979, Jose´ Eduardo dos Santos became the
country’s president following the death of Neto. By the late 1980s, the Angolan conflict had once again
reached a stalemate and by 1991, the MPLA-dominated government and UNITA signed the Bicesse Ac-
cords (Pearce, 2012). Following the peace agreement, the international community organized elections.
When UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi failed to gain power, he rejected the election results (in which dos Santos
won) and returned the country to war. The following war was brutal and despite numerous peace ef-
forts including the Lusaka Protocol in 1994, Savimbi was unwilling to commit to a military settlement.
Fighting thus continued until the Luena Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2002.
In spite of the enduring legacy of colonial repression and civil war violence, women in Angola
made great efforts to mobilize politically. The state-run apparatus of the MPLA held many party-
based opportunities for women’s participation in party activities (Pearce, 2012). In 1962, in fact, the
Organization of Angolan Women (OMA) was established as the women’s wing of the MPLA; OMA
played an active and crucial role in the guerrilla forces throughout the country’s conflicts. It is also worth
pointing out that OMA was not a marginal group. Estimates indicate that the group had as many as 1.8
million registered members by 1983 (Ducados, 2004). In 1973, the Independent League for Angolan
Women (LIMA) was created as the women’s wing of UNITA. As members of LIMA, women were
trained as political activists, tasked with mobilizing youth to join the armed conflict, and responsible for
transporting materials to men on the front lines (Ducados, 2004).
Although data is limited, human rights data collected by Cingranelli, Richards and Clay (2014) in-
dicates that Angolan women’s political rights were legally protected, although restricted somewhat in
practice. CIRI’s score of two for Angola, however, indicates a relatively open political environment
for women. According to Ducados (2004), OMA fought hard and succeeded in introducing and im-
plementing extensive social rights for women including right to consensual marriage and free family
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planning. The conditions, then, should have been conducive and open for women’s voices to be heard
and for women’s rights to be further improved through the country’s peace processes. Because women’s
rights were not codified in the peace agreements, however, Angolan women’s rights remained stagnant.
The legal-political framework for the post-conflict state excluded any reference to women, and as such,
women’s rights remained marginalized.
Comments on Gender within Angolan Peace Efforts
Angola saw a series of peace agreements beginning with the Bicesse Agreement in 1991, the Lusaka
Protocol in 1994, and the Memorandum of Understanding which finally put an end to the conflict in
2002. Unlike the peace agreements of Burundi, Liberia, and South Africa, however, women’s rights
were excluded from the texts of the agreements. Instead, the agreements remained myopically focused
on military issues, leaving aside many societal questions that would be foundational for a higher quality
peace. For example, the text of the Lusaka Protocol remained focused on reintegrating UNITA into
the political life of the state. The agreement, specifically, dedicated two sections to “military issues,”
another to the police, one to national reconciliation and one to the completion of the electoral process.
While the agreement speaks of tolerance, coexistence, and respect, no explicit reference is made to
women. The Lusaka Protocol ultimately failed to end Angola’s conflict.
With the death of UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi in 2002, the warring parties agreed to the Luena Memo-
randum of Understanding. Like the Lusaka Protocol, the Memorandum of Understanding calls for the
decentralization of power, the reintegration of UNITA into the legislature and other bodies of govern-
ment, and free and fair elections. Once again, the peace agreement is focused on military and security
issues at the expense of steps toward inclusion. While military and security incompatibilities must un-
doubtedly be resolved to end a civil war, the agreement does little to address the blatant divisions and
inequalities in Angolan society as a whole. Women, who were actively involved in the conflict in groups
such as LIMA and OMA, were excluded from the peace process, and the resulting peace agreements
are void of gender-specific language.
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Effects of the Peace Agreements
The singular focus on a military solution to the conflict had detrimental effects on Angolan society
more broadly. While the war stopped and thus a negative peace took hold, a step that cannot be dimin-
ished, the peace agreement was crafted in ways that did not consider more positive dimensions of peace.
By leaving out women’s rights, the peace agreement did not set in motion processes of change. The
agreement did not tie conflict actors’ hands to gender equality, did not generate positive externalities or
empowerment, nor did it spur a shift in gender norms. Donald Steinberg, deputy president for policy
of the International Crisis Group cites Angola as a cautionary tale of what happens when women are
excluded from the peace process. He goes as far as saying that “a peace agreement that fails to address
gender is, in itself, discriminatory against women – and less likely to be successful” (Ackerman, 2009,
87). Moreover, Ackerman (2009) states that peace agreements and peace processes that exclude women
create situations in which “issues like internal displacement, sexual violence, government abuse, and
the rebuilding of social services are not at the forefront of the discussion, or not discussed at all” (87).
Excluding women not only inhibits improvements in gender equality, but may also have detrimental
effects for other aspects of states’ political, social, and economic structures.
Considering Alternative Explanations
Angola, as a case illustration, reveals the missed opportunity, so to speak, that occurs when peace
agreements do not make reference to women’s rights. While the agreements such as the Lusaka Proto-
col and the Luena Memorandum of Understanding did not necessarily make life worse for women, they
failed to make the most out of changing legal, political, and normative frameworks. Rather than redefin-
ing the role of women in Angolan society to better reflect the country’s vibrant women’s movements,
the agreements focused on the most proximate issues to the conflict. The case of Angola cannot prove
that peace agreements cause improvements in women’s rights, but it can illustrate that absent the spark
or without the motivation, women’s rights tend not to change.
The case of Angola is particularly striking for the ways in which it also speaks to the primary
competing explanation for improvements in women’s rights. In the presentation of the causal processes
in Burundi, Liberia, and South Africa, the causal processes were complicated by the presence of strong
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women’s movements. In Angola, like the three aforementioned cases, however, women’s movements
were both active and influential. According to Ducados (2004), Angolan women’s groups were active
politically, “in constant negotiation with the political leadership, lobbying for their concerns to be taken
seriously by policy-makers and government officials. In the past, OMA played a decisive role as a
policy-driven outfit dedicated to fighting for the improvement of women’s legal status as well as their
economic empowerment, and above all, the integration of women’s issues into mainstream policies”
(60). As noted above, both LIMA and OMA were heavily involved in mobilization and coordination
during the conflict. In many ways, their structures were more entrenched and longer-lived than the
women’s movements in either Liberia or Burundi.
To what extent were women involved in the peace process? Like Burundi and Liberia, women were
largely excluded during peace negotiations and peace building. At the same time, women’s groups did
push for peace at several points in time. On the other hand, Ducados (2004) describes the women’s peace
movements as poorly organized and unable to represent women at the grassroots level. One could thus
argue that women’s rights have not improved in Angola because women have not worked hard enough
or have not mobilized effectively enough. I assert, however, that the underlying likelihood for improve-
ments in women’s rights is similar across the cases of Burundi, Liberia, and Angola. In particular, the
cases of Burundi and Angola have similarities; both cases started with fairly elevated levels of women’s
rights according to Cingranelli, Richards and Clay (2014) and both had strong women’s movements that
were then excluded from the peace process. While Burundian women seem to have mobilized more
fully for peace, Angolan women had a wider network of roles and duties during the conflict. With
a baseline openness to women’s rights and women’s movements, I would have expected both Angola
and Burundi to be possible candidates for greater women’s empowerment. Whereas in Burundi the
peace agreement outlined a gender-aware post-conflict framework, the Angolan peace agreements ig-
nored gender issues. By missing the opportunity to spur change, the Angolan peace agreements failed
to do what the Burundian and Liberian peace agreements did: lay forth a framework for a higher quality
peace.
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Conclusions
In Angola, conflict actors and peacemakers failed to capitalize on the opening for change. Civil
wars create the possibility to revise the status quo, but this change does not necessarily come about
spontaneously. In those cases like Angola, where women’s rights do not enter into the plan for the
post-conflict state, gender relations are unlikely to change. Indeed, some even assert that the absence of
gender provisions does harm to societies (Ackerman, 2009). The Angolan peace process – through its
singularly-focused agreements – reiterated structural violence (Galtung, 1969). The agreements allowed
inequalities to continue; instead of embracing and empowering the already well-organized women’s
groups, the agreement paid no attention to women’s role in the political future of the state.
Conclusion: Lessons and Limits of the Case Illustrations
The cases of Burundi, Liberia, South Africa, and Angola illustrate the effects of gender-specific
peace agreements. In the same vein as past works on peace agreements, the analysis herein indicates
that peace agreements are more than just scraps of paper. Their contents matter for the extent to which a
higher quality peace takes hold following conflict. As quasi-constitutional documents, peace agreements
set forth a road map for the post-conflict state; indeed, their contents shape the legal, political, and
normative conditions of post-conflict societies. As such, peace makers and conflict actors must be
cognizant of the possibilities present during the peace process. Depending on the situation, they must
seize the opportunity for change and craft a settlement that not only establishes a negative peace but also
builds a more positive peace.
Burundi was a society in which women faced a number of discriminatory political, economic,
and social practices. Their political representation was quite low in the pre-conflict period, but their
rights were, at least, protected legally. In spite of a vibrant women’s movement and moderate levels of
women’s rights prior to the peace process, women were not granted seats at the negotiating table.23 The
enumeration of extensive rights and protections within the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement,
however, contributed directly to changes in the country’s post-conflict legal structures. Through these
23Instead, the United Nations helped to facilitate a parallel women’s peace conference which then made efforts to shape the
agenda.
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changes, Burundian women have had greater access to political power and have been able to hold more
influence in post-conflict politics.
In Liberia, even more so than Burundi, women’s political rights were restricted prior to the country’s
civil wars. The conflict and the subsequent transitional period thus provided an opening for changes to
the discriminatory status quo. As in the other cases that I have included in this analysis, Liberian women
mobilized early on as both actors in the conflict and later, as agents of peace, but they remained marginal-
ized from key negotiating roles. Nonetheless, the peace agreements in Liberia took on a gender-specific
nature and had noticeable effects on the post-conflict quality of peace. Specifically, the Accra Agree-
ment further empowered women and legitimized their voices. Women continued to push for change in
the post-conflict period, and their calls were met, largely because the Accra Agreement granted legiti-
macy to their mission. The case of Liberia thus illustrates that peace agreements can indirectly change
gender relations by empowering women’s groups to hold leaders accountable.
South Africa illustrates the third and final causal mechanism identified in the second chapter of this
dissertation. Women’s rights were severely restricted both legally and in practice in the pre-conflict
period. South Africa, on many levels, functioned as an extreme case of discrimination and exclusion on
both racial and gender dimensions. In spite of severe rights restrictions, women began to mobilize to
push for peace and for a voice in South Africa. Unlike the cases of Liberia and Burundi, women were
granted a large number of seats at the negotiating table. However, qualitative accounts confirm that
improvements in women’s rights should not be treated as inevitable. Instead, the case of South Africa
illustrates the power that comes from institutionalizing rights within peace agreements. The gender-
specific nature of the Interim Constitution, in particular, tied actors’ hands to extend rights to women
and it spurred changes in gender norms.
The final case that I have included is that of Angola, a case in which women’s rights remained
absent from the country’s peace agreements. As with the previous cases, Angolan women were actively
involved in the country’s conflict; perhaps more fully than the other cases, women were integrated
into political parties and into the political life of the state. However, the peace processes took on a
singular focus on military and security issues. Actors thus failed to capitalize on the opening for change.
Although Angola should have been an “easy” case for improvements in women’s rights, women’s rights
remained stagnant because gender was not part of the discussion during peace talks. By marginalizing
93
women during the peace process (by excluding them from the table and by excluding gender provisions
from the peace agreements), Angola laid a framework for a post-conflict society in which women would
be marginalized. The case of Angola illustrates that a vibrant women’s movement is not sufficient to
achieve change; without a legal framework to protect and extend rights for women, little will change in
the post-conflict period.
With the four case illustrations included in this chapter, I have shown that the proposed causal
mechanisms are plausible. At the same time, I have unveiled a number of questions that warrant further
research. First and foremost, it will be necessary in future work to more fully explore the dynamics of
women’s movements, gendered peace processes, and subsequent gender relations in the post-conflict
period. The cases included here demonstrate that women, depending on the case, hold roles as conflict
actors, as advocates for peace, as negotiators, and/or as agents of change following conflict. At this
point, however, very little cross-national data exists to encapsulate the full range of women’s roles in
times of war and peace. For example, I currently have data on female signatories to peace agreements,
but this – as I have learned through the cases of Liberia, Burundi, and South Africa – is insufficient
to proxy the strength and reach of women’s movements. As such, future extensions of this work will
collect more comprehensive data on how women are involved in civil wars and peace processes. With
that information, I will be able to develop a more holistic understanding of how women’s rights appear
on the agenda of peace processes, under what conditions these rights are codified within agreements,
and through which mechanisms agreements translate to tangible post-conflict gains.
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CHAPTER 4
CONTEXT-SPECIFIC PEACE AGREEMENTS: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
Peacemaking...to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify
and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of con-
fidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may
include... advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening govern-
mental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.
– UN Sec. Gen. Boutros Boutros-Ghali1
Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation shift from a focus on women’s rights to another dimension of a
quality peace: the political rights and inclusivity of societies more broadly. Former United Nations Sec-
retary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasized, in 1992, that countries must focus on political rights
and participation as they are on the road to the consolidation of peace following civil war. Inclusivity of
opportunity, to Boutros-Ghali, is part of achieving higher levels of well-being among populations. To
Galtung (1969), as well, violence may continue even when war concludes. He argues that violence con-
tinues when “the structure deprives [members of society] of chances to organize and bring their power
to bear against the topdogs, as voting power, bargaining power, striking power, violent power – partly
because they are atomized and disintegrated, partly because they are overawed by all the authority the
topdogs present” (1969, 177). In systems, however, where citizens are free from government repression
and able to exercise political power, peace takes hold. In a country like Coˆte d’Ivoire, widespread ex-
clusion and violent repression has tarnished the country’s post-conflict political processes. While the
country is at peace, according to conventional or negative definitions of the term, government leaders
regularly use repressive tactics to marginalize and subdue opposition parties and members of minority
1From “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping,” 31 January 1992. See:
http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-un-secretary-general-agenda-peace/p23439
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groups. On the other hand, countries such as Liberia have been able to achieve more open and inclusive
political systems. As a whole, most if not all groups have some access to political power in Liberia
and feel relatively safe in their capacity to exercise political voice. What might account for the varia-
tion across these two cases? Why, in the case of Coˆte d’Ivoire, has exclusion and structural violence
remained the dominant norm, while in Liberia most groups have gained access to political opportunity
and inclusion?
Utilizing the framework laid forth throughout my research, I argue that the content of peace agree-
ments shapes the extent to which societies move toward a higher quality peace. That is, I argue that
peace agreements hold the potential to reduce levels of political repression and improve political oppor-
tunity for members of post-conflict societies. In particular, I expect peace agreements that are designed
with context in mind – those peace agreements that are crafted to address the underlying causes of
conflict – will change incentives for actors in post-conflict societies. In brief, repression is wielded as
a tool of often insecure and uncertain leaders as they seek to consolidate their grips on power. Peace
agreements may disincentivize repression by providing political power through alternative means and
by reducing the insecurity groups feel with their hold on power.
This chapter of the dissertation proceeds as follows. First, I present a brief overview of the literature
and place specific focus on the extent to which the contents of negotiated settlements influence the
post-conflict period. Second, I outline the theoretical argument to explain how context-specific peace
agreements create an environment that is conducive for a peace that is both politically inclusive and
secure. I then present a quantitative analysis of my expectations using data on all civil war peace
agreements from 1981 to 2011. My findings offer strong support for the hypothesized relationship.
By addressing the causes of conflict, context-specific peace agreements lead to improvements in levels
of repression and political rights following conflict. In sum, the findings offer further support for the
assertion herein that the contents of peace agreements have meaningful implications for the quality of
post-civil war peace.
Negotiated Settlements and the Resolution of Grievances
Within this section, I discuss some of the key findings on civil war peace agreements and their
effects. Peace agreements are an increasingly common tool to resolve civil wars. Yet, with nearly half
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of negotiated settlements failing to put a meaningful end to conflict, questions still persist regarding
how to end civil war in durable or meaningful ways (Walter, 2002). To what extent, then, do peace
agreements truly matter and if so, how? Fortna (2003) emphasizes that the contents of peace agreements
shape the prospects for the success or failure of conflict resolution attempts. Walter (2002) frames the
research on agreements in terms of credible commitment theory, writing that “even if combatants reach
a mutually agreeable bargain they will not implement its terms unless credible guarantees on the terms
of the treaty are included” (8). When an agreement includes specific mechanisms such as withdrawal of
forces, third-party guarantees, and other dispute resolution procedures, the agreement will tend to lead
to a more durable peace. We, as a field, thus know that peace agreements can put an end to war, but their
long-term success depends on their contents and provisions.
As I highlight throughout my own research on peace agreements and the quality of post-conflict
peace, few systematic empirical analyses have been done to explore the sources and foundations of a
quality peace.2 Instead, researchers have focused on theorizing and testing the sources of negotiated
settlements as well as the extent to which these settlements generate durable peaceful outcomes as
defined by the absence of war. In other words, a rich body of literature exists on the means through
which civil war violence ends, but much less is known regarding how to consolidate peace. Below,
I present an overview of extant work on the negotiated end to civil war. Most importantly, however,
I emphasize the need to better understand the long-term implications of peace processes for the post-
conflict environment.
Resolving Civil War Through Negotiated Settlement
Extant work on negotiated settlements and their effects has focused on identifying strategies to
achieve a durable peace following civil war. At the most basic level, the findings fall within two cat-
egories. First, third party enforcement mechanisms such as peacekeepers or observer missions greatly
increase the probability that a durable peace will take hold in the wake of conflict. Third parties reduce
insecurity by assuaging problems of credible commitment and increasing the information available to
disputants. Second, particular institutional designs lead to a more durable settlement; power sharing,
2As noted earlier, however, empirical work is moving towards a focus on civil war settlements and quality of peace indicators.
Hartzell and Hoddie (2015), for example, investigate how power-sharing provisions within the settlement process influence the
likelihood that democratic institutions take root. Wallensteen (2015) considers how war outcomes shape the quality of peace.
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more specifically, reduces fear among former warring factions, decreases the probability of continued
exclusion, and enhances parties’ willingness to become stakeholders in the post-conflict period. I re-
view these two lines of work briefly below. I also highlight, however, that one must be careful to make
one-size-fits-all prescriptions to civil war resolution processes. Thus, I also consider the extent to which
addressing the grievances specific to a conflict is an effective conflict management strategy.
Third party enforcement is, according to many studies, a necessary condition in generating more
durable peaceful outcomes (see e.g. Stedman, 2002; Mattes, 2008; Mattes and Savun, 2009, 2010; Wal-
ter, 2002). Third parties are crucial in guiding disputants through the implementation phase of civil war
resolution; they limit the possibility of cheating or deviations from the settlement’s terms. Third-party
security guarantees serve as a promise that the third party will intervene if one group decides to renege
on a bargain (Walter, 2002). Third parties thus reduce fears and concerns about cheating. Mattes and
Savun (2009) write that third party guarantees are a fear-reducing provision, and that they reduce both
insecurities and uncertainties endemic in post-conflict societies. Within the framework of bargaining
models of war, third parties manipulate the utility function of combatants such that peace becomes a
more attractive option than continued fighting (Addison and Murshed, 2002, 499). Thus, third parties
are able to mitigate commitment problems and incentivize actors to comply with negotiated settlements.
Of course, research has also indicated that third party enforcement is not a panacea for civil war
resolution. Hartzell (1999), while recognizing that third-party actors may be able to reduce the likeli-
hood of conflict recurrence, cautions: “in an age when the ability and willingness if third-party actors
such as the United States to make long-term commitments are increasingly being called into question,
reliance on such a strategy for stopping civil conflicts seems increasingly precarious” (20). Beyond the
questionable political will of third parties mentioned by Hartzell (1999) and Fortna (2004a), Hartzell
and Hoddie (2007) present a second reason to be skeptical of the ability of third parties to end civil
war: third parties have highly variable capacities and powers. Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) write, then,
that “there are genuine reasons to doubt that peacekeepers will have the omniscient powers that Walter
ascribes them” (91). While not intended to dismiss the importance of third-party enforcement and ver-
ification mechanisms, the literature highlights the need to look beyond third parties to investigate other
key pathways to durable civil war settlement.
A second key finding in works on the civil war resolution process focuses on domestic institutional
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design. Research has shown that peace agreements that generate power-sharing institutions are more
durable than those agreements without power sharing provisions (see e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003,
2007; Walter, 2002; Mattes and Savun, 2009). Mattes and Savun (2009) emphasize that power-sharing
provisions reduce fear amongst former disputants, because they ensure that no group single-handedly
controls the government or security forces. Power-sharing institutions signal to disputants that they
have a share of the pie and that they will not become victims of systematic discrimination, exclusion, or
violence. The costs associated with power-sharing also serve to strengthen the commitments of former
disputants. The very willingness of an agreement’s signatories to endure and enforce the implementation
of power-sharing institutions serves as a costly signal of peaceful intentions (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003,
2007).
Taken together, the research on third-party guarantees and power-sharing institutions offers strong
indication that the content of peace agreements matters for the civil war resolution process. A peace
agreement can serve many functions ranging from reducing uncertainty and fear to increasing the like-
lihood that actors are truly committed to peace. Negotiated settlements hold the potential to alter the
incentives of disputants and put an end to conflict. Indeed, peace agreements are key tools in building a
durable peace following civil war. The question remains, however, regarding how peace agreements in-
fluence more positive conceptions of peace. Can peace agreements lead to improvements in the quality
of peace?
Research has also found, however, that practitioners and scholars alike must be cautious not to
prescribe a one-size-fits-all solution to all civil wars. Indeed, work by Roland Paris (1997; 2004) points
to the dangers of placing an overemphasis on political and economic liberalization following civil war.
While power sharing, democratization, and economic liberalization are appropriate in many cases, their
ubiquitous application to resolution processes runs the risk of introducing new instabilities into fragile
societies. To what extent have researchers heeded this advice? To what extent can and should peace
processes focus on the specific needs and grievances of disputants? In the following section, I discuss
the research on grievances and peace agreements. I then consider how peace agreements that are crafted
to address the context-specific needs of a conflict and its actors are best-equipped to generate a quality
peace following conflict.
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Peace Agreements as a Means to Address Grievances
A number of works have considered the extent to which the context-specificity of peace agreements
– or the extent to which agreements resolve the causes of conflict – leads to a more durable peace.
While the evidence is mixed, the theoretical expectations reinforce Paris’ calls to generate settlements
to match the needs of a conflict and its actors (1997; 2002; 2004). By addressing the causes of conflict,
more specific agreements have been found to reduce incentives to return to war. Work on comprehensive
agreements, for example, agreements that are often defined as addressing the needs and incompatibilities
of the disputants, are found to be the most durable form of settlement. Fortna (2004b) argues that the
more specific or more comprehensive an agreement is, the less likely signatories will be to renege.
Comprehensive agreements, within her framework, raise the costs of reneging, reduce uncertainty about
intentions and actions through specificity, and establish measures to check compliance. Werner and
Yuen (2005) similarly find evidence that “the strength of the agreement significantly reduces the risk
that ceasefires fail” (276). By reducing security fears and rendering peace a more beneficial outcome
than renewed conflict, more comprehensive agreements lead to a peace that is more durable.3 Negotiated
settlements, while precarious, may be crafted to generate a lasting peace.4
As noted, however, the finding that comprehensive peace agreements lead to a more durable peace
is contested across studies. DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen (2009), for example, find that “agreement
comprehensiveness is in the expected direction [reduces likelihood of peace failure] but not significant.
We cannot confirm that specifically addressing the root cause of the fighting leads to longer agreements”
(382). Werner (1999), as well, finds little evidence that resolving the issues that led to conflict generates
more durable peaceful outcomes.5 Finally, Call and Cousens (2008) are critical of defining success
through overly ambitious metrics. They write that while addressing the “root causes” of conflict may be
“philosophically appealing,” it is “unhelpful for practitioners” (7).6
3See, also: Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001); Mattes and Savun (2010).
4While her analysis is not specifically focused on comprehensive peace agreements, Reid’s (2015) study on civil war media-
tion finds that comprehensive peace agreements have a positive and statistically significant effect on the durability of peace.
5I would argue, however, that her measures of issue resolution do not directly measure whether or not the causes of conflict
were resolved. She relies on dummy variables for (1) imposed settlements, (2) mediation attempts, (3) territorial disputes, and
(4) military stalemates to deduce issue resolution.
6Call (2008), however, goes on to note: “To the extent that root causes are specific to a society, then this standard makes more
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Two points warrant noting before transitioning to the theoretical framework of this chapter. First,
none of the aforementioned studies consider the effect addressing the root causes of conflict has on the
quality of post-conflict peace. While they find, more often than not, that comprehensive agreements
reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence, they do not speak to the type of peace that ensues. Just
like addressing the causes of conflict alters incentives so as to generate a more durable peace, I also
expect such a process renders actors more likely to commit to greater levels of political openness and
opportunity.
Second, and importantly, there is an uneven application of the terms comprehensive agreements,
specificity of agreements, and full agreements throughout the aforementioned literature. While some
analyses identify full agreements as those that address the entire incompatibility, and comprehensive
as those that include all relevant actors (e.g. Ho¨gbladh, 2011), others focus more on specificity or the
presence of certain provisions within an agreement (for example, the literature on power sharing or
third party commitments). I proceed with an agnostic view toward the type or level of peace agreement.
Instead, my research is purely focused on the type of provisions within the peace agreement and the
extent to which those provisions address the causes of each specific conflict. This allows flexibility
and recognizes that there are many tools available to peacemakers and conflict actors to resolve their
differences.
The question of peace agreement design is both challenging and important; I seek to add to the
wealth of knowledge already in existence. Moreover, I seek to push current understanding of peace
agreements to a new area: how do peace agreements and the nature of civil war settlements influence
the quality of post-conflict peace? To what extent can agreements shape the quality of peace in the
aftermath of conflict? Beyond committing actors to peace, can peace agreements also commit actors to
outcomes of political inclusivity, for example?
A Theory of Context-Specific Peace Agreements and Quality Peace
As part of the broader research on the quality of peace, I focus on peace agreements as one mech-
anism to generate a peace that is more meaningful and more inclusive of all members of society. In
sense. Addressing the causes of conflict, rather than the symptoms would logically reduce the chances of war recurrence”
(190).
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the second chapter, my quantitative analyses support my theoretical expectations: the content of peace
agreements contribute to an increased respect for women’s political rights. What, though, of a question
on political rights more broadly? To what extent do peace agreements create a peace that is politically
secure and inclusive for all members of society regardless of identity? Building upon past research that
emphasizes the importance of peace agreement language, my theory assumes that the words on paper
matter. The very content of the agreement holds meaning and outlines a legal framework for the post-
conflict society. This framework, I argue, changes actors’ preferences and thus creates a higher quality
peace.
The following theoretical framework addresses the causal mechanisms linking peace agreements to
changes in the quality of peace. First, I summarize the general theoretical expectations bridging peace
agreements and their contents to a higher quality peace. Second, I delve into the specific mechanisms
that link context-specific agreements to greater respect for political rights. Repression and exclusion
are, at times, both strategic and advantageous political decisions. How, then, might peace agreements
change the strategic calculations of actors so as to make these practices less appealing? In particular, I
argue that by addressing the causes of conflict, context-specific peace agreement change the incentives
of actors and create institutional constraints. As such, those in power are less willing and less able to
resort to repressive practices, political violence, and exclusion.
Peace Agreements’ Enduring Effects
The creation and consolidation of a quality peace is not guaranteed following civil war; the de-
struction and destabilization created by civil war, however, generates a situation in which the status
quo can change. Entire societies and countries are ravaged by war, and countries are left to rebuild in
the aftermath. This opening for change creates a situation which is, in some ways, quite malleable. I
argue that the trajectory of the peace process7 has the capacity to shape and shift the ways in which
rights are accorded and protected in the post-conflict environment. Bell and O’Rourke (2007) point
to peace agreements as a tangible representation of the transformations and revisions that occur at the
7The term peace process here is used to refer to the period of formal negotiations and their outcome. Undoubtedly, the peace
process in a civil war is open-ended and in some ways synonymous with the concept of bargaining, which is ongoing before,
during, and after conflicts. Given information constraints, however, I restrict my theory and analyses to the formal negotiation
processes.
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end of a civil war. As noted earlier, Bell and O’Rourke (2007) further identify peace agreements as
quasi-constitutional documents, or documents that map out the power structures of the post-conflict
state. Within this chapter as in this dissertation as a whole, I look to the political-legal framework or
roadmap of peace agreements, and I argue that this framework is a key mechanism that spurs and shapes
the likelihood of post-conflict progress toward a higher quality peace.
How might peace agreements generate a situation in which rights and inclusivity improve in the
aftermath of civil war? Peace agreements, in their quasi-constitutional nature, have potential to cre-
ate a framework of legal rules and institutions. While peace agreements vary greatly in their content
and specificity, an issue which will be explored shortly, many peace agreements include in them legal
frameworks and specific plans for the post-conflict period. As Abbott and Snidal (2000) write: “Legal
rules and institutions operate both by changing material incentives and by modifying understandings,
standards of behavior, and identities. In particular, they invoke doctrines and institutions that facilitate
enforcement as well as social norms of obedience to law” (425). Similarly, I posit that peace agreements
catalyze and incentivize changes to the status quo. Through legal as well as normative shifts that are
generated through the peace process, peace agreements themselves revise extant laws and standards of
behavior.
In the civil war and conflict resolution context, Roeder (2010) indicates that institutions generated
during peace processes hold the potential to be permanent and to influence actors’ behaviors for the
foreseeable post-conflict period. Peace agreements, by outlining institutions and a framework for a
transition to peace, serve as an impetus to processes that revise pre-conflict and war-time realities. Peace
agreement signatories may perceive incentives to follow through on provisions that are clearly outlined
in agreements.8 When war is more costly than peace, leaders will be incentivized to follow through on
the terms of peace agreements.
In addition to incentives, peace agreements also constrain the behavior of former conflict actors
following conflict. On the most basic level, peace agreements influence the quality of peace in the
wake of civil war by tying actors’ hands to particular policies or reforms. Through institutional and
legal constraints, peace agreements promote a higher quality peace by limiting the extent to which
8Similarly, reforms that are achieved through the peace process may be less costly vis-a`-vis the domestic audience than
those reforms that are developed through entirely domestic processes. Leaders may be able to “blame” unpopular reforms on
external actors.
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governments and other actors can continue to pursue policies of exclusion or repression. The extent to
which peace agreements create incentives for compliance and tie hands of actors is likely dependent
on the specific provisions of peace agreements themselves. Cross (1999) engages the role that law
and constitutional provisions play in shaping human rights protections. His work posits that precision
or specificity of provisions tend to generate stronger signals about what the post-conflict environment
must look like. Through precision, Bell (2006) posits that peace agreements can “facilitate compliance
by imparting clarity regarding implementation and breach, which enhances their normative ‘compliance
pull’” (395). I similarly argue that the more precise agreements are, the less willing and able belligerents
will be to renege on particular agreement goals and commitments.
An Application to Political Rights
How do peace agreements influence political rights in the aftermath of civil war? In particular,
why do context-specific peace agreements, those that address the underlying causes of conflict, generate
positive effects for levels of political inclusivity following conflict? Post-conflict societies are at a high
risk for repression, continued human rights violations, and political exclusions; these risks stem from
ongoing insecurities and struggles for power. I recognize that while these risks do not change overnight,
there is an opportunity for change in the post-conflict period. Civil wars generate an opening to revise
the status quo. The language of peace agreements shapes the trajectory and extent of changes following
conflict. Peace agreements and the institutions which they put in place, I argue, generate incentives
and constraints that alter the political and security environment following conflict. In the following
paragraphs, I engage how context-specific agreements incentivize and constrain actors to commit to
opening political systems.
First, context-specific peace agreements incentivize shifts in levels of repression and political inclu-
sion. More accurately, I argue that context-specific agreements create positive incentives and negative
incentives (or disincentives) that shape the quality of peace. As a means of addressing the grievances
of disputants or the underlying causes of conflict, peace agreements create new political, economic,
and social institutions for the post-conflict period. The new institutions, which are more often than not
democratic in nature, decrease the costs actors face in opening the political system. Indeed, political
elites may find it advantageous to open the political process and refrain from political violence; doing
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so builds legitimacy for elites and provides an opportunity to garner support. New and reformed insti-
tutions likely reward those who follow the rules of the game; whether through domestic or international
pressure, compliance with new and more open institutions creates tangible benefits for former conflict
actors.
On the flip side, context-specific peace agreements create a web of disincentives that discourage
continued or increased violations of human rights and political freedoms. In dealing with the causes of
conflict, context-specific peace agreements often include either the division or sharing of power politi-
cally, economically, or territorially.9 Beyond divisions or sharing of power, context-specific agreements
also contain a plethora of other political, economic, social, and territorial reforms. As such, the lines of
power distribution tend to be clearer in the post-agreement period than prior to the conflict; the clarity
only increases as agreements are better-designed to address the specific conflict at hand. Leaders, while
still incentivized by a desire to obtain and amass power, are less vulnerable and therefore less likely to
resort to repression as a means to an end. Davenport (2007) writes that democratic institutions increase
the costs of repression. Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) write: “when the state is dominated by
a single group or coalition of groups and acts aggressively toward out-group interests, exploiting and
repressing their politically disadvantaged peoples, [the state]...itself can become the source of manifest
grievances and opposition” (2001, 185). New (or newly empowered) political actors will be incentivized
to consolidate power within the new political system as opposed to turning to repression and exclusion,
which would in turn jeopardize leaders’ hold on power.
Wallensteen (2015), focusing on the foundations of a quality peace, writes: “The idea is that ac-
tors will always have choices and when the strength of structures are such that they cannot break out
will they also remain within the framework... If all (or most) actors benefit from the new institutional
arrangements, then there is less incentive for challenging them, not the least as the actors may fear to
become more isolated and marginalized” (26). Political repression, then, risks destabilizing the newly
approved status quo. Indeed, in a fragile post-conflict period, repression and widespread exclusion risks
leading to a recurrence of conflict. When agreements are crafted to address the underlying causes of
9Power sharing, however, is ubiquitous in post-conflict settlements and not always appropriate. While having clear and
positive effects on the duration of peace, its application is not sufficient to also generate higher quality peaceful outcomes.
Moreover, this is not purely a story of democratization or liberalization, although the two go hand in hand with peace agree-
ments. Roland Paris 1997; 2004 has cautioned against an overemphasis on political liberalization; in many ways, his work
recognizes the need to pay attention to context, a goal which I follow here.
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conflict, political actors will have more to gain from compliance than they will from reneging.10 In the
next chapter, I offer as evidence for the (dis)incentives mechanism the case of Liberia. President Sirleaf,
in the period following the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement, made moves toward greater political
openness; she justified said policies by stating that she would prefer political openness to a return to
war.
Perhaps the disincentives put in place by context-specific peace agreements are best described by
considering what happens when peace agreements do not fully address the grievances of the disputants.
In cases where peace agreements take on a one-size-fits-all structure or only tangentially cater to the
causes of conflict, the division of power and resources remains uncertain in the post-conflict period.
Actors on one or all sides of the conflict find their demands and concerns only partially met. As such,
political actors may resort to exclusion and/or repression to consolidate their hold on power and re-
sources. Ongoing repression and exclusion will be necessary to achieve actors’ goals, and may even
be perceived as a necessary step toward building a more secure society. At the most basic level, civil
wars that end unresolved may lead governments to use preemptive repression in order to make “it more
difficult for the [opposition] group to act” (Danneman and Ritter, 2014, 258). The case of Coˆte d’Ivoire,
which will be explicated in Chapter 5, drives home Danneman and Ritter’s point. When civil wars and
their resolution are characterized by a struggle for power and a struggle to revise or protect the status
quo, only those agreements that recognize the contextual specificities of a conflict will have the capacity
to shift conflictual relations to more cooperative ones.
Having now established an understanding of the positive and negative incentives linking context-
specific agreements to a higher quality peace, I now turn to consider the extent to which these agreements
constrain actors so as to lay the foundations for greater respect for political rights. When I state that
context-specific peace agreements constrain the behavior of actors in the post-conflict period, I mean
that peace agreements hold the potential to institutionalize concrete mechanisms that punish or inhibit
rights violations. These concrete mechanisms include but are not limited to reformed justice and security
systems, elections, power sharing institutions, and/or checks and balances on power (to limit executive
10I do recognize that spoilers, or those unhappy with the new status quo created by the peace agreement, may have an interest
in destabilizing the political process. These groups, however, tend to be peripheral to the government. Because I am focused
on the way in which the peace agreement alters the extent to which the government represses and excludes its citizens, I am
leaving spoilers out of the discussion.
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control, for example). In other words, context-specific agreements may, at the most basic level, prevent
the possibility of widespread rights violations. Beyond incentives/disincentives to better respect human
rights, peace agreements may limit the range of available options to an actor; repression and political
exclusion become unfeasible or impossible strategies.
Another constraint on the ability and will of actors to repress and exclude is driven by international
attention on post-conflict societies. A so-called “spotlight effect” places pressure on actors to limit vi-
olence, limit exclusion, and exhibit a level of commitment to the peace process. Peace agreements are
almost exclusively products of an international process to bring peace to conflict-ridden states. There-
fore, peace agreements almost always carry with them a focus on the state and on actors within the
state. Agreements that are particularly context-specific in nature generate an acute sense of oversight
and commitment by international actors. Whether perceived or actual, actors shape their behavior so
as to garner positive/neutral international attention (possibility of rewards) as opposed to negative in-
ternational attention (possibility of sanctions/punishment). If actors believe they are under international
spotlight and believe that they are being judged by their progress on agreement implementation, they
may shape their behavior so as to send a positive signal. In short, international pressure holds actors
accountable directly and indirectly.
The preceding discussion offers insight into a number of causal pathways linking context-specific
agreements to greater respect for political rights following civil wars. The causal processes identified
herein are complex and multifaceted; because the civil war resolution process is long, wrought with chal-
lenges, and shaped by social processes, it is counterproductive to settle on a singular causal pathway. As
such, I theorize that context-specific agreements lead to tangible benefits for the inclusivity and security
of post-conflict societies due to both incentives and constraints. Context-specific agreements incentivize
actors to take advantage of new political structures; newly created political openings disincentivize ac-
tors to threaten or undermine the post-conflict political environment. Moreover, context-specific peace
agreements constrain actors and reduce political exclusions by institutionally preventing rights abuses
and by strengthening the international spotlight effect. Through both positive and negative pathways, I
thus hypothesize:
Hypothesis: As the context-specificity of peace agreements increases, I expect government
respect for political rights to increase as well.
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Research Design
To test my expectations regarding peace agreements and government respect for political rights, I
use the universe of civil war settlement cases identified within the UCDP Peace Agreements Database
(Ho¨gbladh, 2011). In total, the UCDP Peace Agreements Database (PAD) provides 196 peace agree-
ments (including peace process agreements, partial agreements, and comprehensive agreements) signed
between at least two warring parties within civil wars between the years 1975 and 2011. I further subset
the dataset to include only the universe of peace agreements that have not ended. A peace agreement
ends, according to the UCDP PAD, when one of the primary parties is no longer party to the agreement.
I take this step to reflect the expected causal mechanisms, all of which rely on the quasi-constitutional
nature of peace agreements. In short, a peace agreement that has ended cannot legitimately alter the
political-legal framework of the state. Finally, because of limited data availability on a number of my
measures of quality peace, my dataset is restricted to the 1981-2011 time period. My unit of analysis is
the peace agreement within a civil war dyad.
Dependent Variable
The present study focuses on the extent to which peace agreements generate improvements in the
quality of peace following conflict. The dependent variable, therefore, measures whether or not the
quality of peace increases following conflict. For purposes of this section, I define the quality of peace
using levels of repression. Repression, although a negative metric of political inclusivity, proxies the
openness and opportunity within a country’s political system. Moreover, repression proxies the extent
to which all members of society are safe to engage in the political life of the state. Data on political
repression comes from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Gibney et al., 2015). The Political Terror Scale
codes data from yearly Amnesty International reports, the U.S. State Department Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices, and Human Rights Watch’s World Reports. The goal of the PTS is to measure
levels of political violence and terror; the data range from a score of 1 to a score of 5. A score of 1
represents a country that is “under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and
torture is rare” whereas a score of 5 represents a country where “terror has been expanded to the whole
population [and where] leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with
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which they pursue personal or ideological goals” (Gibney et al., 2015). In between the extremes, the
scores represent varying degrees of political imprisonment, torture, and civil/political rights violations.11
Specifically, to assess whether or not context-specific peace agreement generate positive effects
for political rights within post-conflict societies, I code two dependent variables. The first dependent
variables measures whether or not countries experienced an improvement in levels of political repression
in the year immediately following the signing of the agreement. In other words, do levels of political
rights and protections improve in the immediate aftermath of conflict? Because the coding of PTS is
from 1 to 5 where 5 represents widespread exclusion and torture and 1 represents a society that is secure
under the rule of law, I look for improvements (or reductions) in states’ PTS scores. I code the variable,
Rights Improvements: Immediate, as 1 if the PTS score improves in the year following the signing
of the agreement as compared to the pre-conflict score. The variable is coded 0 if there is either no
improvement or levels of repression worsen in the year following the signing of the agreement.12
As a stricter test of the potential benefits of context-specific peace agreements, I also code a depen-
dent variable to capture durable rights improvements. Do context-specific agreements not only lead to
lower levels of repression, but also enduring improvements in political rights? The variable, Rights Im-
provements: Durable, is coded 1 for those cases where rights improvements occur in year one following
the signing of the agreement and endure through year three. I code cases as 0 if rights improvements
do not occur or do not endure for the three year period following the signing of a peace agreement. The
second dependent variable is crucial in gauging whether peace agreements’ effects are fleeting or more
durable in nature.13 Given the dichotomous nature of each dependent variable, I run my analyses using
11In both the pre- and post-conflict periods in my dataset, the universe of cases take on the full range of values of the PTS
score. The mean PTS score in pre-conflict societies is 3.6.
12I code the dependent variables to account for context; in other words, the coding takes into account the baseline levels of
political rights and opportunities existing within societies. This coding is justified given that the quality of peace is a relative
concept. Quality of peace is not, I argue, absolute; one cannot compare the quality of peace or the possible progress toward a
quality peace in Northern Ireland to that in South Africa or Liberia. The coding takes into account that progress is relative to
the realities on the ground.
13In a future extension of this paper, I plan to code the dependent variable – political rights and opportunities – using both
a high- and low-bar, so to speak. The low-bar for quality of peace improvements is measured by repression levels. I argue,
however, that while stating that levels of repression improve is a crucial step, it also represents negative or minimalist progress
toward quality peace. A high-bar measure, on the other hand, would set a stricter metric for quality peace. For the high-bar
measure, I plan to use the Varieties of Democracy Dataset’s (Coppedge et al., 2015) variable: “Power distributed by social
group.” This variable measures the extent to which political power is monopolized or dispersed across social groups within
societies.
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logistic regression, and I cluster the standard errors according to the peace process.
Explanatory Variable and Controls
The primary independent variable of interest in this study is the extent to which peace agreements
address the underlying causes of conflict. I label this characteristic of peace agreements as the context-
specificity of the agreements. I argue that context-specific peace agreements lay the foundations for a
higher quality peace than those that are less context-specific by changing incentives of political leaders
and constraining exclusionary and/or repressive behavior. In the following, I describe the coding of
context-specificity, a process that proceeds in a number of steps. First, I identify the causes of conflict for
each conflict within my dataset. Data on the causes of conflict is found by reading Conflict Barometer
yearly reports (HIIK, 2015).14 The causes of conflict fall into the following categories: secession,
autonomy, ideology/national power, and natural resources. Several conflicts are driven by multiple
causes; I code those conflicts accordingly rather than restricting my coding to only one cause per conflict.
After coding the causes of conflict, I then identify the extent to which peace agreement provisions
address the very grievances that led to conflict onset. See Figure A.1 in Appendix 2 for details on this
process. I must note that it is both possible and common to partially address the causes of conflict; my
coding recognizes this and thus focuses on generating a continuous measure of the extent to which a
peace agreement is context-specific.15
After coding the causes of each conflict and the solutions embodied within peace agreements, I
then aggregate the information into a measure of context-specificity. The continuous variable per-
cent address, measures how fully a peace agreement addresses the causes of conflict. Specifically, the
variable is calculated by counting the total number of peace agreement provisions focused on grievance-
resolution and divides that number by the total number of provisions that it would take to fully address
14I cross-verify the causes of conflict using the Minorities at Risk database (MAR, 2009). I also rely on UCDP’s country
reports for cross-verification and information on those cases not found within the time frame of the Conflict Barometer (1992-
present).
15For example, in those conflicts that are driven by secessionist aspirations, peace agreements may fully address the cause of
conflict by giving conflict actors the right to an independence referendum or the right to self-determination. An agreement
may partially address the grievances of secessionist movements by taking steps toward federalism, political decentralization,
and/or territorial power sharing.
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the causes of the conflict. The resulting score for context-specificity ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 rep-
resents peace agreements that are quite shallow in nature while 1 represents agreements whose design
specifically meets the needs and concerns of warring parties.16 For descriptive statistics on context-
specificity, see Table 4.1.17
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Context-Specificity by Peace Agreement Type
Type of Agreement Mean (S.D.) Min. Max.
Comprehensive 0.812 (.228) .33 1
Partial 0.449 (.344) 0 1
Process 0.099 (.189) 0 .66
In the quantitative analyses, I control for a number of variables that are also expected to influence
the extent to which a quality peace takes hold in the post-conflict period. First, I control for whether
or not the agreement signed was comprehensive. As noted earlier, comprehensive agreements are, on
average, expected to be more durable. Their very categorization is based upon addressing the grievances
of disputants. While comprehensive peace agreements are often treated as the most successful form of
peace agreement, I note that they still vary quite extensively in the extent to which they address the
causes of conflict. Within my sample of cases, for example, comprehensive agreements have a mean
value of .81 for context-specificity. Thus, my analyses do not assume that comprehensive agreements
are “better” than partial or process agreements; indeed, my theoretical expectations simply rely on how
peace agreements are crafted to recognize and resolve causes of conflict. Data on the type of agreements
is provided by the UCDP PAD (Ho¨gbladh, 2011). The variable is dichotomous and coded as 1 if the
agreement is comprehensive.18
Beyond controlling for the agreement type, I also control for whether or not the peace agreement
included promises for peacekeeping forces. Again this variable is dichotomous and derived from the
UCDP PAD dataset. I expect peacekeeping promises to enhance the theorized spotlight effect and thus
16The mean value for the context-specificity is .493.
17Descriptive statistics are on the sub-sample of cases that are actually in my regression analyses.
18UCDP labels such agreements as full agreements, those in which one or more dyad agree to settle the whole incompatibility.
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lead to improvements in political rights; with peacekeepers either promised or present, domestic actors
will be less willing and less able to resort to political repression. Third, I control for a state’s regime
type in the time period following the signing of the agreement using a lagged version of Polity scores
(Jaggers and Marshall, 2000). I expect more democratic societies, those with higher Polity scores, to
experience lower levels of repression. Countries with mid-range or more democratic regimes should be
more likely to see improvements toward a higher quality peace than those countries with more closed
political systems. Fourth, I control for a state’s GDP per capita (log value, lagged) to gauge the level of
development, economic opportunity, and openness of the society (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2009).
Fifth, I control for whether or not the peace agreements include power-sharing institutions. The variable
used in the analyses is a count variable of the number of power-sharing institutions; the values range
from 0 to 4 and count for the presence of political, economic, military, and/or territorial power sharing.
Data on power sharing comes from Ottmann and Vu¨llers (2014) Power Sharing Event Dataset (PSED).
As the number of power sharing institutions increase, I anticipate the web of institutional constraints to
be such that actors will resort to repressive practices less frequently. Finally, to account for the potential
of improvement in levels of repression, I control for countries’ PTS scores prior to conflict.
Results
Table 4.2 presents the full set of results of the logistic regression analyses. Models 1 through 3
provide an “easy” or short-term test of the effects of context-specific agreements. Models 4 through 6, on
the other hand, present the results for the harder test: are the effects of context-specific peace agreements
durable in the post-conflict period? Within both sets of analyses, I run three models: one that assesses
the effects of both context-specificity and comprehensive agreements, one that looks solely at context-
specific agreements, and a final one that only measures the effects of comprehensive agreements. These
steps are taken to assuage concerns regarding which type of peace agreement is driving the effects on
the post-conflict political environment.
Across the set of model specifications, my analyses lend support for the paper’s main hypothesis.
As the context-specificity of peace agreements increases – as agreements more fully address the causes
of conflict – the likelihood of an improvement in governments’ respect for political rights also increases.
Thus, context-specific agreements lay the foundations for a higher quality peace, as measured by levels
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Table 4.2: Logistic Regression: Peace Agreements and Government Respect for Political Rights
DV: Rights Improve. (Immediate) DV: Rights Improve. (Durable)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Context-Specificity 2.354∗ 2.424∗∗ 3.394∗∗ 3.460∗∗
(1.285) (1.211) (1.487) (1.415)
Comp. Agreement 0.133 0.544 0.127 0.688
(0.851) (0.757) (0.907) (0.807)
PKO 0.788 0.807 0.392 0.589 0.612 0.063
(1.008) (1.003) (0.932) (1.080) (1.068) (0.977)
Polity (lagged) 0.022 0.023 0.050 -.102 -0.101 -0.046
(0.079) (0.079) (0.074) (0.089) (0.089) (0.080)
GDPpc (lag, log) 0.356 0.358 0.073 0.997∗ 0.999∗ 0.482
(0.430) (0.431) (0.385) (0.521) (0.522) (0.416)
Power Sharing -0.825∗ -0.811∗ -0.444 -0.969∗ -0.956∗ -0.358
(0.616) (0.439) (0.377) (0.531) (0.523) (0.395))
Pre-War Rights 3.326∗∗∗ 3.317∗∗∗ 3.167∗∗∗ 4.783∗∗∗ 4.766∗∗∗ 4.215∗∗∗
(0.786) (0.780) (0.735) (1.261) (1.252) (1.089)
Intercept -16.413∗∗∗ -16.399∗∗∗ -12.912∗∗∗ -27.595∗∗∗ -27.553∗∗∗ -20.426∗∗∗
(5.245) (5.238) (4.406) (7.940) (7.923) (5.975)
N 110 110 112 111 111 113
R-Squared 0.556 0.556 0.528 0.614 0.613 0.569
Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels: ∗∗∗p < .01 ;∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
of repression. When looking at Models 1 and 2, context-specificity has a positive and statistically signif-
icant effects on the likelihood of rights improvements in the year following the signing of the agreement;
the effect is significant at the p<.1 and p<.05 levels, respectively. Comprehensive agreements, while
positively signed, do not have a distinguishable effect on levels of political repression. Peacekeeping
operations, a country’s regime type, and its level of development do not reach statistical significance.
Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficients for power sharing are both negative and statistically significant
and the .1-level in Models 1 and 2. The effect disappears in Model 3. While the results are certainly
not strong or consistent enough to offer a condemnation of power sharing, they may speak to the fact
that power sharing is not always the right tool for the job at hand. More is not always better. In fact,
the results may indicate that peace agreements will be more successful when crafted to fit the context
at hand, rather than placing a one-size-fits-all solution on a peace process. Finally, Models 1 through
3 indicate that for every one unit increase in a country’s pre-war PTS score, the log-odds of a rights
improvement following conflict increase.
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Figure 4.1: Substantive Effects of Context-Specific Agreements
Context-specific agreements have positive effects in the immediate aftermath of conflict, but does
this improvement endure at all? Models 4 and 5 show that as the context-specificity of peace agree-
ments increases, the likelihood of a country experiencing a durable improvement in political rights also
increases. The effect within these models reaches statistical significance at the p<.05-level. The effects
of the control variables in Models 4 through 6 are quite similar to those in Models 1 through 3. Perhaps
as expected, in Models 4 and 5, a country’s level of economic growth has a positive and statistically
significant effect on the probability of rights improvements.
I now turn to a discussion of the substantive effects of the results. While the logistic regression
results offer support for my hypothesis, I am interested to determine the magnitude of the effects
of context-specific agreements. To assess substantive effects, I calculate the predicted probability of
achieving a lasting improvement in PTS scores. In other words, what is the probability that a peace
agreement will generate tangible and lasting improvements in a country’s level of political rights and
securities? Figure 4.1 presents the results in the form of a predicted probability plot. All calculations are
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done while holding continuous variables at their mean value and dichotomous or categorical variables
at their modal value. As context-specificity ranges from its minimum value, 0, to its maximum value,
1, the predicted probability of an improvement in the PTS score ranges from approximately 15 percent
to just over 80 percent. Peace agreements that fully address the causes of conflict thus have clear and
tangible benefits for post-conflict societies. Figure 4.1 also offers another lesson: the marginal benefit
of addressing grievances increases at a fairly constant rate. Even those agreements that only partially
address the causes of conflict increase the probability that a higher quality peace will take hold. As such,
policymakers and peace practitioners must strive to be aware of context and to the specific needs of the
conflict at hand.
Discussion and Conclusion
The goal of this dissertation is to ascertain the role peace agreements play in generating a higher
quality peace. In so doing, my work moves the discussion beyond negative conceptions of peace. In-
stead, I focus on understanding how to establish or lay the framework for a peace that is meaningful,
secure, and open to all those living in post-conflict societies. In earlier chapters, my research has shown
that peace agreements – when crafted to include specific protections for women – facilitate the pro-
cess of societies becoming more welcoming and open to women’s political participation. This chapter
further offers support for the assertion that peace agreements shape the nature of post-conflict peace.
While shifting gears from a focus on women’s rights, specifically, to a broader focus on the political
rights and protections for a society as a whole, the lessons to be learned remain similar. The content of
peace agreements matters. In crafting agreements, then, actors must be aware that they are building the
structures, institutions, and norms that will condition life following conflict.
Specifically, the analyses of this chapter support the hypothesized relationship. Within this paper,
I argue that context-specific peace agreements – those that are designed to remedy the causes of con-
flict – will lead to a higher quality peace. I argue that context-specificity, through the creation of new
institutions and checks in society, incentivizes following the new rules of the game, disincentivizes
destabilizing the new status quo, and constrains actors’ capacity to continue to resort to repressive and
exclusionary practices. By addressing context rather than taking the form of a one-size-fits-all solution
to conflict, peace agreements truly change the perception and reality of what is possible in post-conflict
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society. The results herein support the theoretical expectations: as the context-specificity of agreements
increases, the likelihood of rights improvements increases as well.
At the most basic level, then, the analysis further confirms that peace agreements are more than
just scraps of paper. Their contents matter and hold important implications for life following conflict.
The juxtaposition in the effects of context-specific peace agreements versus comprehensive peace agree-
ments serves as a particularly striking lesson. As Paris (1997, 2002, 2004) has written time and time
again, one-size-fits-all processes of democratization and liberalization are not always appropriate in the
immediate aftermath of conflict. I build on his warnings to emphasize that peace processes must be
designed to match the needs of the conflict and the disputants. It is my hope that the new measure
and theory of context-specific peace agreements developed within this chapter further shine light on the
need to be cognizant of context. Of course mediators and peace practitioners will strive for democracy,
political openness, and economic growth; I do not frown upon these goals per se. Instead, I argue that
there must be a greater awareness. The tangible benefits for the quality of peace when context is taken
into account are, according this study, quite large.
Future of extensions of this work will focus on analyzing the sources and determinants of context-
specific peace agreements. When are mediators, former warring parties, and other actors able to come
together to truly discuss and resolve the causes of conflict? When, on the other hand, are peace agree-
ments purposefully crafted in a piecemeal fashion, to only address one or two issues? Finally, when are
agreements simply used as a delay tactic and thus inclusive of very little substance? Throughout my
work, I am ever-aware of these pressing questions and conscious of their capacity to shape (or skew) any
large-N empirical analysis. As such, I plan to address these questions and potentially larger issues of
endogeneity through both case work and more rigorous empirical analyses. In the following chapter, I
build upon this theoretical discussion and quantitative analysis to further explore the real experiences of
civil war resolution. I turn to the cases of Burundi, Liberia, and Coˆte d’Ivoire to better explicate causal
mechanisms and to draw conclusions about both the sources and the effects of context-specific peace
agreements.
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CHAPTER 5
CONTEXT-SPECIFIC PEACE AGREEMENTS: CASE ILLUSTRATIONS
Our collective challenge is to address the immediate priorities for peace consolidation, in
such a way that it also promotes a holistic approach to the requirements for sustainable
peace. We must invest generously in critical national capacities to ensure that peace is
sustainable. Viable states require local institutions capable of delivering basic services
and providing security, justice and political stability.
– U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, June 23, 20081
Peace consolidation is a process that must focus on the immediate goal of ending war while also
taking steps to institutionalize positive dimensions of peace. In particular, the creation and consoli-
dation of a quality peace necessitates a focus on processes and institutions of inclusivity and political
opportunity. While there are many tools at peacemakers’ disposal to achieve the consolidation of qual-
ity peace, I posit that those strategies that are most successful are those that focus on context. In other
words, peacemakers, to be truly successful, must focus on the causes of conflict and needs of the conflict
actors within the situation at hand. With a specific focus on peace agreements, I argue that agreements
are best-equipped to achieve the goals of security, inclusivity, and opportunity when they take context
into account. To this end, the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 confirms that context-specific peace
agreements lead to improvements in the quality of post-conflict peace. This chapter seeks to further ex-
amine the underlying causal processes to strengthen both the academic and policy-implications related
to context-specific peacebuilding.
In examining the toolset available to peacemakers, works by Mukherjee (2006) and Tull and Mehler
1Statement made in his remarks at the closing meeting of the Second Session of the Peacebuilding Commission
(http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search full.asp?statID=272)
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(2005) assert that even the most successful conflict resolution tools, such as power sharing, are not ap-
propriate for every context. The ubiquitous use of power sharing, political liberalization, and economic
liberalization – as I have discussed in the previous chapter – may render peace fragile and prone to
collapse. Call and Cousens (2008) capture the heart of this argument when they write: “External actors
need to understand the history, politics, and cultures of the countries in which they are attempting to
‘build peace,’ whether societies are emerging from statelessness, institutionalized authoritarian regimes,
or highly informal predatory states” (14). The authors go on to assert that “Without understanding
something about how state-society relations have evolved, how war may have changed things, or who
has power and how power works, any generic peacebuilding strategy is likely to be a poor fit” (Call and
Cousens, 2008, 14). Peace fails to take hold far too often; by designing settlements that fit the needs and
grievances of specific cases, I argue that actors will be better able to help countries remove themselves
from the conflict trap.
Why, specifically, does context matter, and how does an attention to context help countries out of
the conflict trap? Why are peace agreements that are crafted to fit the conflict context more likely
to contribute to a higher quality peace? Throughout the preceding chapters, I have argued that peace
agreements both constrain and incentivize behavior. With respect to context-specific peace agreements
and their effects on political opportunity following conflict, I argue that the agreements work through
these same two causal mechanisms: constraints and (dis)incentives. First, peace agreements create
a new system of political, economic, and social institutions; in short, they create a completely new
or revised state apparatus that limits actors’ behaviors and prevents extreme deviations from working
within the new political system. Context-specific agreements, in particular, create an extensive web of
institutions that are intentionally chosen to match the needs of the conflict at hand. In Burundi, for
example, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement set up an extensive network of new political,
economic, and security institutions that limited actors’ capacity to consolidate and abuse power.
Second, peace agreements have the capacity to disincentivize repression by rewarding those who
work within the new political system. Specifically, I argue that context-specific peace agreements alter
the incentives of actors by creating a system that takes into account the very grievances and incompati-
bilities that led to violent conflict in the first place. Rather than using repression and exclusion as tools
to further amass power, actors who have signed context-specific peace agreements will, on average, be
118
more likely to choose strategies that work within the new political system. Mason et al. (2011), for
example, highlight how repression and exclusion are not politically “smart” in that they can lead to
future rebellion.2 Assuming actors’ grievances were sufficiently addressed in a peace agreement, there
is little incentive to repress and destabilize the new status quo.3 On the other hand, one might consider
that conflicts that are resolved using one-size-fits-all solutions may leave actors with both uncertainty
and a belief that they could gain more through violence, exclusion, and repression. There is some evi-
dence from the case of Liberia that President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf wanted to ensure that the opposition
perceived the system to be fair and just, so as to avoid a return to war. Political inclusion was, in the
Liberian case, more strategically beneficial than exclusion or repression.
The causal processes that I have identified find parallels in other works on civil war resolution.4 For
example, recent work by Barbara Walter (2015) identifies the quality of governance as a key determinant
for a peace that is durable. While her research is distinct from my own in that it focuses on (1) the
durability of a negative peace and (2) quality governance as an independent variable rather than the
outcome of interest, she highlights a number of key effects of institutions. She identifies, in particular,
how institutions create multiple avenues for political interactions; violence no longer needs to be the
pathway through which bargaining occurs. In my own work, I similarly argue that context-specific
peace agreements lay forth institutions that shift the focus of political interactions from violence to
non-violence, from exclusion to a greater degree of inclusion.
This chapter provides a deeper consideration of the causal processes discussed above. To this end,
I have chosen to present three case illustrations: Liberia, Burundi, and Coˆte d’Ivoire. The cases are
not intended to prove or disprove the theory; instead, they are intended to complement the quantitative
analysis in Chapter 4 and illustrate the plausibility of the causal story. In the following section, I will
briefly discuss the process of case selection. Then, I will present the three cases. In each case, I focus
on the extent to which the peace agreements within these countries were designed with context in mind.
In the cases of both Liberia and Burundi, the key peace agreements fully addressed the grievances of the
2Gurses and Rost (2013) also find that political and economic exclusion of ethnic groups increases the chances of conflict
recurrence.
3Mason et al. (2011) highlight an area to further investigate: that military power sharing, in particular, will reduce repression
levels.
4For a full review of the theoretical foundations of this work, see earlier chapters.
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disputants; in other words, they were context-specific. On the other hand, the Ivorian case illustrates the
negative consequences of pushing a peace agreement that does not pay sufficient attention to context.
While the cases of Burundi and Liberia have taken strides toward a higher quality peace, violence has
remained a tool of political interaction in Coˆte d’Ivoire.
Case Selection
The cases presented in this chapter have been chosen to illustrate the constraining and incentiviz-
ing mechanisms linking agreement context-specificity to post-conflict political inclusivity. The cases of
Liberia, Burundi, and Coˆte d’Ivoire vary on key explanatory and outcome variables while also control-
ling for alternative explanations. Each of the three cases is a case of civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa
and all three stem from disputes over national power. While Burundi has strong ethnic components and
the civil war in Coˆte d’Ivoire was partially driven by the consequences of the discriminatory policies of
Ivoirite´, the conflict in Liberia was not organized or motivated by ethnic divisions. Burundi has long
been one of the most impoverished nations in Africa whereas Coˆte d’Ivoire was a model of prosperity
and stability for three decades following independence from France. Each country within this chapter
faced distinct challenges and upheavals as their political systems liberalized.
While I do not claim that the conflicts were identical in nature, I do emphasize that each of the
three faced distinct challenges in moving toward a higher quality peace. Liberia experienced two deadly
episodes of civil war with a failed attempt at peace in the interim. Burundi’s ethnic tensions and ex-
clusionary policies erupted into ethnic violence at several points throughout the country’s history. Yet,
both Liberia and Burundi have moved toward a higher quality peace by reducing levels of repression
and increasing those who hold a stake in the national political discourse. On the other hand, the relative
success and prosperity of Coˆte d’Ivoire did not carry over into the country’s post-conflict period. Fol-
lowing a peace agreement that left the actors’ incompatibilities unresolved, actors resorted to violence
and intimidation as a means to practice politics. In Liberia and Burundi, post-conflict bargaining and
political interaction has (for the most part) occurred through non-violent and more inclusive means.
The following cases also control for one alternative explanation: that international involvement or
third-party guarantees are sufficient to achieve a higher quality peace. In all three cases, international
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contingents and the United Nations, in particular, were present to monitor and enforce the peace agree-
ment. While third parties seem to bolster the quality of peace by serving as a constraining force in
Liberia and Burundi, they were unable to maintain peaceful political interactions in Coˆte d’Ivoire. The
question of third parties’ role in promoting higher quality peaceful outcomes is one that warrants further
attention, but I postulate that third parties’ ability to instill a quality peace is only as strong as the legal
framework that they are standing upon. They cannot achieve a higher quality peace if a peace agreement
does not strive for and codify steps toward a higher quality peace.5
Qualitative Illustrations
In the following sections, I present the cases of Liberia, Burundi, and Coˆte d’Ivoire. Liberia and
Burundi, although still facing serious obstacles on their paths away from war, have made strides toward
greater political inclusivity and opportunity. Coˆte d’Ivoire, on the other hand, has seen its post-conflict
political environment marred by violence and intimidation. To what extent did the peace agreements
shape each country’s progress toward or away from a more inclusive and higher quality peace? I begin
each section by analyzing the causes of conflict and considering the context in which civil war began. I
then discuss the extent to which the peace agreements of the countries – the Abuja II Agreement and the
Accra Peace Agreement in Liberia, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, and
the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement in Coˆte d’Ivoire – were context-specific. Next, I discuss the extent
to which the peace agreements did, or did not, spur the proposed causal processes of incentives and con-
straints. Finally, I conclude each country’s analysis with thoughts for future research and implications
for the broader theory within this dissertation.
5I also would like to control for power sharing as an alternative mechanism. In both cases of success, power sharing in-
stitutions are entrenched in the peace agreements. In Coˆte d’Ivoire, power sharing attempts had previously failed and the
Ouagadougou Peace Agreement called for sharing of power between Alessane Ouattara and Guillaume Soro. While the pres-
ence of power sharing in all three cases may say that it is insufficient for higher quality peaceful outcomes, I also want to note
that there is significant variation in the specificity of the conflicts’ power sharing provisions. Moreover, because power sharing
is used so commonly, it may be hard to test its effects on the quality of peace. A more important question for future research,
then, is when and where power sharing is appropriate or when, in other words, does it fit the context.
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Liberia
From Liberia’s earliest years, the the country’s political and economic power structures were marked
by inequality and exploitation. Americo-Liberians, while only comprising five percent of the population,
formed a small but elite ruling class (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). Decades of exclusion and
inequality spurred increasing conflict by the 1970s. While Samuel Doe led a coup in 1980 to overthrow
the minority-ruled government, Liberians saw little improvement in their political or economic oppor-
tunities. In spite of rhetoric which promised to “release [Liberians] from the chains of oppression,” Doe
continued to exploit the country’s natural resources and rely on intimidation to maintain power (Kandeh,
1996, 392). According to accounts from the time, Doe’s time in power was characterized by “sustained
levels of brutality, dramatic economic decline, political immobilization, and purges of real or imagined
enemies” (Sesay, 1996, 36). Any threats against the government – real or perceived – were quickly
eliminated, or more bluntly, executed.
When the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, launched an offensive
against Doe’s government and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), Doe’s hold on power began to
crumble. In 1990, he was captured and killed by opposition forces; Liberia descended into its first
bloody episode of civil war (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). Following the signing of the Abuja
II Peace Agreement in 1996, levels of political exclusion and repression only worsened in the interwar
years from 1996 to 2000. Charles Taylor was elected president in 1997, and according to United States
State Department Reports, Taylor’s regime continued the exploitation of natural resources for personal
benefit and to blatantly violate human rights in the form of killing, torture, and arbitrary detention.
During this time period, Liberian governance was marked by intimidation, fear, and violence.6 By 2000,
the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) mobilized to fight Taylor’s regime, thus
sparking Liberia’s second civil war which would last until the singing of the Accra Peace Agreement in
2003.
Liberia’s conflicts were, primarily, driven by a fight for national power. In the first episode of
conflict, the NPFL fought to end Doe’s regime; the second episode of conflict was then driven by
Liberians who sought to overthrow Charles Taylor’s stronghold on power. Political exclusion and a
6http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/254.htm
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dissatisfaction with government leadership and policies drove opposition forces to mobilize and fight.
Any solution to Liberia’s conflicts, then, would need to be focused on establishing means to distribute
control in ways that reflect balances of power and the needs of previously excluded groups. In the
following sections, I consider the extent to which Liberia’s peace agreements were crafted to address
the underlying causes of conflict. In particular, given the incompatibilities over control of national
power, I examine the extent to which the peace agreements in Liberia’s conflict focused on revising and
restructuring the state’s political institutions. I show that the Accra Peace Agreement, unlike Liberia’s
first attempt at peace in 1996 (with the Abuja Agreements), fully addressed the incompatibilities leading
to conflict. As such, I argue that the Accra Peace Agreement both constrained actors and changed
incentives so as to make repression a less attractive strategy.
Liberia’s Peace Agreements
Liberia has seen at least thirteen peace agreements since 1990, according to UCDP’s Peace Agree-
ment Database (Ho¨gbladh, 2011). Within this analysis, I focus on two agreements in particular: (1) the
Abuja II Agreement of 1996, and (2) the Accra Peace Agreement of 2003. Whereas the former only
partially addressed the causes of conflict, the latter laid out an extensive framework to revise national
governance structures. After presenting an overview of the agreements’ provisions below, I will argue
that the context-specific nature of the Accra Peace Agreement, in particular, laid the foundations for a
more inclusive and secure peace in Liberia.
Signed to end the country’s first episode of civil war, the Abuja II Agreement reiterated and sought
to reinstate the failed Abuja Agreement from the previous year. The Abuja Agreements were significant
in that they did outline a certain degree of power sharing. For example, the Abuja Agreement of 1995
states: “The Parties agree that during the transitional period leading to the inauguration of an elected
government, the executive powers of the Republic of Liberia shall be vested in a six-member Council
of State” to be made up of members of the NPLF (Charles Taylor), ULIMO, and other groups (Part
II, Section A.i). In spite of the sharing of political power within a transitional government that was
designed to last no more than one year, the agreement did nothing to institutionalize an inclusive political
system. Indeed, although the Abuja II Peace agreement was implemented, Charles Taylor was elected
president in 1997 and all progress to inclusivity or security was stopped. In many ways the language
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and provisions of the Abuja Agreements were boilerplate; Liberia did need mechanisms to share power
across groups who were competing for control of the national government, but it needed more than
the Abuja Agreements provided. The Abuja Agreements constructed an executive council that shared
power amongst warlords and key conflict actors. On the other hand, the Accra Peace Agreement shared
power across different regions, civil society groups, political parties, and business organizations.7
The Accra Peace Agreement of 2003, by looking more broadly at the power distribution within
Liberian society as opposed to solely amongst elites, was much more extensive in addressing disputes
over national power. In its sections on governance reform and the transitional government’s structure,
the Accra Peace Agreement promised “a national and regional balance in appointments” (Article XVI)
in order to “reflect a broad spectrum of the Liberian society” (Article XXIV). More specifically, the Na-
tional Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) was to have “a maximum of Seventy-six (76) members
who shall come from the following entities: (a) each of the fifteen counties; (b) the present Government
of Liberia, the LURD, MODEL, the Political Parties, Civil Society and Interest Groups including the
National Bar Association, the Liberian Business Organizations, Women Organizations, Trade Unions,
Teachers Union, Refugees, the Liberians in the Diaspora/America and the Youth” (Article XXIV). The
Cabinet, as well, was to be established in such a way that would reflect a broad cross-section of Liberian
society (Article XXVI). The Accra Peace Agreement, then, went to great lengths to distribute national
power and increase the number of voices and stakeholders in Liberian government. In a conflict driven
by disputes over national power, then, the Accra Peace Agreement created a web of institutions to divide
and share power across multiple groups.
Based on the theoretical expectations outlined in the previous chapter, I argue that the new institu-
tions and power structures created within the Accra Peace Agreement both incentivize greater political
inclusion and constrain actors from continuing exclusionary practices. Moreover, the agreement fos-
tered an environment of greater trust by dispersing power and by generating a system of checks and
balances. In this new political environment in which actors’ grievances were addressed, my theoretical
expectations would predict that political rights and political security will improve. In the next section,
I discuss the state of political rights in post-conflict Liberia before more fully delving into the causal
7Future extensions of this research may want to build a more nuanced measure of context-specificity, because the current
coding does not fully capture the difference between elite-focused power sharing versus promises to be inclusive of broader
portions of society.
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mechanisms at work in this case.
Political Inclusion and Repression in Post-Conflict Liberia
To what extent, if at all, did political rights and protections improve in the aftermath of both the
Abuja Peace Agreements and the Accra Peace Agreement? Did they, as hypothesized, lead to the
establishment of a more inclusive environment? While both agreements contained certain steps toward
a more inclusive political environment and thus made efforts to resolve the causes of conflict, the Accra
Peace Agreement went much further in extending an inclusive peace to more members of society. A
brief look at the political environment following each agreement provides evidence for the theoretical
expectations.
After the signing of the Abuja II Peace Agreement in 1996, levels of political repression and terror
soon worsened. By 1999, repression spiked to its worst possible levels. According to the Political Terror
Scale, Liberia’s score of 5 represents a country in which “terror has expanded to the whole population.
The leaders of these societies place no limited on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue
personal or ideological goals” (Gibney et al., 2015). Indeed, Charles Taylor’s reign following the second
Abuja Peace Agreement was marked by some of the worst levels of exclusion and repression. One
must ask to what extent the peace process in 1996 failed to clearly delineate power structures and
create checks on power. Beyond repression levels, other metrics of political rights and inclusions saw
a dramatic decline following the Abuja II Peace Agreement as well. In the aftermath of this first peace
process, political power remained monopolized by a small number of social groups who represented
a minority of the population (Coppedge et al., 2015). The peace agreement which was limited in its
inclusion of societal actors thus generated an environment in which exclusion remained the norm.
The Accra Peace Agreement, in contrast to the Abuja II Agreement, set Liberian political life on
a different – and more inclusive – trajectory. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the Accra Peace
Agreement, repression levels dropped dramatically. In the three years following the Accra Peace Agree-
ment, society remained marked by extensive political imprisonment, political violence, and lengthy
political detentions, but this was a clear improvement over an environment of widespread torture, rights
violations, and terror. By 2008, Liberia had achieved an even more secure and open political system
in which political imprisonment was quite limited and torture was rare (Gibney et al., 2015). On a
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more positive level, Liberian political inclusivity improved in terms of which groups were able to access
power. According to the Varieties of Democracy data on power distribution, the post-Accra period in
Liberia was a political environment in which “either all social groups possess some political power,
with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power... but
all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power” (Coppedge et al., 2015). Figure 5.1 shows the
progression of distribution of political power by social group, according to Coppedge et al. (2015). A
score of 0 indicates political power that is totally monopolized by one social group that represents a
minority of the population and a score of 4 is indicative of a society in which all social groups have
roughly equal political power.
Figure 5.1: To what extent is power distributed according to social groups? (Liberia, 1980-2013)
Comments on Causality
In analyzing how Liberia’s peace agreement did or did not lay the foundations for a higher quality
peace, it is crucial to remember that any progress toward a quality peace in 1996 or 2003 was not
inevitable. While there was an opening for change in both time periods, the peace agreements played
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a role in shaping the direction of that change. Nilsson and Kovacs (2005) warn, for example, that
“Liberia’s previously poor democratic record and lack of good governance, in combination with the
fragility of the current political system and the inexperience of the new administration, constitutes a
pertinent threat to the peace process” (397). Nevertheless, Liberia in the post-2003 period has been able
to make strides toward greater inclusivity and opportunity. Indeed, Nilsson and Kovacs (2005) as well
as Call (2012) contrast the Accra Peace Agreement with previous peace processes in terms of its scope,
inclusivity, and potential for progress. Call (2012) writes that a main difference in determining the
success or lack thereof when looking at the Abuja II Agreement and the Accra Peace Agreement is the
extent to which the agreements integrated all key political actors. The political environment following
the Accra Peace Agreement has remained more secure and more open; while not the only driver, it
is important to recognize the ways in which the Accra Peace Agreement addressed the causes of the
Liberian conflict and generated a higher quality peace.
Specifically, evidence from post-2003 Liberia illustrates that the Accra Peace Agreement created
both incentives and constraints which ultimately facilitated a more open and inclusive political sys-
tem. With respect to incentivizing a more open and inclusive political system, I argue that the context-
specificity of the Accra Peace Agreement created an environment in which peace became a more attrac-
tive option than continued fighting. In terms of the bargaining framework, by addressing the causes of
conflict, the Accra Peace Agreement created a distribution of power to which actors were committed
and which made actors adverse to disrupting the new status quo.
The following example contrasts Charles Taylor’s behavior in the post-Abuja II period to that of
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in the post-Accra period. After the elections in 1997 which brought Charles Taylor
to power, Taylor launched a campaign of violence, terror, and repression against political opponents.
Given the uncertainty that remained following the 1996 peace processes (where the causes of conflict
were not fully addressed), Taylor viewed exclusion and violence as strategically necessary to maintain
power. On the other hand, the specificities of the Accra Peace Agreement in 2003 disincentivized
Johnson-Sirleaf from taking part in similar behavior. Indeed, according to Nilsson and Kovacs (2005),
Johnson-Sirleaf “promised a government of inclusion” and “asserted that no member of the new Liberia
shall ever again feel so excluded that they are to resort to violence” (407). I argue that President Sirleaf
was a rational political actor who was committed first and foremost to maintaining and consolidating
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power; however, she calculated that the most effective strategy toward this goal was to work within a
more open and inclusive political system. She did not want to risk behavior that would lead to renewed
conflict or that would jeopardize her power. In other words, while violence and repression appeared
to be the best strategy available to Taylor in his quest for power, non-violence and inclusion was the
optimal strategy for Johnson-Sirleaf. The political structures put in place by the Accra Peace Agreement
decreased insecurity, decreased incentives to renege, and thus increased Johnson-Sirleaf’s ability to lead
a more open political system.
In addition to incentives, the Accra Peace Agreement created greater constraints on conflict actors
and political leaders, constraints that have limited opportunities for continued exclusion. Most sim-
ply, by spreading power across not only political parties but also to civil society groups, the Accra
Peace Agreement institutionalized structures of greater political inclusivity. Unless conflict actors to-
tally shirked on agreement commitments, the agreement laid the legal framework for a peace that was
more inclusive in nature. While progress remains slow, the current government has committed efforts to
form a Constitution Review Committee in order to remedy existing constitutional provisions that have
further perpetuated underlying tensions in Liberian society (UN News Centre, 2013). The Committee
presented a plan to President Sirleaf that emphasizes the participation of political parties, traditional
leaders, women’s groups and other groups and encourages the revision of the 1986 Constitution to re-
flect the country’s new circumstances (United Nations Development Program, 2015).
Finally, one can point to the international spotlight that accompanied the Accra Peace Agreement as
a constraint mechanism that tied actors’ hands to more inclusive practices. The peace agreement called
for the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to lead a multina-
tional peacekeeping force to preserve the peace and help monitor peace agreement implementation. In
addition, a United Nations peacekeeping operation, UNMIL, led the oversight of many implementation
processes. With international actors present and committed to the terms of the agreement, leaders were
restricted in their capacity to pursue exclusionary or blatantly repressive policies. In brief, actors were
less likely to renege on their commitment to new and non-violent political institutions in the presence
of third-party enforcers.
Nilsson and Kovacs (2005) write that international peacekeepers were critical in providing security
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and implementation oversight. Indeed, the authors go on to state: “The extensive international com-
mitment to peace in Liberia is one of the factors that most evidently differs between the current peace
process and the one that ended the first civil war in 1996...” (Nilsson and Kovacs, 2005, 403). It is
crucial to point out, however, that the constraints of international actors alone are likely insufficient
to generate a quality peace.8 Instead, international actors are able to constrain actors’ insofar as they
have a legal-institutional framework to do so. In other words, the peace agreements shape the realm of
what is possible for third parties to implement, but third parties are unlikely to arrive at quality peace
outcomes on their own. Because the Accra Peace Agreement was context-specific and dealt with the
necessary political incompatibilities so thoroughly, international actors had a strong footing on which to
hold actors to their commitment.
Lessons from Liberia
Liberia, like the vast majority of post-conflict societies, has a long way to go. For example, a United
Nations report from 2013 points to the ongoing challenges of deep cleavages and political opportunity
in Liberia.9. Moreover, the preceding account focuses solely on progress toward political inclusivity
and says little about the ongoing corruption and economic challenges facing Liberian society. At the
same time, however, the Accra Peace Agreement laid a foundation for a peace that is more inclusive and
secure than it may have been. In the period of transformation that was occurring at the end of Liberia’s
second civil war, the Accra Peace Agreement pushed Liberia down the road toward a higher quality
peace rather than a road toward continued exclusions, exploitation, and violence.
The case of Liberia does illustrate how context-specific peace agreements such as the Accra Peace
Agreement can lay the foundation for more politically inclusive and secure system by incentivizing and
constraining political actors. President Sirleaf made statements which illustrated how she prioritized
inclusion and respect for the political process so as to avoid the recurrence of war. Because the Accra
Peace Agreement addressed the underlying causes of conflict, political actors felt secure working within
the new institutional framework rather than resorting to violence to gain more power. International actors
8This is a question that I have explored empirically, and have thus far found little evidence that peacekeeping, on its own,
generates higher quality peaceful outcomes. I want to emphasize, however, that the links between third-party enforcement and
quality peace require greater attention both theoretically and empirically.
9http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10958.doc.htm
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such as ECOMOG and UNMIL led implementation oversight so as to tie actors’ hands to the provisions
set forth within the Accra Peace Agreement.
Nonetheless, the Liberian case highlights the need for further research in a number of areas. First,
the difference between the Abuja II Agreement and the Accra Agreement illustrate the importance
of understanding which conflict actors should gain a seat at the table and which actors should gain
positions in post-conflict governments. Indeed, similar to the lessons from the Angolan case in Chapter
3, the peace processes leading to the signing of the Abuja II Peace Agreement in 1996 were largely
focused on conflict actors and military solutions. While they contained mechanisms to share power,
they did not include a broad cross-section of Liberian society. On the other hand, in addressing the
causes of conflict through a series of institutional mechanisms, the Accra Peace Agreement focused on
the role of many different groups in Liberia. The aforementioned discussion thus suggests that it may
be insufficient to cater to a small number of conflict actors. Instead, peace agreements may be best-
positioned to contribute to a higher quality peace when they not only address the causes of conflict but
also give roles to a diverse set of societal actors.
Second, the case illustration of Liberia demonstrates the need to better understand the role of third
party actors. While third parties are deemed a necessary condition in achieving a durable peace10, less
is known about their role in consolidating a higher quality peace. The theory herein suggests that third
parties can be instrumental in holding actors accountable to the extensive promises of context-specific
agreements. More, however, must be done to assess which types of third parties are most beneficial and
when, for instance, a dependence on third parties actually weakens states’ ability to institutionalize a
quality peace.
Finally, and perhaps the question which warrants the most attention is the question of the causes or
sources of context-specific agreements. Why, specifically, were negotiators and conflict actors in Liberia
able to achieve a context-specific peace agreement in 2003 when they were unable to find such success in
1996? There are a number of explanations that warrant future research, including but not limited to: (1)
the make-up and leverage of mediation teams, (2) the inclusivity of conflict actors, and (3) the stage of
the conflict in terms of power distribution. A related question for Liberia, in particular, revolves around
the extent to which actors used lessons from Abuja’s failure to craft a stronger settlement in 2003. Peace
10See, e.g.: Walter (2002); Fortna (2004a)
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processes are long and dynamic; peace agreements are but one manifestation of the process. While more
research must be done to understand the multiple steps toward peace, the case of Liberia illustrates the
role that a peace agreement can have in shaping the trajectory of peace.
Burundi
The causes of conflict in Burundi, like the Liberian case, stem from disputes over national power.
Burundian society was shaped by divisions that had their roots in colonial times; Belgian colonizers
entrenched power within the hands of the Tutsi minority while the Hutu majority remained excluded and
marginalized. Tutsis, who made up only ten to fourteen percent of the population, maintained a hold
on power in the post-independence period through violent and repressive military regimes. Although
Burundi took steps toward democratization and political liberalization in 1990, ethnic divisions, distrust,
and ongoing political uncertainty led conflict to erupt in 1993. The causes of conflict, in short, stem from
entrenched and oftentimes violent divisions within Burundian society and the subsequent dispute over
who should control the national government.
During the long period of exclusion and leading up to the the civil war that began in 1993, political
elites ruled through the regular use of intimidation, fear, and repression. Any solutions to the civil war
in Burundi, then, would need to institutionalize non-violent political processes and place checks on
incentives and decisions to use violence against the population. In spite of the challenges and divisions
driving this dispute over national power, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi
was context-specific in that it laid out a framework that was designed to mitigate and reduce the tensions
revolving around access to state power. The context-specific peace agreement in Burundi put in place
institutional constraints and also changed the incentives for actors. In so doing, the agreement created
a political environment that was both more secure and more inclusive in nature than what existed prior
to the country’s civil war. In the next sections, I discuss the provisions of the peace agreement, the
extent to which rights improved following the conflict, and the plausibility of identifying a causal link
between the context-specificity of the agreement and post-conflict rights levels. At the same time, the
case of Burundi is also interesting in that it is on the verge of collapse at the time of this writing. While
Burundi illustrates the fragility of post-conflict societies, it nonetheless shows how peace agreements
can generate improvements in levels of repression and exclusion.
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Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi
In the period leading up to Burundi’s civil war, the country’s ethnic cleavages served as the under-
pinnings of extreme exclusion, intermittent violence, and repressive policies. Indeed, as the country
took destabilizing steps toward democratization in the early 1990s, Hutus and Tutsis sparred over con-
trol of national power. A context-specific solution to the Burundian civil war, then, requires a focus on
not only the distribution of power within Burundi but the sensitivity to entrenched ethnic differences.11
The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, which was signed by all main conflict
actors in 2000,12 offered the context-specific solution that Burundi needed at the time. By providing nu-
anced and contextual solutions to the causes of conflict, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement
created an environment in which key actors were incentivized to respect political rights and constrained
from continuing political violence and repression.
How, in particular, did the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement address the causes of civil
war in Burundi and thus lay the framework for a higher quality peace? According to the UCDP Peace
Agreement Database, the agreement included: (1) reforming the armed and security forces to follow
an ethnic quota; (2) the creation of a power-sharing transitional government; (3) a Senate that would
be elected on an ethnic basis; and (4) a number of mechanisms to ensure that at no level could one
political party or one ethnic group achieve total domination (Ho¨gbladh, 2011). The agreement was thus
sensitive to the fact that Burundi had been marked by the domination of a single group and the use of
overt violence as a tool of political power. By outlining the role different groups would and could play
on numerous governmental and societal levels, the Arusha Agreement placed checks on the power of
any one group.
The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation was written with a distinct awareness to the country’s ethnic
cleavages. Chapter 1 of the peace agreement details the historical causes of Burundi’s civil war. The
11While I say entrenched ethnic differences, I want to emphasize that the categorization of Burundians as Hutus or Tutsis had
origins not in ethnic differences but in historical manipulation by colonial powers.
12The agreement was initially denounced by the CNDD-FDD (Conseil National pour la De´fense de la De´mocratie – Forces
pour la De´fense de la De´mocratie) and the FNL (Forces Nationales de Libe´ration); these two parties nonetheless agreed to
later reiterations of the agreement. This uncertainty with respect to commitment by some key actors provides an even tougher
test of the theory, however.
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agreement explains that ethnic cleavages were not always present in Burundi,13 but that the German and
Belgian colonizers instilled deep divisions within society:
The colonial administration, first German and then Belgian under a League of Nations man-
date and United Nations trusteeship, played a decisive role in the heightening of frustrations
among the Bahutu, the Batutsi and the Batwa, and in the divisions which led to ethnic ten-
sions.
In the context of a strategy of “divide and rule”, the colonial administration injected and
imposed a caricatured, racist vision of Burundian society, accompanied by prejudices and
cliche´s relating to morphological considerations designed to set the different components
of Burundi’s population against one another on the basis of physical characteristics and
character traits (Chapter 1, Article 2).
In addition to addressing the historical roots of conflict, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
acknowledges that “The conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic divisions;
It stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power” (Chapter 1, Article
4; “Nature of the Burundi Conflict”). The agreement is thus quite specific and contextual in outlining
the causes of conflict before moving to the solutions to the country’s civil war.
As a key solution to the country’s civil war, the peace agreement ensured “a reorganization of the
State institutions to make them capable of integrating and reassuring all the ethnic components of Burun-
dian society” (Chapter 2, Article 5). Moreover, the parties agreed to the “banning of all political or other
associations advocating ethnic, regional, religious or gender discrimination or ideas contrary to national
unity” (Chapter 2, Article 7). In sum, the peace agreement not only required parties to recognize the
causes of conflict, but it also promoted solutions that were designed with the conflict’s context in mind.
While power sharing was a key component of the solution to the dispute over national power, the Arusha
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement also took the necessary steps to address the social and historical
ethnic tensions in society. Much of the agreed-upon language focused on unity, equal opportunity, and
inclusivity for all Burundians regardless of ethnicity. The framework used within this dissertation argues
that the words of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement had real and tangible implications
13Chapter 1, Article 1
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for the political structures and behaviors of the state following conflict. By catering so specifically to
the causes of conflict, the agreement increased the extent to which actors were committed (by desire or
obligation) to a more secure and open political system.
Political Inclusion and Repression in Post-Conflict Burundi
Burundi has faced ongoing instability and uncertainty in its post-conflict period. Nonetheless, the
country has made strides toward a higher quality peace. UN Special Representative of the Secretary-
General and head of the UN office in Burundi, Karin Landgren, states of Burundi: “for a country still
recovering from years of conflict, Burundi is to be commended for the relative political freedoms it has
entrenched in its post-transition constitution” (UN News Centre, 2011). Burundi has thus made relative
progress toward a more secure, open, and inclusive political system in the aftermath of its civil war.
While progress is still needed to further consolidate the peace, the country’s political inclusiveness has
improved in the wake of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement.
Following the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, levels of repression and
political violence soon improved. Prior to Burundi’s civil war, levels of political repression spiked to
their worst possible level according to Gibney et al. (2015). A 1992 report from Amnesty International
states that “The most conspicuous of these human rights violations are periodic mass extrajudicial ex-
ecutions which have been perpetrated against members of the majority Hutu ethnic group by members
of security forces” (Amnesty International, 1992). The report goes on to identify widespread violence,
torture, killing, and indefinite detentions as tools used by the government of Pierre Buyoya to target the
country’s Hutu majority.
Following the conflict in Burundi, however, practices by the government and security forces tran-
sitioned away from violence and intimidation to greater openness. According to the PTS, levels of
political violence improved to a score of 3; while still marked by some intimidation and insecurity, the
vast majority of Burundians were no longer subject government terror and intimidation. A United States
State Department Human Rights Report on Burundi from 2007 states: “Neither the government nor its
agents committed any politically motivated killings; however, security forces killed civilians during the
year, although there were fewer such incidents than in the previous year (see section 1.g.). Unlike in
the previous year, there were no reports of summary executions or killings of civilians in reprisal for
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rebel attacks or for suspected collaboration with rebel forces (Section 1a)” (United States Department
of State, 2007). The report goes on to confirm that the country experienced no politically motivated
disappearances or kidnappings (Section 1b). Using a negative or thin metric of political rights, then,
Burundi made clear improvements toward a higher quality peace.
Figure 5.2: To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved? (Burundi, 1980-2014)
To what extent, though, did the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement facilitate a move to-
ward more positive dimensions of political rights? Beyond improvements in repression levels, did the
government of Burundi extend political rights and opportunities to all members of society? Admitting
that “the way out of past violence is long and difficult,” Karin Landgren also asserted that the legal
framework in post-conflict Burundi “will ensure that there is no narrowing of the political space...[or]
harassment of civil society” (UN News Centre, 2011). A cursory look at the measure of egalitarian
access to politics from the Varieties of Democracy Project illustrates the political opening that has taken
place in Burundi. The data in Figure 5.2 reflect the extent to which political power is distributed across
social groups (class, sex, religion, and ethnicity). According to Coppedge et al. (2015), “this perspective
on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil liberties are not always
sufficient for political equality.” The measure is thus taking into account the practices as well as the
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policies of inclusivity. Burundi saw a quick spike in inclusivity immediately prior to the conflict, as the
government attempted to move toward democracy. In the aftermath of the peace processes that were in
large part shaped by the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, one can see another improvement
in inclusivity. Burundi, on average, had been accustomed to a high concentration of power with the Tutsi
elites, but the peace process that ended the civil war helped the country move toward a more inclusive
political system.
Causal Process in Burundi
Burundi experienced clear improvements in political inclusivity and political protections following
the conclusion of its civil war. I argue that the nature and contents of the Arusha Peace and Reconcili-
ation Agreement helped direct the country from an exclusionary and violent political space to one that
would be more open. The civil war in Burundi began a period of transition and a break from the status
quo; the peace processes as manifested by the Arusha Agreement shaped the direction of that transition.
In other words, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, through its context-specificity, led the
country and its actors on a path toward more inclusive political processes. In the following paragraphs,
I consider the plausibility of a number of causal mechanisms and offer a number of pieces of evidence
that illustrate the causal linkages.
The theoretical mechanisms laid forth in Chapter 4 include the ways in which context-specific peace
agreements incentivize and constrain actors in the post-conflict period. The case of Burundi serves to
illustrate the constraining role of context-specific peace agreements; specifically, the agreement created
domestic institutions as well as international spotlight effects which tied actors’ hands and prevented
them from resorting to widespread repression and exclusion. There are reasons to believe, however, that
the Arusha peace processes did not sufficiently or durably change the incentives of all conflict actors.
This cautionary note is a point which I will consider in the next section.
The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and subsequent reaffirmations of the agreement,
evidence indicates, constrained actors and limited their ability to continue exclusionary and/or politically
violent practices. In simple terms, the agreement legally constrained actors to more inclusive practices.
For evidence of the constraint mechanism, I first look to see the extent to which the provisions of the
peace agreement were translated into the permanent legal apparatus of the state. A number of the legal
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changes put in place include the strict sharing of power across ethnic groups and political parties. For
example, Curtis describes the political structures of the post-conflict state: “Each political party must
present a blocked list of electoral candidates, in which not more than two out of every three candidates
can be from the same ethnic group. At least one out of every four candidates on the list must be a
woman” (Curtis, 2013, 87). Burundi also has a President and two Vice-Presidents, who must belong
to different ethnic groups and political parties. These provisions were not only outlined in the Arusha
Accords to address the incompatibilities that led to conflict, but they also became realities in the post-
conflict state.
Beyond domestic institutional constraints, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and
subsequent peace agreements carried with them an international spotlight. The international attention,
at a very minimum, reduced actors’ capacity and will to blatantly violate political rights. Moreover,
the international involvement limited the possibility that actors would renege on their commitment to
certain inclusive practices. The Arusha Agreement itself calls for the agreement to be observed and
implemented with the assistance of the United Nations, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), and
a Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi (Ho¨gbladh, 2011). In 2004, the United Nations operation in
Burundi (ONUB) was officially set up to keep a close watch on peace implementation efforts and to
lead national reconciliation efforts (Sullivan, 2005).
Reflections on the Burundian Case
The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement which was signed in 2000 was highly context-
specific in nature in that it attempted to resolve ethnically-driven disputes over national power. The
agreement went to great lengths to outline new institutional rules and structures that would create a
more secure system; in so doing, the agreement directly constrained actors to more inclusive political
outcomes. The process is reflected in the relative improvements in political rights that Burundi has
experienced in the aftermath of conflict. With that said, however, evidence also questions the extent
to which the peace agreement changed the prevailing incentives of actors. While key political players
were constrained to more inclusive outcomes by the agreement, the underlying perceptions of ethnic
and societal divisions remained in place. The disconnect, then, between constraints and incentives may
– with further research – help explain the ongoing struggles and episodic violence Burundi has faced in
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recent years.
Daley (2006), for example, points to the fact that the Arusha Agreement corrected the ethnic imbal-
ance amongst elites but left “intact the contradictions within the society” (659). The agreement, while
sensitive to the causes of conflict and the role of ethnicity in overcoming conflict, according to Daley
failed to move Burundi away from ethnic categorizations. In fact, Daley writes that “the Arusha Peace
and Reconciliation Agreement, in seeking to correct ethnic imbalance in government, officially, insti-
tutionalized ethnicity as a criterion for participation in the state” (Daley, 2006). While the agreement
created the structures for a more open and inclusive political system, it may have also perpetuated or ex-
acerbated ethnic tensions. A serious consideration of these claims thus indicates that context-specificity
(addressing the causes of conflict) must focus equally on institutional constraints and incentives for in-
clusivity. In this respect, I can contrast the case of Burundi with that of Liberia, which set up structures
which incentivized actors to build bridges both across political elites but also across different sects of
society.14
Falch (2008) and Sullivan (2005) argue that another key shortcoming of Burundi’s peace processes
was that main conflict actors were often excluded from negotiations. According to Falch, the exclusion
of rebel groups increased incentives of spoilers to undermine peace efforts. In the wake of the signing of
the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, for example, the CNDD-FDD and the FNL continued
fighting. The agreement and subsequent agreements, then, although context-specific in nature, struggled
to change incentives and generate the trust necessary to consolidate a truly inclusive peace. Curtis (2013)
argues that while power sharing and political inclusivity is quite extensive in Burundi, a fact that makes
liberal peacebuilders hail the country as an example of success, he notes that this does not capture
the entire story. Instead, he argues that post-Arusha Burundi is marked by violence, intimidation, and
militarization. In spite of criticisms leveled by Curtis (2013), he acknowledges that “Burundi is a safer
place in 2012 than it was at the beginning of the Arusha process in 1998 or at the time of the Convention
of Government in 1994” (90). Moreover, he recognizes that it is, at least, more successful than its
counterparts in places such as Democratic Republic of Congo and Coˆte d’Ivoire.
14Daley (2006) writes of Burundi: “This exclusion of civil society representatives from actively participating in the peace
process reinforced the idea that peacemaking is solely the prerogative of political parties, rebel movements and men. In this
respect, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement promoted an elitist and ethnicized politics of the state and failed to
conceptualise a more inclusive politics that give the agency a multiple-voiced Burundi political community” (676).
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The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and subsequent agreements in Burundi have had
clear shortcomings. They do not sufficiently incentivize actors to move beyond ethnic divisions but
instead have made ethnicity a key component of the state’s power distribution. As such, they have not
fully changed the incentives or trust structures of all actors. At the same time, however, the agreements
are quite extensive in their efforts to address the causes of conflict and redistribute access to national
power. Evidence suggests that the legal framework of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
constrained actors such that a more open and inclusive system has taken hold. Burundi, in spite of its
progress, nonetheless has a long way to go to achieve a truly secure and open political system.
Coˆte d’Ivoire
Coˆte d’Ivoire was, for decades, a model of success and economic prosperity in a region that was
rife with conflict. Following independence from France in 1960, Coˆte d’Ivoire was led by a single po-
litical party (Parti de´mocratique de la Coˆte d’Ivoire, or PDCI) under the leadership of President Fe´lix
Houphoue¨t-Boigny. During Houphoue¨t-Boigny’s tenure in power, Coˆte d’Ivoire grew to become the
wealthiest country in West Africa and one of the most robust economies on the continent. Migrant
workers from nearby states joined the country’s estimated 60 ethnic groups; by the 1990s, migrant
workers made up approximately one-third of the population of Coˆte d’Ivoire (Uppsala Conflict Data
Program, 2016). Between 1960 and the early 1990s, the single-party Ivorian state failed to institu-
tionalize a transparent or democratic government (Bah, 2010). Nevertheless, the security and rights of
individuals were largely respected; political intimidation and violence were rare. As Houphoue¨t-Boigny
began to open and liberalize the political environment in 1990, however, tensions across groups and
within Ivorian society rose.
Following the death of Houphoue¨t-Boigny in 1993, the country’s “less savvy politicians exploited
ethnic and nationalist sentiments,” drawing distinctions based on the concept of Ivoirite´ (Bah, 2010,
601). The new nationalist political platform made a distinction between indigenous Ivorians and those
who had immigrant ancestry. As a result of the institutionalization of the restrictive citizenship code,
large portions of Ivorian society became excluded from political opportunities. In addition to the
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marginalization of the country’s immigrant community, many Ivorians from the predominantly Mus-
lim north of the country could no longer access political or economic power.15 Following a coup in
1999, the breakdown of state authority and political stability became apparent. In 2002, three rebel
groups emerged to attempt to overthrow then-president Laurent Gbagbo. The conflict in Coˆte d’Ivoire,
then, is above all else a conflict that was driven by disputes of national power and disputes over which
portions of Ivorian society should have access to that power.
Coˆte d’Ivoire, like the cases of Liberia and Burundi, experienced a conflict over control of national
power. Although not distinctly ethnic in nature, the civil war in Coˆte d’Ivoire had strong foundations in
disputes over citizenship rights and what it meant to be Ivorian. In the following sections, I assess the
extent to which one of the comprehensive peace agreements in Coˆte d’Ivoire, the Ouagadougou Peace
Agreement of 2007, addressed the causes of the conflict. Because the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement
left components of the conflict’s incompatibilities unsettled, it limited the country’s capacity to make
strides toward a higher quality peace. In other words, because the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement did
not fully fit the context at hand, the post-agreement period remained marked by insecurity, uncertainty,
and exclusion. Although civil war and its resolution is a transformative period, positive progress cannot
be taken for granted. The case of Coˆte d’Ivoire illustrates the dangers of promoting agreements that do
not fit the specific context and further emphasizes the argument that the content of peace agreements
has lasting implications for post-conflict societies.
Ouagadougou Peace Agreement
The Ouagadougou Peace Agreement was one of the last in a series of efforts to bring an end to
civil war in Coˆte d’Ivoire. Signed in 2007 by the government and the Forces Nouvelles (FN), the
Ouagadougou Agreement “departed from the peace formula devised in [earlier agreements] and marked
a monumental shift in the peace process. In contrast to all the other agreements, the Ouagadougou
Agreement was spearheaded by Ivorians” (Bah, 2010, 610).16 Observers and negotiators had reason to
be optimistic about this agreement, in particular. On the other hand, the agreement did not fully address
the causes of the conflict in Coˆte d’Ivoire, an obstacle that I argue has undermined progress to a more
15See Bah (2010) for a more detailed discussion of the concept and consequences of Ivoirite´.
16The Ouagadougou peace process was, however, mediated by President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso.
140
inclusive and open peace in the country.
From a positive or optimistic perspective, the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement did address several
important incompatibilities and dimensions of the Ivorian conflict. Bah (2010) praises the agreement as
making much greater progress than prior peace agreements in the country in that it addressed citizenship
issues and military issues. Article 1 of the Ouagadougou Agreement recognizes “the identification
of the Ivorian and foreign populations living in Coˆte d’Ivoire [as] a major issue” and a “source of
conflicts.” The agreement thus goes on to explicate revised processes to ensure that citizenship laws do
not explicitly or implicitly exclude certain groups of Ivorians.
Beyond addressing identity issues which were divisive in the pre-conflict and conflict period, the
agreement also calls for electoral reforms. Ho¨gbladh (2011) indicates: “Regarding the incompatibility
the agreement provided for the organisation of open and transparent presidential elections to be held
after the conclusion of the identification and registration process of eligible voters. Until the elections a
government of transition would administrate the country.” The two main mechanisms that were included
to address the causes of conflict were: (1) reforms to citizenship rules, and (2) electoral reforms and the
occurrence of free, fair, and transparent elections.
While identity, elections, and demobilization issues are highly important and appropriate steps for
the Ivorian conflict, the provisions of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement do not fully address the cause
of conflict: the distribution of power within the state. The components of the agreement do little to
explicitly outline new political, economic, or social structures that would govern the post-conflict state.
The first supplement to the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement did elaborate that the leader of the Forces
Nouvelles, Guillaume Soro, would hold the post of Prime Minister; the agreement stipulated, however,
that Soro would not be able to run for office in the post-conflict presidential elections. The Ouagadougou
Agreement and its supplements did little to outline or implement long term plans for the Ivorian state.
If a peace agreement is a quasi-constitutional document that sets the legal framework for the post-
conflict state, the Ouagadougou Agreement left many parts of the framework unanswered. Given the
uncertainties and questions surrounding the political structures of the state, I argue that the agreement
failed to set Coˆte d’Ivoire on a path to a higher quality peace.
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Ouagadougou Peace Agreement: A Missed Opportunity?
Levels of political violence and repression were quite limited under the rule of President Houphoue¨t-
Boigny (Gibney et al., 2015). During the 1990s, however, repression and political violence became
more commonplace – although not widespread – and large portions of the Ivorian population were
marginalized from political life due to their apparent lack of Ivoirite´. What effects did the Ouagadougou
Peace Agreement have on the political rights and opportunities of the average Ivorian? In other words,
how did the provisions of the agreement shape the quality of peace in Coˆte d’Ivoire?
The Ouagadougou Peace Agreement was signed at a moment where there “was a clear sense of war
fatigue among the masses and realization by the elite that outright military victory was elusive” (Bah,
2010, 609). The agreement occurred at a moment when conflict actors were ready to settle the dispute,
yet the agreement missed the opportunity to fully resolve the conflict’s incompatibilities. According to
accounts by Bah (2010), the peace process was based on an assumed mutual trust and understanding
of each other’s intentions. However, the absence of a legal framework to address the state’s power
distribution undermined any perceived success. The arrangement of Gbagbo as president and Soro as
prime minister did satisfy the power aspirations of the two leaders, but it did not address power struggles
more broadly. More importantly, it left assumed that the sharing of power across groups would follow
naturally from the current arrangement.
In the years following the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement, violence around the transitional
political processes has been common. The elections that were promised in the peace agreement took
place in 2010 and were marred by violence and intimidation. According to Bellamy and Williams
(2011):
Disputes about citizenship and ethnicity resurfaced; both sides used violence and intimi-
dation, and dozens were killed in pre-election violence. Using this as a pretext, Gbagbo
imposed a curfew during the election. When Ouattara’s supporters in Abidjan took to the
streets to oppose the move, security forces opened fire, killing five people and injuring
many others (832).
Reports also surfaced in Coˆte d’Ivoire of suspected mass graves. President Laurant Gbagbo, although
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he suffered an apparent electoral defeat to Alessane Ouattara, prevented the dissemination of the elec-
tion results, accused the predominantly Muslim north of vote rigging, and continued a spree of vio-
lence against demonstrators, northern Muslims and members of the immigrant community (Bellamy
and Williams, 2011). By 2011, the United Nations had documented as many as 1,000 civilian deaths
(Straus, 2011).
Because the agreement did not fully delineate actors’ access to state power, it left insecurities un-
resolved. Actors – even the leaders who had been satisfied at the time with the Ouagadougou Peace
Agreement – saw violence as a necessary tool to achieve the consolidation of power. The agreement
had failed to incentivize a commitment to peace as opposed to violence. Additionally, the agreement
failed to set up the institutions necessary to constrain actors to non-violent political interactions. Al-
though the agreement did carry with it international spotlight in the form of United Nations observers,
the third party presence was insufficient to keep Coˆte d’Ivoire on the path to a quality peace. In the ab-
sence of a legal framework that incentivizes inclusion and constrains actors from violence, the optimal
strategy to access power may be violence. As such, it is crucial for peace agreements to meet the con-
textual needs of the conflict and its actors; the distribution of power and access to political opportunity
should not, in a civil war driven by national power, be left unaddressed.
Lessons from Coˆte d’Ivoire
In many ways, Coˆte d’Ivoire should have been a relatively easy case to achieve a context-specific
peace agreement that paved the way for a higher quality peace. Because the country was a beacon
of stability and prosperity for so long, one might have expected the country to have the capacity to
overcome violence and commit to peace. The peace process in Coˆte d’Ivoire, however, failed to fully
address the underlying incompatibilities that led to conflict onset. In a conflict spurred by disputes
over access to national political power, the Ouagadougou Agreement only went so far as to establish
elections and name an opposition leader as Prime Minister. In short, the agreement lacked a long-term
plan to address questions about access to power. I argue that this lack of context-specificity did little
to incentivize or constrain actors to peaceful and politically inclusive outcomes. Instead, the lingering
questions and insecurities created a situation in which political violence, intimidation, and exclusion
remained the only tools available to maintain a hold on power. The case of Coˆte d’Ivoire thus emphasizes
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the importance of focusing on context and using the peace agreement as a legal framework to increase
security and inclusivity in the post-conflict state.
Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter had presented the cases of Liberia, Burundi, and Coˆte d’Ivoire to illustrate the causal
linkages between peace agreements and post-conflict levels of political inclusivity. Specifically, I have
argued and the cases have shown that as peace agreements increase in their context-specificity, they are
more likely to generate more inclusive and secure political systems. In Liberia and Burundi, the context-
specificity of the Accra Peace Agreement and Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, respectively,
increased the perceived security of actors such that they were incentivized and constrained to commit
to more inclusive systems. In Coˆte d’Ivoire, on the other hand, the agreement left key incompatibilities
unaddressed. As such, leaders remained insecure in their access to power; when post-conflict elections
took place, violence and intimidation marred the country’s peace efforts. The case illustrations reiterate
that peace agreements, when they are crafted to fit the context at hand, help increase security and move
countries toward a higher quality peace.
The cases herein also illustrate the challenges in capturing “soft” causal mechanisms such as actors’
incentives. Indeed, in researching the effects of the peace agreements in Liberia and Burundi, it re-
mained challenging to identify the incentives of actors to use inclusive or exclusive policies. While the
use of inclusion and exclusion are clear strategic choices based on perceptions of security and power,
actors rarely make statements to that effect. To be clear, I am confident that the chosen cases illustrate
the causal processes identified in this dissertation; at the same time, however, I recognize the need for
deeper analysis such as interviews to truly gauge the ways in which agreements altered the behavior of
conflict actors and political leaders.
Future extensions of both this chapter and the preceding quantitative chapter must also grapple with
the possibility that grievances are not static. The evolution of grievances, incompatibilities, and goals of
disputants are, in fact, likely to change over time. Thus, further analyses may want to analyze statements
of conflict actors and updates to the distribution of power to gain a more nuanced understanding of how
peace agreements and their contents must evolve. Nevertheless, the present research is significant in
that it provides the necessary first step to recognize that context matters. More importantly, it highlights
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the dangers of peace processes that fail to fully address context.
Finally, Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation offer important policy implications to peacemakers such
as the United Nations and other mediators. Conflict resolution and post-conflict development is a time
of uncertainty; oftentimes, leading international actors, in their efforts to help post-conflict societies,
impose one-size-fits-all policies of democratization and economic liberalization. What this research has
found, however, is that actors must not impose such solutions. Instead, mediators, peacekeepers, and
peace builders must strive to find solutions to fit the context at hand. The research on mediation by Reid
(2015) comes to similar conclusions with respect to local knowledge. While one-size-fits-all solutions
may be “easy” and may work in some locations, the international community has witnessed too many
failures of peace building to continue such policies. With a focus on context, peace processes may be
able to not only end war but establish a meaningful, inclusive, and secure peace.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
How can a quality peace be established in the aftermath of civil war? To what extent is it possible
to not only end violence but create a peace that is meaningful for those living in post-conflict societies?
To begin to answer these questions, this dissertation focuses on peace agreements as tools that condition
the extent to which a higher quality peace can be achieved. The preceding chapters develop a theoretical
framework for how peace agreements influence the quality of post-conflict peace, as defined by levels of
political inclusivity and opportunity. Within this dissertation I present two distinct empirical applications
of this theoretical framework, the first of which focuses on women’s rights and the second of which
assesses levels of political inclusivity and security more broadly. Throughout, I endeavor to better
understand how peace processes shape what life looks like following civil war. The research presented
here offers strong indication that the words within peace agreements matter and that they play a key role
in shaping, at the very least, the political rights and opportunities accorded to citizens in the wake of
war.
Peace agreements, I have argued, are quasi-constitutional in nature.1 The implications of their
legal status mean that agreements lay forth the political, economic, social, and security structures for
the post-conflict state. Their contents serve as a framework for the institutions that are to be created,
revised, or reinforced following civil war. As such, peace agreements have the capacity to spur a number
of processes that lead to tangible improvements in the quality of peace. Beyond ending war, peace
agreements also have the capacity to build peace. Peace agreements, as tangible manifestations of the
peace process, set the tone for post-conflict structures. Most simply, they change the incentives and
constraints faced by actors. Through a number of mechanisms, which I will summarize below, the
1Based on work by Bell (2006).
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content of peace agreements has the capacity to commit actors to more inclusive outcomes and to render
exclusion, repression, and rights violations less attractive options.
The second chapter of this dissertation assesses the role of peace agreements in shaping the quality
of peace by focusing on one specific component of a quality peace: women’s rights. I ask whether or
not the inclusion of women’s rights provisions within peace agreements leads to tangible improvements
in the status of women following conflict. The question of women’s rights and gender equality is a
crucial component of the quality peace in that women’s empowerment is seen as a mechanism through
which societies can achieve a plethora of successful economic, social, political, and health outcomes.
In Chapter 2, I posit that gender-specific peace agreements have the capacity to influence women’s
rights through the three following mechanisms: (1) tying hands; (2) shifting norms; and/or (3) positive
externalities. The quantitative analysis of peace agreements signed between the years 1981 and 2011
offers strong support for the hypothesized relationship. The probability of rights improvements for
women following the signing of a gender-specific peace agreement is over 80 percent. Through both
direct and indirect processes, gender-specific peace agreements are shown to have positive effects on
women’s rights.
Chapter 3 presents four case illustrations to further investigate the causal mechanisms and the plau-
sibility of the causal processes established in the second chapter. The cases of Burundi, Liberia, South
Africa, and Angola provide further support for the large-N analysis while also uncovering a number of
questions for future research. Burundi, particularly the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
that was signed in 2000, illustrates the direct causal mechanism; specifically, the Arusha Agreement
shows how gender provisions within the agreement tie actors’ hands to change. The provisions of the
agreement directly manifested themselves in the country’s post-conflict laws and women experienced
improvements in their political rights. In Liberia, the Accra Peace Agreement of 2003 generated positive
externalities insofar as it empowered women’s groups to push for greater rights following conflict. With
the legal footing of the peace agreement to stand on, women were able to legitimately push political
leaders to extend greater rights to women. The final positive case – South Africa – is illustrative of a
peace agreement spurring norms shifts. The signing of the Interim Constitution in 1993 was soon after
followed by a noticeable change in perceptions of women. Arguably, the peace agreements in South
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Africa, through their gender-specific language, helped to legitimize women as worthy and capable polit-
ical actors. Lastly, the third chapter concludes with an analysis of the Angolan case. Although women
played an active role in the country’s civil war, the peace agreements in Angola were void of women’s
rights protections. As such, the Angolan peace process was a missed opportunity; while civil wars carry
with them the winds of change, positive progress may not be guaranteed unless peace agreements are
crafted with such positive goals in mind.
In Chapter 4, I shifted the focus from women’s rights to the question of how peace agreements may
influence political rights and protections more broadly. In this vein, I focus on one dimension of peace
agreements, context-specificity, and argue that the context-specificity of agreements shapes the ways in
which rights are accorded and respected following conflict. Context-specificity is defined as the extent
to which peace agreements address the underlying causes of conflict. Thus, this chapter contributes to
the literature by not only pushing a focus on positive dimensions of peace, but also by recognizing the
importance of moving beyond “one-size-fits-all” solutions to conflict. By catering to the specific needs
of the disputants and the specific causes of conflict, peace agreements incentivize greater inclusivity
and constrain against rights abuses. The quantitative analysis confirms that as the context-specificity of
agreements increases, so too do rights protections. While focused on a different dimension of quality
peace, Chapter 4 confirms the findings and implications of Chapters 2 and 3: the contents of peace
agreements matter for what peace looks like in post-conflict societies. Beyond ending violence, peace
agreements also shape the nature of peace in the aftermath of war.
The final substantive chapter of this dissertation assesses three cases – Burundi, Liberia, and Coˆte
d’Ivoire – in order to better understand the causal processes linking context-specific peace agreements
to changes in the quality of peace. While Burundi and Liberia still face distinct political, economic,
and social obstacles as they move further away from their histories of civil war, the two countries have
experienced improvements in the quality of peace following civil war. Indeed, in each case, political
protections have improved relative to what they were prior to conflict. In Burundi, the Arusha Peace
and Reconciliation Agreement put in place a web of institutions that constrained leaders’ capacity to
pursue blatantly exclusionary or abusive practices. Moreover, by creating institutions appropriate for
the particular case, actors felt secure to work within the new political system as opposed to destabilizing
the new system. In Liberia, the Accra Peace Agreement of 2003 achieved what the Abuja II Peace
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Agreement of 1996 could not: the agreement addressed the underlying causes of conflict. The Accra
Agreement, then, not only prevented a return to war, but it has also incentivized actors to work within
the new system and respect the rights of ordinary citizens. In Coˆte d’Ivoire, on the other hand, the
Ouagadougou Peace Agreement failed to fully address the disputes over national power that drove the
country’s conflict. As such, in the aftermath of civil war, political leaders have continued to resort to
violence, exclusion, and intimidation as a means to achieve their goals. While the cases presented in
Chapters 3 and 5 are not intended to be tests of the this dissertation’s theory, they do illustrate the key
role peace agreements play in shaping the direction of countries’ paths toward peace.
Taken as a whole, this dissertation not only shows that higher quality peaceful outcomes are possible,
but also that peace agreements are tools that the international community and domestic actors can use
to shape the nature of post-conflict peace. As Galtung (1969) stated, peace is much more than the
absence of violence; indeed, peace requires progress that extends justice, dignity, and opportunity for
all members of society. With this in mind, peace agreements must be crafted to not only achieve negative
peace, as defined by the absence of war, but also positive or quality peaceful outcomes. The words on
paper matter and should be embraced as one important instrument when guiding countries out of the
conflict trap. By focusing on two dimensions of peace agreements – gender-specificity and context-
specificity – I have shown that the contents of peace agreements can have transformative effects. They
influence the direction of progress following conflict and help to determine whether or not peace truly
will be peaceful for the majority of citizens following civil war. In the following two sections, I address
questions and concerns for future research as well as the policy implications of this research.
Future Research
How can countries get on a path to a higher quality peace? Why have countries such as Liberia and
Burundi achieved more open and inclusive societies vis-a`-vis pre-conflict realities, while Angola and
Coˆte d’Ivoire, for example, remain bound to negative conceptions of peace? The research within this
dissertation builds a theory of how one component of peace processes, peace agreements, contributes
to the creation of higher quality peaceful outcomes. In particular, I focus on the processes through
which societies achieve greater gender inclusivity and greater respect for political rights more broadly.
The preceding theory and analyses offer a strong contribution insofar as they show that a higher quality
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peace is possible, especially when peace agreements lay the legal framework with such an end in mind.
Nonetheless, the work presented here will serve as a springboard for future research on the determinants
of a quality peace.
Different Stages of Peace Processes
In developing the theory and empirical analyses of Chapters 2 and 4 and further investigating specific
cases in Chapters 3 and 5, I was struck by a number of new questions and avenues for future research.
I identify one broad set of questions as those questions about the peace process. The focus of this dis-
sertation has been on peace agreements and their influence on the quality of peace. Peace agreements,
while instrumental, are but one component of the broader peace process that occurs during and after
civil wars. The interactions leading up to the peaceful resolution of civil war are all part of the broader
bargaining process that occurs between actors. Bargaining thus proceeds throughout the fighting itself,
the various negotiation attempts prior to the signing of an agreement, the interaction with third-party
mediators, the “successful” negotiations that lead to ceasefires and more comprehensive peace agree-
ments, and the implementation processes of agreements. The quality of peace is shaped at every level –
from the time of fighting to the last successful resolution attempt. I must emphasize that in raising the
following questions, I do not seek to call into doubt the findings with respect to peace agreements; in
fact, peace agreements seem to be a dominant factor in shaping post-war outcomes. I also recognize,
however, that they are not the only factor. I consider specific implications and extensions inspired by the
complexity of peace processes in the following paragraphs.
One piece of the broader conceptualization of peace processes and the quality of peace involves
further considering the effects of different types of settlements, specifically military victories versus
negotiated settlements. I expect that a military victory could have effects that cut two ways. On the
one hand, military victories concentrate power in the hands of one group; with the opposition entirely
defeated, there may be no strategic incentive to implement inclusive policies or revise status quo in-
stitutions. Of course, this relationship may depend on who wins, rebels or government forces.2 On
the other hand, military victories could actually facilitate political inclusion of formerly marginalized
2When the government wins, I expect a reinforcement of status quo policies, while a rebel victory may bring in greater
changes as the rebel group was seeking to revise the pre-conflict power structures of the state.
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groups, because the victors will feel secure in their new role. By militarily defeating the opposition, the
government has eliminated violent threats. Wallensteen (2015) has taken steps to research this relation-
ship. Based on the theory presented here, I suspect the former causal story to hold more weight: that
military victories reduce incentives to implement inclusive policies. Civil war resolution is a transfor-
mative period that can be shaped by the nature of the negotiated settlement; a military victory, by the
government in particular, will inhibit any dramatic revisions of status quo policies and institutions.
Beyond contrasting the effects of military victories versus negotiated settlements, future extensions
of this work on quality peace and its determinants must model the processes leading up the the signing
of peace agreements. Peace agreements themselves reveal a good deal of information about the nature,
goals, and intentions of a peace process. At the same time, future work will want to address the following
questions: (1) who has a seat at the negotiating table and how does this influence both the contents of
peace agreements but also the likelihood that quality peace takes root?; (2) what strategies and attributes
of mediators and third-party actors increase the likelihood of a quality peace?; (3) how does the power
balance of the combatants influence their openness toward inclusive post-conflict policies?; and (4) to
what extent does the presence of third-party enforcers such as United Nations peacekeepers increase the
commitment of actors to more inclusive and higher-quality policies? Importantly, the common goal of
these questions is to better understand how domestic and international actors interact to influence the
quality of post-conflict peace. I do not expect that there is a one-size-fits-all formula to achieve a quality
peace. However, by answering the preceding questions, I will be better equipped to assess the pathways
through which a quality peace is established and which tools are appropriate given the particular context
of various cases.
A specific example of the need to model the various stages of a peace process stems from the chap-
ters on women’s rights. The empirical analysis presented in Chapter 2 takes into account the likely
endogenous treatment effects; in other words, I do account for the fact that the processes influencing
improvements in women’s post-conflict rights may also be causing gender provisions to appear in peace
agreements. While I am confident, then, in the strength of my findings and the policy implications that
follow, I believe more work must be done. The case illustrations of Chapter 3 suggest that the pres-
ence or absence of a women’s movement, female negotiators, and/or United Nations pressure all may
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influence the extent to which women’s rights exist within peace agreements.3 Increasingly, researchers
are collecting data on and analyzing the effects of female fighters and female negotiators. Together,
then, this line of research must address how to translate women’s involvement in earlier stages of the
conflict and negotiations to more permanent empowerment following conflict. My findings suggest that
gender-specific agreements are effective in this respect. In addition, the research must investigate the
processes through which women and other underrepresented groups can be empowered even in those
cases in which such groups were excluded both prior to and during the conflict.
Similarly, work on context-specific peace agreements and quality of peace would also benefit from
an investigation of the sources of context-specific agreements. Assuming, as the results indicate, that
context-specific peace agreements lead to improvements in human rights and political opportunity, fu-
ture work must identify the ways in which context-specific agreements come about. What, in other
words, can actors do to better address the causes of conflicts and to resolve the contextual needs of
specific cases? An immediate avenue for research involves drawing from my own work on mediation
leverage (Reid, 2015) and Menninga’s (2015) work on multiparty mediation to construct a theory of
how mediators, in particular, shape the contents of peace agreements. Again, the future extensions of
this dissertation are driven by a need to better understand how civil wars can be successfully resolved in
ways that not only end violence but create quality peace. A key component toward this end is construct-
ing a more complete story of how various stages of a peace process shape prospects for a higher quality
peace.
Extending Definitions of a Quality Peace
A second task for future research is to consider additional dimensions of a quality peace. I define a
quality peace as one that offers political, economic, and social inclusion for all members of a society.
The research presented here focuses on two important components of that definition: women’s political
rights and the political rights and opportunities of society more broadly. First and foremost, I plan to ex-
tend the analyses of Chapters 2 and 3 to include other dimensions of women’s rights. To institutionalize
political inclusivity for women in both law and in practice is essential. Beyond granting women a voice
3At the same time, the contrasting case of Angola demonstrates that a vibrant presence of female fighters is insufficient to
push women’s rights onto the agenda of a peace process or to guarantee rights improvements following civil war.
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in the political life of the state, political protections may also set forth longer term changes in women’s
political, economic, and social roles. At the same time, women’s political rights may be the “easiest”
realm to make progress. While the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland extended political rights
to women, it has not remedied ongoing personal violence experienced by many women in the region.4
Similarly, while Liberia has a female head of state, female empowerment has not necessarily taken root
within all levels in the country. Beyond women’s political rights, then, future research will ask how
peace processes influence women’s economic and social roles as well.5
Additionally, in extensions of Chapter 4, I plan to build upon existing (and admittedly negative)
operationalizations of political rights. At present, I find that increases in the context-specificity of peace
agreements improves the likelihood that governments will treat their citizens better in the aftermath of
war. Specifically, the findings suggest that context-specificity leads to reductions in repression levels
when compared to pre-conflict levels. As such, I have concluded that context-specific agreements lead
to more open and secure political systems. At the same time, levels of repression are a “negative”
conceptualization of rights; reductions in political intimidation and violence are essential, but in striving
for a higher quality peace, we must also strive for more. As I stated earlier in this work, if researchers
and policymakers only strive for a negative peace, then perhaps that is all that they will get. Future
extensions will rely on more positive dimensions of political inclusivity to better gauge the extent to
which all groups within society have equal access to political protections and opportunities.6
Beyond the extensions listed above, research on the quality of post-conflict peace should consider
how peace processes help or inhibit the establishment of inclusive economic and social policies and
practices. The establishment of inclusion of opportunity is a tall task and involves a focus on many
slow-moving processes. Although returns on efforts might not be immediate (in education levels, for
example, or access to equal employment), it is nonetheless crucial for domestic actors, international
negotiators, and third-party implementation efforts to consider both the short- and long-term processes
that guide countries out of the conflict trap.
4Based on accounts from participants in the Women, Peace, and Power Sharing Conference hosted by Queen’s University,
Belfast, Northern Ireland, November 2015.
5A key limitation in extending beyond political rights, however, has been a lack of available data.
6A fruitful avenue for said extension is the latest release of the Varieties of Democracy data (Coppedge et al., 2015).
153
Policy Implications
What can policymakers learn from this research? The implications of the theory and findings on
the quality of post-conflict peace are quite straight forward: peace agreements matter and their contents
shape what peace looks like following civil war. The end of a civil war is a transformative time and
a time in which actors have the potential to change the status quo; positive progress however is not
assured. Actors need to think fully about the implications of the words on paper. The contents of the
peace agreements included in this study – a comprehensive set of civil war peace agreements signed
between 1981 and 2011 – have had clear implications for the nature of peace in their respective states.
Peace agreements such as the Accra Peace Agreement in Liberia empowered societal actors to hold
leaders accountable and discouraged leaders from continuing blatantly exclusionary practices. To say
that policymakers must focus more on the substance of negotiations is perhaps an obvious statement,
but it remains truer now than ever before.
The first two substantive chapters focus on gender-specific peace agreements and women’s post-
conflict rights, and the chapters’ findings add fuel and legitimacy for the United Nations’ calls for
gender-inclusive peace processes. Since 2000 and the signing of U.N. Security Council Resolution
1325 on “Women, Peace, and Security,” the United Nations has pursued an agenda of women’s empow-
erment and women’s involvement in peace processes. The U.N.’s efforts, however, have been called
into question as women are still largely marginalized or altogether excluded from peace negotiations.
While I do not disagree with those who question the efficacy of UNSCR 1325, I do want to emphasize
that small steps can have meaningful results. Put simply, the inclusion of gender-specific provisions in
an agreement can lead to tangible benefits for women’s rights. It is but one piece of the larger effort
to establish equality of the sexes, but it is a step forward nonetheless. Thus, even when women are not
secured a seat at the table, the actors who do have a voice (third-parties, conflict actors, civil society
groups, etc.) must ensure that women’s rights are on the agenda. Indeed, this is an avenue that media-
tors and other third-parties should focus on as a means of creating the foundations for a higher quality
peace.
A second set of policy implications arise from the analysis on context-specific peace agreements.
The findings suggest that negotiators must pay greater attention to the context in which they are working.
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This goal involves understanding the causes of conflict, the evolving needs of the disputants, and past
successes or failures of resolution attempts. By focusing on the context and designing a solution to fit
the situation at hand, negotiators are setting a country on a path to a higher quality peace. While I am
not the first to make such a statement, I want to reiterate the dangers of one-size-fits-all solutions. By
ignoring the context in which the conflict and its resolution are occurring, actors risk missing a chance
at a quality peace and perhaps worse, they risk setting a country on the path toward renewed violence.
The policy implications arising from Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that peace agreements must be crafted
in ways that are context-specific, but they further suggest that negotiating teams should be chosen to fit
the situation as well. By paying attention to context rather than imposing one-size-fits-all solutions, the
outlook for post-conflict societies and the people living within them is much more hopeful.
The goal of all conflict resolution efforts must, first and foremost, be to end war. At the same
time, the end of war does not guarantee the end of violence; injustice, exclusion, and marginalization
of groups perpetuates structures of violence in post-conflict societies. Thus, conflict resolution efforts
must focus on not only ending war but also establishing a peace that is free from systematic exclusions
and injustices. My research has found that peace agreements are important tools in striving toward
and shaping a higher quality peace. Post-conflict societies can and should work toward higher quality
outcomes; marginalized groups should continue to push for greater inclusion at every level. By working
together, domestic and international actors have the capacity to create a peace that is meaningful for all
groups within society.
Of course, the research, future work, and policy prescriptions that I have laid forth are not without
obstacles. The obstacles, however, should not prevent researchers and policymakers alike from striving
for a better understanding of the context in which civil wars are successfully resolved. The research
herein strives for more inclusive and meaningful definitions of peace, a peace that takes into account the
dignity of those in post-conflict states. Anne-Marie Slaughter, in writing about UN reforms, sums up
many of the sentiments put forth in this and other work on quality peace:
As human beings, we all seek to live our lives in dignity, free from fear and from want. We
need not be guaranteed prosperity, but at least the health and education necessary to strive
for it. We cannot be guaranteed long lives, but at least that our government will not try to
murder us and will do its utmost to prevent our fellow citizens from doing so. We should
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not be guaranteed equal esteem of our fellow human beings, but at least equal respect, the
promise that neither politicians nor ethnic or religious leaders can declare any group, class,
or nation less than human (Slaughter, 2005).
My research and findings indicate that peace agreements are key tools for establishing greater respect
for humanity. They are not, of course, a panacea nor do they establish some utopian version of respect,
dignity, and equality. Yet, peace agreements, as one piece of a broader process, help societies find the
pathways that take them toward greater human security and a higher quality peace.
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APPENDIX 1
Table A.1: Robustness Check: Controlling for Comprehensive Agreements
DV: Rights Improvements (Durable)
Model 1 Model 2
Outcome Equation
Gender Provisions 1.8980∗∗ 1.9033∗∗
(0.3415) (0.4952)
Comprehensive -0.9089
(0.5663)
Conflict Duration 0.0095∗
(0.0039)
PKO 0.4593
(0.4207)
Women’s Political Rights (Global) 1.9084
(2.7002)
GDPpc (lag, log) -0.5141
(0.3503)
Selection Equation
Conflict Duration 0.0103∗∗
(0.0027)
Comprehensive 1.0961∗∗
(0.3602)
PKO -0.4593
(0.4207)
Women’s Political Rights (Global) 16.4747 ∗∗
(4.2171)
GDPpc (lag, log) -0.9461∗
(0.3401)
Post-UNSCR 1325 -2.9890∗∗
(1.0298)
Third-party Female Signatories 0.1347∗∗ 0.0803∗∗
(0.0369) (0.0188)
N 100 73
χ2 155.803∗∗ 316.541∗∗
Significance level: ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01
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Table A.2: Peacekeeping Operations and Gender-Specific Peace Agreements
No Peacekeeping Peacekeeping
No Gender Provisions 72 18 90
Gender Provisions 24 5 29
96 23 119
χ2 = 0.1070; Pr(χ2)=.744
Table A.3: Peacekeeping Operations and Women’s Rights Improvements
No Peacekeeping Peacekeeping
No Rights Improvements 59 14 73
Rights Improvements 35 6 41
94 20 114
χ2 = 0.3747; Pr(χ2)=.540
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APPENDIX 2
Figure A.1: Coding of Context-Specificity of Peace Agreements
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Table A.4: Peace Agreements and Post-Conflict Repression (Select Examples)
Agreement Name Context-Specificity Repression Decreases
Accra Peace Agreement 1.00 Yes
(Liberia, 2003)
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 1.00 Yes
(Burundi, 2000)
Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord 1.00 Yes
(Bangladesh, 1997)
Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace 0.66 Yes
(Guatemala, 1996)
Comprehensive Peace Agreement 1.00 No
(Nepal, 2006)
Memorandum of Understanding 0.50 No
(Angola, 2002)
Yebibou Agreement 0.33 No
(Chad, 2005)
Note: By repression decreases I mean the DV is coded as 1.
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